Fidel Leaves, Embargo Stays

When a policy fails to achieve its stated goal, it is usually changed. Pragmatism ultimately trumps ideology. Or so rationalism dictates. America’s Cuba policy, largely embodied by the 1962 trade embargo, does not follow this course. But with the recent abdication of Fidel Castro, handing over the reigns of government to his brother Raul after over four decades of autocratic rule, there might be an opening to correct the misguided policies of the past and ease the embargo.

After the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s, when communist rebel Fidel Castro deposed the pro-US military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the U.S. reevaluated relations with Cuba. With the Cold War in full force and the Soviets quickly lending support to Havana, the U.S. pulled out all the stops to quell the revolution raging in its backyard.

In the 1960s, the communist regime and the embargo withstood the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Cuban missile crisis; and several assassination attempts on Castro—some did not seek to kill him, one plot involved thallium salts in an effort to emasculate the charismatic leader by forcing his hair, beard and all, to fall out.

Despite America’s best efforts, Castro remained—emboldened from survival. Yet when Castro’s main benefactor and bankroller, the Soviet Union, crumbled in the early 1990s, Cuba was mired in political and economic chaos. Without subsidies from its communist comrades in Moscow, Christopher Caldwell notes, “Cuba turned into a basket case. People worked by candlelight and in restaurants the silverware was chained to the tables.”

In Washington, the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union should have resulted in a re-think, but the opposite resulted: a strengthened embargo. Indeed, rather than stepping in to help them pick up the pieces, hardliners determined the embargo was needed now more than ever. The thinking was: Castro is going under; all he needs is a little push.

This nudge came in the form of the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. The former stated that the fall of Castro and the inception of democracy on the island had to precipitate the lifting of the embargo, while the latter added sanctions on third countries which trade with Cuba.

These acts did little to curb Castro’s autocracy. And despite the end of Soviet support and the strengthening of the embargo, the regimes obituary was never written. Now, Fidel has stepped aside, and still Washington will not budge. Why?

If the policy was dictated by geopolitics, in a rational goal-oriented fashion, the embargo would have been lifted after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the small island was no longer threatening. Another paradox lies in the fact that Cuba has become an outlier among communist nations: U.S. relations with China and Vietnam have warmed by leaps and bounds and are now marked by burgeoning trade flows. Moreover, there would be no embargo if economics took precedence—American exporters stand to gain from access to the Cuban market. Agricultural trade was loosened in 2000, and now U.S. food exports to Havana total over $400 million.

The primary answer to this foreign policy question, however, oddly enough lies in the domestic realm. As the importance of Cuba as a Cold War strategic battleground waned, domestic politics gained precedence. The Cuban-American lobby—chiefly made up of hard line exiles represented by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)—stepped in to fill the power vacuum, funding and pressuring candidates to support anti-Castro policies.

The strategic location of these hardliners—concentrated in the swing states, Florida and New Jersey—gives them an electoral advantage. It is telling that the two major pieces of legislation above passed in election years: 1992 and 1996. No candidate attempting to win the presidency can fully support lifting the embargo without the fear of losing votes in Florida, where less than a thousand votes separated Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 election.

Recent case in point: Mike Huckabee. As Arkansas governor in 2002, he wrote a letter to President Bush in favor of lifting the embargo. Now, in the race for the presidency, he approves of the economic sanctions on Cuba, a stance he defended just prior to the Florida Republican Primary, declaring, “Rather than seeing it as some huge change, I would call it, rather, the simple reality that I'm running for president of the United States, not for reelection as governor of Arkansas.” Unfortunately, he is dead right.

Other than in Miami during election time, does Cuba even matter? It was pertinent in 1962 when the Soviets maintained nuclear missiles, and during the Cold War in general when it was a communist ally to Moscow. But now, Cuba seems irrelevant on the international stage. Not so—Cuba still looms large in the region, where an ideological conflict is brewing between Anti-American populists, led by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, and more centrist, Pro-American countries like Colombia. Opening up to Cuba, which receives subsidized oil from Caracas and publicly backs Chavez, would send a positive signal and could do wonders for regional diplomacy.

In more abstract terms, Cuba also gets to the heart of a crucial foreign policy debate. What is the best way to induce positive change in other countries: isolation or engagement? Washington currently tends to support the former when dealing with rival dictatorships—witness U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, North Korea and, of course, Cuba. Autocrats only respond to pressure; so crank it up. Critics, many residing in Brussels, disagree. Leverage is lost when relations are broken; engagement can help change things from the inside.

Both views are well-argued, but regarding Cuba, the debate should be over. Isolation clearly has not reached its goal of triggering the end of communism in Cuba. It is time to give engagement, at least economically, a try. Softening the policy would not only make economic sense, but would also make it more difficult for the regime to use the embargo and the U.S. as scapegoats for its failings.

Fidel’s abdication gives Washington an excuse to readjust the policy. Shifting Cuban-American sentiment, particularly among the younger generation, may help provide political cover. According to a Florida International University poll from last year, 57.5% of Cuban-Americans support the embargo, nearly a ten point drop from the year before. All these factors point to the need for a change in policy.

Former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston once quipped that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Ending the embargo is in America’s interest and may eventually gain it a friend. Hopefully the next president will agree.

Renewed Balkan Unrest Looms

The deadline for an agreed settlement over Kosovo, thrown down by Kosovar separatists to the Serbs and the world, has passed. Tensions are at a high point and neither side seems willing to give in to the other, raising the threat of ethnic violence, which marred the region for much of the 1990s.

Kosovo’s status has been unresolved since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign pushed out Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian forces and resulted in a UN administrative presence to keep the peace.

In an area roughly split between the 90% ethnic Albanian population and the 10% Serbian minority, demographics were always going to be a problem. Serbia’s historical attachment and geographic integrity, along with an ardent nationalism and responsibility to protect its brethren in the province, push it toward intransigence over the issue. For its part, Kosovar separatists’ desire for nothing short of independence reduces the possibility for compromise. Deadlock unfortunately was foreseeable.

On top of that, international politics complicates things. The U.S. and much of the European Union have backed independence for Kosovo, while Russia supports its fellow Slavs by threatening to veto any UNSC action that does not have Serbian endorsement. Kosovo is now part of a wider regional struggle—seen in Ukraine, Georgia, and elsewhere—for influence between the Kremlin and the West.

Fears that an independent Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent, leading to more separatist declarations in other countries, also underline the small province’s international ramifications. For the most part, the EU members states wary of recognizing a sovereign Kosovoa, a group including Cyprus, Spain and Romania, to name a few, are those home to restive nationalist minorities. Moreover, Russia specifically warns that if Kosovo gains autonomy it will have no choice but to push independence for separatist enclaves in Georgia, a measure Tbilisi would likely respond to with military force.

The good news is that Kosovar officials have shown public restraint since the December 10 deadline lapsed, promising to coordinate its decisions with the European Union. But this deference will not likely last too long; the status-quo must be changed. Unfortunately, all potential solutions risk violence and upheaval.

The lack of a resolution on Kosovo’s status endangers the Serbian minority, who could be subject to forceful reprisal by angry and frustrated Kosovars, which could then be met with a bloody Serbian intervention—a slippery slope indeed. The plan put forth by U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which envisions an independent, yet internationally supervised, Kosovo, failed to secure Russian and Serbian backing. In response, government officials in Belgrade routinely offer autonomy, short of independence, to skeptical Kosovars.

A likely scenario is a declaration of independence, supported by the EU and U.S., but rejected by Russia and Serbia. Both could possibly be bought off: Russia with leniency on another issue such as missile defense or Iran, Kosovo with financial incentives and warmer relations with the European Union, in the form of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a way-station to EU membership.

Washington and the EU have to prioritize. Is Kosovar independence worth giving ground on other important issues? Certainly, a SAA, which Brussels seemed likely to grant sometime in the future anyway, would be well worth it to prevent the risk of violence on Europe’s doorstep. Washington has a tougher decision, although the consequences would be just as dire. Then again, Russia and Serbia could dismiss any attempt to obtain their acquiescence. Violence would then likely ensue, unfortunately, an all too familiar occurrence in the region.

NIE Findings On Iran Are Good—But Not Great

Finally there is a report somewhat praising the regime in Tehran. According to a newly-declassified National Intelligence Estimate, Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, after succumbing to Western diplomacy, and could make further concessions given the right pressure and incentives.

The good news traveled fast—well, unless you are Mike Huckabee. Less than twenty-four hours after the NIE became available, politicians and analysts alike were jumping for joy. Senator Hillary Clinton declared: “I'm relieved that the intelligence community has reached this conclusion.”

But other Democrats were tougher in their tone, utilizing the information to make the case that the Bush Administration was overestimating the threat from Iran to further its case for regime change. Clinton’s fellow Democratic presidential contender John Edwards noted, in reference to the administration, “It's absolutely clear and eerily similar to what we saw with Iraq, where they were headed." "The last seven years in the Mideast by this administration have been the lost seven years when you see on every front a reversal,” said Rahm Emanuel, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus.

Not so fast. While certainly a welcome development, the NIE does not close the case on Iran and its nuclear program—not even close. While certainly understandable, the Democrats should wait before using the findings for political vindication, just as the Republicans should not act as if the news is insignificant.

Indeed, the NIE does not alter many of the troubling circumstances surrounding Iran. First, Iran is still a sponsor or terrorism, funding and supporting Hizbollah; less than helpful in Iraq, shipping weapons to the country for attacks on Sunni and coalition forces; and has belligerent regional ambitions.

Second, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the country continues to produce highly-enriched uranium, which can be weaponized and made into a bomb. The NIE stated that there was indeed a covert nuclear weapons program, albeit suspended in 2003, a finding which sows doubt about Iranian claims of a peaceful program in and of itself. Moreover, Tehran hid its nuclear program for over 20 years; is known to have received information from AQ Khan, the Pakistani who ran a black market nuclear bazaar; and is not fully cooperating with the UN and IAEA—just ask Mohammed El-Bareidi.

The IAEA chief a few months back gave Iran the benefit of the doubt and the chance to come clean about its troubled past, but was somewhat rebuked. His recent report, while not entirely damning, notes, Iran’s “cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,” and “since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing.”

No sideswipe at the intelligence community whatsoever, but intelligence is inherently flawed—and in this case, perhaps even more so. Primarily because the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, it lacks intelligence resources in Tehran. Iran is also thought to be mindful of the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq, where Israeli planes took out Saddam's nascent nuclear plant, so it disperses and hides its nuclear facilities underground, making them almost impervious to inspection and military strikes. Hence, the NIE's conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt.

In fact, the NIE could even have a negative net effect. It has been seized upon by the Iranians for a media tool. They can now play the victims of baseless Western accusations and hostility. Firebrand Iranian president Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "This is a declaration of victory for the Iranian nation against the world powers over the nuclear issue…a final shot to those who, in the past several years, spread a sense of threat and concern in the world through lies of nuclear weapons.”

Also, the intelligence disclosure will likely disrupt the relative international unity at the UNSC, which recently saw China and Russia, previously dragging their feet, come on board for new sanctions. Do not be surprised when Putin references the NIE for his reluctance to agree to more sanctions.

So where does that leave us? Well, Iran continues to produce highly enriched uranium and has not come clean about its nuclear past and future ambitions. The problem has not gone away.

Iran has the distinct advantage of being able, through Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty, to legally wield a civilian uranium enrichment process on its soil. There is the rub. Any solution will thus have to involve talking Tehran out of doing something perfectly legal, in order to prevent it from using that as a front for a covert, illegal weapons program. And to do so the U.S. must offer a package of carrots and sticks.

As has been the case for years, a grand bargain is needed, one which addresses Iranian energy and security. While one of the biggest energy producing nations, Tehran still complains of the need to diversify its energy through a nuclear program. Iran also has legitimate security concerns: the U.S. maintains a military presence on its borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is almost fully surrounded by ideologically hostile Sunni-Arab states; add Israel to the mix and one could say the neighborhood is quite dangerous.

An energy solution would allow for a limited uranium enrichment facility in Iran—a nationalist prerequisite—or enriching it somewhere else, Russia perhaps, as has been proposed, and sending it back to Tehran. A regional security conference or regime, which would regularly bring these neighbors together to discuss differences and security conditions, could be a good start. But at the end of the day, the U.S. must engage Iran and put everything on the table: economic incentives, possibility of renewed diplomatic relations, security guarantees, and more.

In return, Iran must give up its expansive uranium enrichment program, disclose any and all information on its past and present nuclear undertakings, and scale back its links with Hizbollah and Shia militias in Iraq. To be sure, this is a daunting task. But if the U.S. directly intervened and put forward a grand bargain and Iran balked, the U.S. would no longer be subject to criticism for its lack of engagement and carrots, and Iran would truly be isolated. It is indeed worth a try.

For all Bush’s sabre-rattling, Washington is in no mood for another occupation—especially of a country with roughly three times the landmass and the population of Iraq, not to mention a more fervent nationalist streak. Yet neither is it content with the possibility of a nuclear Iran.

As such, all must be done to strike an accord. The NIE does hold out chances for success, given the mullah’s supposed positive response to Western pressure, but does not fully change or alleviate the situation. This good news only turns to great when the problem is close to being resolved.

A World Under Chinese Hegemony

After the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States was left alone at the top. Uni-polarity and American hegemony became popular phrases among foreign policy thinkers, stirring up comparisons—often ludicrous—between the U.S. and former dominant powers such as Rome and Napoleon’s France.

In this new international context, containment strategies became meaningless—there was no one to contain. Policymakers focused instead on what to do with all this power. Should Washington, as neo-conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer has suggested, utilize this “unipolar moment” to reshape the world in accordance to its values and desires, or follow a more realist dictum, staying out of entangling interventions to preserve hegemony for as long as it can?

Now, the heady days are gone. With a falling dollar, quagmire in Iraq, and constant and increasing international resentment to American power, other, less positive questions are being asked. Is U.S. hegemony coming to an end? How much longer will the U.S. continue to lead the world?

One country inevitably frames this debate: China. A rising China—growing economically at roughly ten percent a year and spending a large percentage of that revenue on revamping its military—frustrates American efforts in Darfur and Iran, to name a few.

More worrying, conventional international relations theory warns that the likelihood of conflict between great powers is heightened at the time of a declining hegemon and the ascendance of a worthy competitor. Washington’s stated goal, outlined in the 2002 NSS, is to prevent the emergence of a competitor—in other words, China. Accordingly, a sense of an inevitability of conflict thus looms, as the U.S. loses prestige and China picks up the slack. The die may be cast and Taiwan may be the trigger.

To be sure, there is a risk of a clash, but it is far from unavoidable. It is in neither country’s interests to fight a world—probably nuclear—war. Doomsday talk is all well and good, but it is unlikely that war will ensue between the powers for a plethora of reasons, economic interdependence being one, hence the statements coming from both governments on the need for strategic partnership and dialogue.

Washington is and will continue to be the leading power. Moreover, Beijing’s upsurge is littered with uncertainties. High economic growth rates are rarely continuous and the communist party’s grip on political power may be challenged by an ever-expanding middle class, threatening stability and the economy.

Be that as it may, China will be a force to be reckoned with, whether as a hegemon or rival superpower. As a result, U.S. policymakers must think about an international system dominated, or at least led, by China. What would such a world look like?

Unlike the U.S. and other past superpowers, China believes above all in sovereignty in foreign policy. One’s domestic problems are just that, domestic, and should be dealt with by one’s own government. This has much to do with China’s own human rights abuses and lack of democratic transparency, which constantly evoke Western criticism.

This non-interventionist zeal is currently playing itself out in Africa, which could serve as a microcosm of a Sino-dominated world. Beijing’s thirst for energy supplies brings it to Sudan and other parts of the continent and results in high levels of aid, investment, and trade, roughly $6 billion in FDI from 2000 to 2006 and over $1 billion in development assistance from 2004 to 2005—enough to inspire Bono to write a ballad.

Yet, Chinese efforts in Africa maintain one primary difference between those of the West. Beijing’s assistance comes with no political strings attached. World Bank and IMF support is usually contingent on political and economic reforms: take it or leave it. But China is filling the gap, becoming a preferable alternative for many regional leaders. Indeed, conditional free loans and aid seem to make the corrupt governments of Mugabe and others happy, while infuriating Western aid officers.

Perhaps the role of hegemon would change this stance, making China a more responsible broker. Perhaps not. The U.S. and EU both tacitly support dictators and those harboring precious energy commodities, Saudi Arabia comes to mind, but not to the extent of China.

This divergence frustrates relations between Beijing and the West, as seen in their impasse on how to proceed in regards to genocide in Darfur and the Iranian nuclear program. The European Union prides itself on pooling national sovereignty and resources and Washington is known for intercession, making the transatlantic alliance unlikely to collaborate with Beijing on many issues.

The U.S. would be left to counterbalance a dominant China by backing regional and fellow democratic powers such as India and Japan—the nuclear deal with the former is one such example of this strategy.

Western liberal interventionism, for all its faults, maintains a decent record: notably in the Balkans. An international system, dominated by China and its hands-off approach—as shown in its current dealings in Africa—would likely allow fraudulent tyrannies to feel at ease, perpetuating international insecurity and injustice. Those yearning for America’s fall from grace should be careful what they wish for.

The Other State of Emergency

Amidst the chaos in Pakistan, where martial law is reigning indefinitely, another state of emergency was declared—this time in Georgia. In similar fashion to Pervez Musharraf, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili cracked down on protesters, blacked out independent media, and criticized the opposition.

Unlike in Pakistan, the state of emergency has now ended. But the damage has been done, and the Rose Revolution, which brought democracy to Georgia and vaulted Mr. Saakashvili to power through an electoral landslide, is perhaps starting to wilt.

Martial law was designed to squash unfriendly protests, which have been rampant in Tbilisi and are said by Saakashvili to be sponsored by the Kremlin. However, claims of links between the opposition and Moscow are dubious. Levan Gachechiladze, recently chosen to face Saakashvili in upcoming elections, has denied subservience to Russia, stating that he largely backs the Georgian president’s pro-West policies.

Instead, domestic uprisings arose from Saakashvili’s failure to spread windfalls from high-level economic growth, topping ten percent annually, to the rural poor—agriculture provides for almost half of the population—and slashing of state-owned industry, which led many to the unemployment line.

Be that as it may, while not as potentially dangerous as Pakistan—the country is devoid of an Islamic terrorist or nuclear threat—Georgia’s authoritarian backsliding is damaging to the West.

President Bush’s conspicuous silence on the issue, no pun intended, speaks to the fact that Georgia’s former illustrious status among the neoconservative ranks is fading. Indeed, the reputation of Saakasvili, Bush’s golden boy, took a hit.

Unfortunately, Georgia’s current strife is a negative trend seen throughout the region. This was not always the case; things were looking up in the neighborhood. Democracy activists had a good run in 2004—at least in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Ten former communist countries joined the European Union, and popular uprisings, known by their respective colors—Rose in Georgia’s case, Orange for Ukraine—resulted in the democratic election of pro-Western leaders in former Soviet republics.

But thereafter, things turned sour. Ukraine has been embroiled with corruption and paralyzing infighting between the pro-Russian Regions Party, led by Victor Yankukovych, and President Yuschenko’s western-leaning Orange Coalition, which has since split into rival factions. And now with Georgia showing signs of implosion, the revolutionary spirits in the region have all but subsided. This is not to mention the repeated sparks flying between the newly independent Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—and a resurgent Russia.

To be sure, Georgia is a strategic country, serving as a microcosm of the wider region’s troubles: torn between Moscow and the West, home to separatist movements, and politically unstable. Tit for tat expulsions of diplomats, trade embargos, and downright espionage, have been commonplace between the Eurasian neighbors. A quasi-Cold War—meaning in this case an ideological conflict between those in Moscow’s orbit and others seeking Euro-Atlantic integration—largely confined to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, is underway.

Tblisi, Moscow, and Washington have all contributed to the acrimony. Saakashvili’s constant paranoia-induced conspiracy theories, along with detention of Russian military personnel, have infuriated the Kremlin. For its part, Russia’s support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially given its own separatist problems in Chechnya, smacks of hypocritical opportunism, as does its refusal to allow precious Georgian exports, such as wine, access to its market.

The U.S. has also been insincere in its push for democracy in the country, overlooking some of the Georgian’s president’s misgivings. And as Dmitri Simes points out: “Blind support for Saakashvili contributes to a sense in Moscow that the United States is pursuing policies aimed at undermining what remains of Russia’s drastically reduced regional influence.”

All sides could help alleviate the situation by reversing these mistaken policies. Saakashvili should turn more focus inward, gearing the economy towards wider prosperity and eschewing the opportunity to blame Moscow for all the country’s ills. Putin needs to recognize that territorial integrity is a priority for Georgia, just as it is for Russia, and halt the political usage of trade sanctions.

The U.S. should protect Georgia, as it is a true democracy in a region surrounded by autocrats, the state of emergency notwithstanding, against Russian belligerence. At the same time, if Washington truly cares about democracy in the region, it should criticize its erosion in Moscow and Tbilisi alike—Bush’s muted response to the state of emergency engenders allegations of double-talk.

The stakes are high, and the region is dangerously polarized. Whether the downward slope is inverted is up to the players involved. And while much of the world’s gaze is now largely transfixed on the Middle-East and specifically on Pakistan, policymakers need to pay attention to the other region’s state of emergency.

The Good News Coming Out of Pakistan

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf put the nail in his own coffin. By declaring a state of emergency, which includes cutting off private media outlets and detaining opposition figures, he has heightened public hatred toward his regime and put Pakistan on the brink of chaos.

Western officials have publicly condemned the move—U.S. Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice pleaded with Musharraf not to go through with it—but privately worry about what would follow in the wake of his demise.

Indeed, stability is paramount in a country home to a mixture of dangerous elements: terrorism, the constant threat of military strife with its Indian neighbor, the presence of Osama Bin Laden, nuclear weapons, and now a weak and unpopular military dictatorship.

With disastrous conditions like this, it is hard to see the silver lining in Pakistan. But there is reason for hope amidst the debris. What has accompanied Musharraf’s distress is the dramatic rise of civil society in the country—enough to make Robert Putnam blush—a precursor for homegrown democracy.

The concept of civil society largely owes itself to the aforementioned political scientist Robert Putnam—famous in the U.S. for his groundbreaking work, “Bowling Alone”, in which he stated that the decline of civic associations in the U.S.—organizations outside of the government, symbolized in this case by bowling leagues—has led to political apathy and democratic deficiency.

He is the godfather of social capital and civil society. And according to Putnam, people who belong to civic associations, whether sports clubs or bird-watching groups, develop trust, participation, and bonds between peers, making them better democrats.

His study of democracy in Italy, “Making Democracy Work”, found that the civic community, whose citizens are “helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance,” was more entrenched in the north of Italy. This is why the region was more democratic and less corrupt than its less civic neighbors in the south. In short, his conclusion was “the more civic a region, the more effective its government.”

What does this have to do with Pakistan? As the Musharraf debacle has illustrated, backing a military dictator is a hazardous enterprise, while Iraq has shown that overthrowing autocrats by force and implanting democracy is also a troublesome tactic. If a third option, indigenous democracy, is the right course of action, the creation of a vibrant civil society maybe the means to bring it about.

There are signs that Pakistan may be ripe for civil society-backed democracy. The current crisis can largely be traced to the removal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary this March, reportedly on trumped up corruption charges—Musharraf’s seemingly favorite strategy of silencing dissent—but likely because of his independent inquiry into the illegal detention of Pakistanis. Packs lined the streets, mainly comprised of lawyers in business suits, in perpetual protest until Chaudhary was reinstated—to much fanfare—and granted rock star status.

These suits could represent the future of Pakistan. With a burgeoning middle-class—spurred by capitalism—and publicly active lawyers bringing about political reform, the country may be another testing ground for Putnam’s theory.

And who are the ones being detained by Musharraf through this state of emergency? Lawyers and opposition politicians are the main targets—despite the general’s statements on tackling extremism—of the martial law declaration. "Those he has arrested are progressive, secular-minded people while the terrorists are offered negotiations and ceasefires,” rightly declared Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist.

However, do a group of lawyers, upset by the president’s stranglehold on the judiciary, really constitute a reformist civil society and the hope for democracy in Pakistan? By definition, groups organizing outside of the scope of government can be deemed a part of civil society. Fighting for civil rights, moreover, logically makes them civil activists.

Civil society stamped and approved or not, these lawyers cannot bring about change by themselves. Democracy hinges on more civil groups joining the fight, and perhaps on Western pressure, among many other things. And even with the inception of democracy, Pakistan will still be one of the most dangerous countries on the planet. There will still be a large terrorist presence—indoctrinated by the country’s numerous madrassahs—and a powerful military and intelligence apparatus, linked to the Taliban and other Islamic extremists, and topped off by a nuclear weapon arsenal.

Putnam’s assertions are flawed but valid. Perhaps they will be tested in Pakistan. Be that is it may, rising public activism, embodied by the protesting groups of lawyers, while not sufficient, is necessary for democratic pluralism. There may be positive effects of the state of emergency after-all.

PKK’s Destructive Plan

After weeks of speculation, the Turkish government has finally ordered military strikes on the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq in an effort to stamp out PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), a separatist terrorist group. Although a ground incursion has yet to be deployed, air strikes may be a precursor to a full-scale invasion. And this is exactly what PKK wants.

Turkey has long struggled to assimilate the roughly 15 million Kurds living in its territory. The PKK, forming in the 1970s, seeks to create an independent Kurdish state and has used terrorist means to achieve its goal. Waging a guerilla war in the 1980s, PKK’s conflict with Turkey has claimed over 37,000 lives.

In recent years, the situation has settled down a bit. PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 and urged the movement to conduct a peaceful struggle, and the group announced a ceasefire last September. Kurds participate in the political process, taking up seats in the Turkish parliament.

Now, there is a threat of all out war, which would open another front in Iraq and likely destabilize the only relatively peaceful area in the country. The U.S., along with the Iraqi central government, has pleaded with Turkey to refrain from military actions in Iraq.

But after succumbing to numerous guerilla attacks—a recent PKK cross-border assault left 12 Turkish soldiers dead—Ankara is fed up. Military actions have ensued. The Turkish military announced yesterday that 30 Kurdish rebels were killed near the Iraq border.

Why would PKK so willingly antagonize Turkey and its vastly powerful military? PKK knew it was on thin ice and Ankara was poised for an invasion to wipe them out, so why did they commit another atrocity, killing 12 Turks? They must have known air strikes and a ground assault were to follow.

PKK knew exactly what it was doing. It wants to lull Turkey into a military conflict in Northern Iraq. With concrete results from its assimilatory program, the Turkish government has helped placate the fiery Kurdish minority, and PKK fears its separatist goals are slipping away. To reinvigorate the pan-Kurdish separatist movement it seeks to extract Turkish revenge.

This is a common terrorist tactic, regularly employed by the Basque separatist group ETA, known as the spiral of action-repression-action. When fearing marginalization, terrorist groups carry out attacks on enemy government forces to inhibit a repressive response, which will rally nationalists and provide legitimacy for more terrorist attacks, producing a cycle of violence.

PKK is using this method because it wants the wrath of Turkey to rally its Kurdish brothers in Iraq. It seems this strategy may work. Upon hearing the Turkish threat of military force, Kurdish regional president, Massoud Barzani, declared: “We are fully prepared to defend our democratic experience and the dignity of our people and the sanctity of our homeland.” This must have been music to PKK’s ears.

Aside from playing into PKK's hands, Turkey also has military limits to its objectives. An invasion would not only stir up Kurdish nationalist sentiment and likely become a PKK recruiting tool, but strategically and militarily it might not do much good.

PKK, in similar fashion to Al-Qaeda in Tora Bora, hides in treacherous mountain terrain in Northern Iraq, maintaining an underground cave system seemingly impervious to air strikes and capture. Annihilating the terrorist group via a ground campaign is a strategy strewn with pitfalls.

So what is to be done? Politically, PKK’s antics have put both Turkey and the Kurdish regional government in a bind. Ankara cannot appear weak to its domestic audience and neither can the Kurds in Iraq. Washington is also in a crunch: it must convince Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to show restraint, knowing full well that it would react similarly to attacks on its forces.

To avoid all the problems associated with a Turkish invasion, Iraqi and American officials must provide Ankara with military and intelligence assistance and conduct missions to rid the area of PKK rebels. To be sure, U.S. troops are under enough duress in the country without taking on another enemy. Yet small-scale missions, or air strikes and intelligence gathering would be tremendously helpful in alleviating the situation. All sides must do everything possible to disrupt PKK’s destructive plan.

Russia and China: The New Axis of Evil?

When President Bush coined the infamous term “Axis of Evil” in his 2003 State of the Union address to describe the non-existent coalition of Iran, North Korea and Iraq, these three states assumingly represented the biggest threat to American interests. Yet they had little contact or mutual interests—Iraq and Iran actually went to war with each other from 1980-1988—which is why pundits are still trying to grasp what the president exactly meant by the phrase.

If evil is equated with the ability and motivation to block American efforts around the world, then one might come to the conclusion that Russia and China, not the three above, now constitute the Axis of Evil. Indeed, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, they can frustrate most U.S. interventions with one word: veto.

And they are. Be it the genocide in Darfur, independence for Kosovo, or the nuclear ambitions of Iran, Russian and or Chinese intransigence denies the West the ability to effectively deal with these situations. The threat of a veto in the UNSC blocks any hope of a united international front. Seen through this light, Russia and China could be on roughly the same level as the original axis.

To hear the 2008 Republican presidential hopefuls on the campaign trail, it seems they agree. Mitt Romney recently deemed the United Nations an “extraordinary failure,” and proposed a democratic alternative. “We should develop some of our own—if you will—forums and alliances or groups that have the ability to actually watch out for the world and do what’s right,” declared the former Massachusetts governor.

John McCain has also floated a similar proposal. In the new issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, he suggests, “We should go further by linking democratic nations in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies,” which “could act when the UN fails.”

Last but not least, national opinion poll leader Rudy Giuliani has followed suit, albeit more subtly. Stating in his recent contribution to Foreign Affairs, “The UN has proved irrelevant to the resolution of almost every major dispute of the last 50 years,” he concludes, “We must be prepared to look to other tools.”

To be sure, UN-bashing is a common practice among GOP circles. The U.S. bypassed the UNSC by invading Iraq, but never before have mainstream, powerful Republicans unanimously recommended going outside the UNSC framework to create a permanent “Coalition of the Willing.” Their point that Russia and China continually hamper American and Western initiatives is well taken. But is a League of Democracies or Coalition of the Free really necessary or practical?

At first glance, the idea seems worthy of consideration. Why not sidestep Russian and Chinese obstruction and garner more legitimacy for Washington’s endeavors by creating a new forum?

First, whether other democratic allies in Europe and elsewhere would go along with this enterprise is dubious. Officials in Brussels still extol the multilateralism of the UN.

Second, what would stop Russia, China, perhaps along with other U.S.-labeled international pariahs such as Venezuela and Cuba, from doing the same and creating an anti-American organization? The world would be further divided, not only ideologically, but now institutionally, between the West and its adversaries. This may be an exaggeration, but the threat of this coming to fruition renders the idea counterproductive.

Finally, there is already such a forum of U.S.-led democracies—it is called NATO. This alliance has expanded to Central and Eastern Europe and fields troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan, among other global hotspots. If Romney and his counterparts really wish to seek other international outlets apart from the UN, then expand NATO. Such a scheme was recently put forward by former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and included adding non-European liberal democracies such as Israel, Australia, and Japan to the membership directory.

Do Russia and China truly constitute an Axis of Evil? Of course not, they are neither evil nor an axis. They be autocratic, but do not—as far as we know—sponsor terrorism or subscribe to an expansive, totalitarian ideology.

Mutual interests may include thumbing their noses at Washington every once and a while, and pursuing pet projects at the expense of the U.S. in the UNSC—China’s thirst for Sudanese energy supplies prevents its backing of intervention in Darfur, while Russia opposes the U.S. and EU by supporting its fellow Slavs in Serbia in their quest to retain Kosovo—yet there is no long-term allegiance between the two.

Realist power politics largely lies behind the Eurasian neighbors’ belligerence towards the West. Preventing the superpower from getting its way, while at the same time increasing one’s power and prestige, is the name of the game. The two are playing it well, to the detriment of Washington and many of its foreign policy goals.

What is the solution? Aznar’s NATO expansion proposal should be analyzed. The Cold War is over, and the conventional military threat to Europe, the Kremlin’s inflammatory rhetoric notwithstanding, affords NATO the opportunity to enlarge beyond its original transatlantic script. Unfortunately, the obstructionist threat from Russia and China is real and here to stay. Branding it an Axis of Evil, however, is misleading. How about Axis of Exasperation?

U.S.-Turkish Relations Take A Hit

As a secular Muslim country, staunch NATO member, and regional power in the strategically important Middle-East, Turkey is a tremendous asset to U.S. foreign policy. But now the alliance, tried and tested throughout the Cold War, is showing signs of strain.There are two primary causes: the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the Armenian genocide.

In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Turkish Parliament narrowly defeated—by one vote—a measure allowing U.S.-led coalition forces to invade Iraq via Turkey. Government officials clearly had the Kurdistan question on their minds during the vote. They feared that overthrowing Saddam Hussein could open Pandora’s box and confer upon the Kurds—a nation without a state—semi-autonomy in Northern Iraq, which would confound Turkey’s own Kurdish problem.

For years, rebels in southeastern Turkey, under the banner of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party), have conducted bloody terrorist attacks in the country in the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan.

Now, with a relatively sovereign Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, PKK members, Ankara claims, are using the area as a safe-haven and base for cross-border attacks in Turkey. Thirty Turks have died in such attacks over the past two weeks, according to the government. Nationalists in the Turkish military have long called for an incursion into Iraq to stamp out PKK. Washington has so far been able to convince Prime Minister Erdogan to refrain from doing so. However, his patience is wearing thin.

Which brings us to the second point of contention—Armenian genocide. When the Ottoman Empire fell in the beginning of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Armenians, at least, died in what is now Turkey. Turks and Armenians are at historical loggerheads over the cause of death.

The former assert that the dead succumbed to circumstances surrounding the war—such as famine—while the latter allege that they were victims of genocide at the hands of Turkey’s early founders. Stubborn nationalists in Ankara refuse to concede any wrongdoing on the part of their forefathers, let alone deem it genocide. And Armenians will call it nothing else.

In this strange historical fight, Armenians have attempted to enlist the help of foreign governments. They are aided in this struggle by a strong lobby. A cabal of ex-pat Armenians, wealthy, organized and obsessed by this single issue, has assisted in persuading the governments of various countries to do their bidding. France, in similar legislation to that regarding the holocaust, even went so far as to proclaim Armenian genocidal-denial a crime.

Washington followed suit this week. The U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, despite the opposition of the Bush Administration, just passed legislation labeling the Armenian casualties, roughly from 1915 to 1917, as genocide. Ankara, unsurprisingly, did not take this very well, temporarily withdrawing its ambassador from Washington.

Turkish officials now appear to be linking the two issues. Aside from recalling its U.S. envoy, Ankara has also followed up the congressional legislation with calls for a ground raid into Northern Iraq, as the Turkish Parliament prepares to vote on a resolution granting authority to the prime minister to use military force in Iraq.

Suat Kiniklioglu, MP from Prime Minister Erdogan’s AKP Party, recently declared: “The prime minister feels that our policy of restraint (on the PKK) has to end.” He also warned, after the vote in Washington: “When we look back in 20 years we might see this as a milestone in the way Turkey and the U.S. have drifted apart.”

All three parties involved have contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. Armenians, with all due respect, should try to move on. Going on a crusade against Turkey, and campaigning for foreign governments to legislate on their behalf, for tragic circumstances occurring almost a century ago, is unproductive.

For Ankara, it would help alleviate concerns if it were to give up some of its stubborn resistance and concede that some Turks—before Turkey was created in 1923—contributed to the slaughter of Armenians. Also, Turkey should not connect the U.S. resolution with the more serious and volatile Kurdish problem.

Washington, to be sure, needs to try to halt PKK operations in Northern Iraq, and solicit the help of the Kurdish Regional Government in this effort. The fervently secular—or Kemalist, in reference to Kemal Ataturk, the country’s founder—Turkish military, fresh off an electoral loss to the mildly Islamist AKP, appears itching for a confrontation with the Kurds.

U.S.-Turkish relations, usually quote strong, lie in the balance. Given the advantages of having a largely secular, democratic, Muslim country—which could be a model for the region—on Washington’s side, the choice should be simple.

With all the troubles in the region, opening up a Kurdish-Turkish front in Northern Iraq would be hazardous, to say the least. Hence, patching up the alliance and preventing a war in Northern Iraq, rather than making it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide, should be an immediate priority.

Prime Minister Putin?

Well, it seems as if Russian President Vladimir Putin is finally off the job market. His recent decision to lead the United Russia Party in upcoming elections likely means that after leaving the Kremlin in 2008 he will take up the post of prime minister. Rumors about his future employment have swirled since he mischievously announced that he would not alter the constitution to serve a third term as president but would still somehow wield power in the future.

The president, by refusing to tinker with the constitution, wants to deflect potential Western criticism, which would liken him to other leaders who have bent the electoral rules to stay in power—i.e. Hugo Chavez. But because of the constitutional promise, conventional wisdom was that Putin would take a lower level position and wait for 2012 to re-take the Kremlin.

Indeed, the Russian Premier has been linked to numerous positions, including the following: CEO of Gazprom, the state-owned energy giant; National Security Advisor; President, amending the constitution and staying on for another term; and some that have yet to be created.

The mystery surrounding Putin’s successor is thrown another twist. Many analysts foresaw Putin naming a prime minister shortly before the election, who would then become president in 2008—a similar route that Putin took to the Kremlin in 1999. The Russian President, however, turned the race upside down when he named unheralded Victor Zubkov, a former Soviet State Farm Director and Putin crony from his days in St. Petersburg, as prime minister a few weeks ago.

Something was up. Yet no one could tell for sure. Now, perhaps we know. Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively, were long considered the frontrunners. These men seem the most likeable. Yet neither is able to become president without the endorsement of Putin, whose ratings are in the 70s. Their potential popularity may turn out to be their downfall, as Putin does not want a rival in the Kremlin.

Instead, he wants a loyalist. Zubkov must now be considered the favorite for the presidency, and will play a primary role in Putin's grand scheme. With the appointment of this relatively unknown, weak bureaucrat, Putin seeks to install a caretaker president who will not pose a threat and gladly relinquish the Kremlin keys to him in 2012.

In the meantime, Putin still needs to maintain his grip on power. The office of Prime Minister, as the current constitution dictates, is not much more than a figure head—the real influence lies in the Kremlin. As such, Putin will likely reform the constitution to grant more authority to the Prime Minister, and if the United Russia Party garners a 2/3 majority in the elections—as it might, given the president’s popularity—he will have the votes to do so.

This would produce another conundrum: what is Putin to do in 2012 when he resumes a presidency which has been weakened by his own reforms? It is unlikely that the constitution would be revised again. He might have to cross that bridge when he comes to it.

Here’s another possibility: Putin’s personality and popular approval is so overwhelming that he eschews institutional reform, and instead, simply pulls the reins of power from the prime minister’s office. Zubkov would not dare deny his ally. Backroom deals would be the norm: President Zubkov would merely read Prime Minister Putin’s marching orders.

On the other hand, Putin might not have the patience to wait until 2012. The constitution simply states that the limit is two consecutive terms. If his successor steps down shortly after gaining the presidency, Putin could technically reoccupy the Kremlin in accordance with the constitution.

As shown time and time again, the Russian premier is unpredictable. The ambiguity surrounding his future and that of his successor only serves to validate this point. Yet the likely scenario is Zubkov and Putin switching roles in 2008, resulting in another Putin presidency in 2012. What happens between 2008 and 2012 is up in the air. Yet, who will wield the true power in Russia for the foreseeable future is not.

Nationalist Economics

Conventional wisdom dictates that nationalism and separatism are characterized by close-knit bonds formed from an intense allegiance to a common history, lineage, land, and language. This is largely correct, especially in regards to more primitive nationalist movements in lesser developed countries.

Yet in more prosperous and federal—where much power is devolved from the central government to regional entities—countries, financial concerns often reign supreme. Self interested economics—anxiety over sharing wealth with less affluent regions within the country—must be added to the dynamic, as witnessed by recent nationalist unrest.

Belgium, famous for its waffles and chocolate, but also for its communitarian and federalist structures, is falling victim to this phenomenon. Its reputation for diversity and collegiality may be on the wane, as the multi-ethnic state is danger of disintegration.

The small country hosts the most supranational entity in the world, the European Union, along with a diverse domestic population: split between the French-speaking Walloons in the south and the Dutch-speaking Flems in the north, with some German-speakers on the side.

Indeed, linguistic cleavages have threatened the unity of the country since its creation in 1830 by King Leopold. The capital, Brussels, is caught in the middle—the site of a verbal war, with each side seeking to impose its linguistic dominance. This an exaggeration perhaps, but gaining validity with time.

Currently exacerbating things is the lack of a standing government, despite over one hundred days passing since the election. An effort to carve together a center-right coalition is hamstrung by—surprise, surprise—bickering between Flemish and Walloon officials.

Fears of the state’s collapse were fanned last year when the television station RTBF—a cruel joke indeed—reported that Flanders had declared independence. Also, one Flemish journalist put Belgium for sale on Ebay.

With no federal government, Flemish separatists may see this as the perfect time to break away. Remi Vermeiren, a Flemish nationalist, declared, "For a while, 'separatist' was a dirty word. Now there are almost daily discussions about it.” Walloons seem scared to death of this possibility, with one regional newspaper noting, “The Walloons are like a wife who's scared that her husband may leave her.”

It was not always this way. Wallonia was a region of immense industrial economic power, with profitable mining and steel sectors. Nationalism followed. Flanders was an economic laggard. But recently, the roles have reversed.

Having achieved high levels of economic growth—clearly delineating itself from Wallonia—largely on the back of a burgeoning services sector, Flanders is reluctant to share the wealth. Subsidies to its poorer regional neighbor suck the state coffers dry, leaving many Flemish citizens feeling bitter.

This is certainly what Vermeiren was trying to convey with the statement: “We are an expensive, inefficient country.” Unsurprisingly, Flemish nationalists want to retain their economic windfalls, while Walloons wish to retain the allocation of funds.

This is not how a successful federal state is governed. Unity in diversity is largely dependent on economic solidarity. Unfortunately in a federal state, despite what Gordon Gekko might say, greed does not work. Reallocating funds from richer to poorer regions helps develop the entire country’s economy, which in the long run is good for the more affluent areas.

The modern European Union is based on this premise. EU Structural and Regional Funds is a financial program, which injects capital from rich member states into lesser developed, usually new, members. Spain joined in 1986, with a relatively dismal economy. Regional funds turned the country’s economic fortunes around to the point that now Spain is a net contributor to the EU budget.

Ironically, Spain is also a country embroiled in separatist, economic conflict. Regional variety, even more so than Belgium, is rampant in Spain, which is made up of 17 semi-autonomous regions. Also home to the two of the most enduring and well known nationalist movements, in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the country is no stranger to separatist unease.

The Catalan and Basque regions are two of the most affluent areas in Spain. To be sure, there is much more than economics at play in these movements, but in today’s federal system, finance again plays a primary role. In this vein, Catalonia recently obtained an agreement with the central government in which it controls over 50% of its tax receipts.

Needier regions such as Andalusia have complained that this jeopardizes national economic cohesion, as the area, much like Wallonia, receives benefits from wealthier regions. The center-right Popular Party responded to the new Catalan statute by warning of “the Balkanization of Spain.”

Neither Spain nor Belgium is in imminent danger of dissolution. But a common thread running through the separatist threats is economic nationalism. If Scots truly thought they could hold their own economically—and there are many who already do—without the help of London and the rest of Great Britain, the nationalist movement would gain even greater support and British unity would likely be in danger.

Prosperity empowers an already divergent people who wish to garner greater control of their economic destiny—much to the dismay of other provinces—adding a financial layer to nationalist separatism. Economic nationalism may be the wave of the future in a globalized world.

The Denouement of De Gaulle's Influence

Charles De Gaulle, former French President and architect of the fifth republic, once said: “France cannot be France without greatness.” Self proclaimed Gaullist and current French premier, Nicolas Sarkozy, campaigned on a similar pledge to make France great, and in doing so, project more power to the world. But the two differ on the means to this end.

For De Gaulle, greatness was best achieved in frequent opposition to the United States. The general likely drew this lesson from the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which the U.S. intervened—after not being consulted—to stop the French, British, and Israeli-led effort to regain control of the canal from Egyptian nationalist president Nasser.

After this rebuff, France and Great Britain were in similar, dire straits: their colonial possessions were disappearing and the United States was emerging as the great power, willing and able to frustrate their imperial endeavors.

Great Britain, henceforth, decided to cling to Washington in order to preserve some of its declining prestige—and the “special relationship” was born. Another viable strategy was to go against the new superpower and seek independence from her, which is the route De Gaulle ended up taking.

France would build up Europe, and a powerful Europe would stand up to the United States and maintain French greatness in the world, a concept which led former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to later remark about De Gaulle: "He talks of Europe and means France." As British historian Timothy Garton Ash observes, "France's rank was to be secured through the institutions of Europe, with French political leadership supported by Germany's economic weight."

It was largely through this framework that France withdrew from the NATO integrated military command in 1966 and forced the mutual security organization to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels; twice denied Great Britain’s application to the European Community in the 1960s, claiming its membership would be like an American “Trojan horse” in the organization; and commenced a rapprochement with Western Germany in the form of the 1963 Elysee Treaty. De Gaulle also flirted with the Soviets, visiting Moscow in 1966.

This is to not to say that De Gaulle openly opposed U.S. foreign policy in all its forms and backed the Soviet Union in the battles of the Cold War. Instead, he actively pursued selective antagonism, attempting to force Washington to take into account French interests.

Sarkozy’s predecessor, Jacques Chirac, carried the Gaullist banner in his calls for a “multilateral world” and resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq—again, not like Hugo Chavez, but nowhere near as friendly to American policy as Tony Blair. A French-led European counterweight was Chirac’s—and De Gaulle’s—ultimate goal.

But this did not happen. Europe has long been divided between Atlanticists who wish to align with Washington on most issues and those who seek to increase European capabilities to balance American power. To be sure, this wedge is not clear-cut, it is not anti-Americans versus Washington lap-dogs—there are different shades.

Nonetheless, there is a rift. The run-up to the Iraq War—with Great Britain, Spain, and Italy, along with many Eastern European countries backing Washington, and France, Germany and others opposing the invasion—highlighted the disunity. But Iraq also showed how fragile these allegiances are, varying from administration to administration.

The European balance of power—not in the conventional sense—of Atlanticists and Gaullists is constantly changing. Spain and Italy are now run by center-left governments who oppose the war and after gaining office quickly withdrew their country’s troops, deployed by former sympathetic conservative leaders, from Iraq. Meanwhile, Germany and France, the main antagonists before the war, are now run by Atlanticists Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy.

One might expect Sarkozy, leader of the Gaullist UMP party to continue De Gaulle and Chirac’s strategy. But this largely has not been the case. Symbolically, he passed over southern France and Europe to vacation in New Hampshire in August. And on the economic side, the new French president is an open admirer of the U.S. and its entrepreneurial spirit and favors American-style reforms of the French labor market.

Sarkozy’s foreign policy, however, is the primary departure from Gaullist ideology. In fact, the French general is likely rolling in his grave after Sarkozy’s recent statements. Opening up old wounds, Sarkozy stated that France should perform a “full role” in NATO, which could lead to the reinstatement of France in the integrated military structure and the reversal of De Gaulle’s 1966 decision.

Moreover, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner frightened many Europeans by alluding to the possibility of military conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, stating: "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war.” He has since moved away from these remarks a bit, but there is a marked change of policy towards Iran.

Kouchner’s declaration has been backed up by threats of more sanctions—outside of the UN Security Council if necessary—if Iran does not comply; similar to Bush’s stance. Washington is no doubt delighted by this somewhat volte-face in French foreign policy, but Gaullists like Chirac are probably not.

Does this truly constitute a repudiation of Gaullist foreign policy? Perhaps not. For all his musings on NATO and Iran, Sarkozy is still an economic nationalist in favor of protection of state-led industry, much like De Gaulle. The French President’s attempts to guard against globalization and build up French and European champions fit the bill. In this sense, American and French interests do not coincide.

Yet, to be sure, no French president has ever appeared so friendly to U.S. foreign policy. Aligning with Washington on a tougher stance vis-à-vis Iran and possibly bringing France back to the forefront of the transatlantic security alliance, NATO, is a clear deviation from De Gaulle and is undoubtedly welcomed by Washington.

Whether the French people will continue to go along with these and other controversial Sarkozy initiatives—his approval rating is roughly in the 60s—remains to be seen. But De Gaulle’s stranglehold on French foreign policy, certainly under Sarkozy, is nearing its end, or to be fitting, its denouement.

Passport Politics

Rarely do travel restrictions enter the discourse of strategic foreign policy-makers. It is doubtful that Henry Kissinger spent much time on the subject. Grander and more long-term issues such as the balance of power get more air-time and attention. It is up to consular officials in the State Department to handle the mundane, everyday issues of U.S. foreign Policy: issuing passports and granting visas.

However, as with so many other issues: it is the little things that count. Denying access to wanting visitors can poison relations with other countries. American officials seem to recognize this, hence the many exchange programs initiated over the years. Without such programs, it is easy for foreign populaces to simply agree with the stereotypes of Americans: fat, arrogant, loud, and uncultured.

It is rare that foreigners who actually make the trek to the United States continue to believe these things. And upon returning to their home countries, they relay their adventures and perceptions of America—hopefully positive—to fellow nationals, likely spreading a more constructive view of the United States. In the grand scheme of things, this can help foster better international relations and more support for U.S. foreign policy.

Seen in this light, the travel restrictions imposed on many Eastern Europeans are tragic. Poland is one such country excluded from the Visa Waiver Program, which allows visitors to enter the United States for ninety days without a visa. As a result, travel and commerce between the two countries suffers. This may seem inconsequential to U.S. officials, but it is at the top of the list of priorities for many Poles, and is beginning to damage what would be an otherwise close relationship.

The alliance between the two is quite strong. Poland sent a large contingency to Iraq and plans to host a U.S.-sponsored missile-defense shield. As is the case with many of its neighbors, the country still harbors much goodwill towards the United States for its support and calls for freedom during the Cold War. Warsaw, given its troubled history, is paranoid and sees Washington as the most likely guarantor of protection from an increasingly resurgent and interventionist Russia.

Unsurprisingly, Polish popular sentiment is largely pro-American—especially when compared to its Western European counterparts. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declares: “I found the cure to anti-Americanism: Come to Poland.” Michael Mandelbaum, U.S. Foreign Policy expert from Johns Hopkins, adds: “Poland is the most pro-American country in the world — including the United States.”

But things are changing—for the worse. The 2007 edition of Transatlantic Trends, the influential survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, bears this out. In 2002, 64% of Poles found strong U.S. world leadership to be desirable. Now, only 40% share that sentiment. Similarly, generic approval rating for the U.S. declined from 65% in 2002 to 57% in 2007.

Many factors are at play here, which could explain the waning pro-American sentiment: adverse effects from the Iraq War and the onset of European Union membership, to name a few. But to be sure, the visa restrictions are playing a primary role in the rise in Polish anti-Americanism. In a recent PBS documentary entitled, “The Anti-Americans: A Hate/Love Relationship”, one Pole pointed out that while blatantly anti-American Frenchman can travel to the U.S. without problems, Poles cannot.

Whenever border issues are brought up, national security concerns surface. Granting asylum to criminals or foreigners bent on doing the country harm obviously should not be U.S. policy. But in this case, these fears are unlikely to be realized. These are Poles, not Syrians: what is the problem?

There are inherent problems—Poland is not devoid of shady characters who wish to travel to the U.S. and there are floods of Islamic, potentially fundamentalist, immigrants residing in Europe—so there should be regulations. But the Visa Waiver Program needs to be updated immediately. Benefits of the program should be bestowed upon countries, like Poland, whose citizens pose little or no security risks and whose governments are friendly to the United States.

A little bit goes a long way. Clearing up these visa difficulties would closely align Poland with the United States for the foreseeable future; giving Polish leaders the political support and leverage to collaborate with the U.S. on future projects such as the missile defense shield. Passport politics is not likely to be taught in intro to international relations courses. But visas, however unexciting, should be part of the U.S. foreign policy arsenal.

Rewarding North Korea Is Inevitable

After much wrangling, the $25 million in allegedly illicit funds were unfrozen and returned to North Korea a few months ago, allowing the nuclear disarmament process to continue.

This followed a landmark agreement in February in which leader Kim Jong Ill signed up to receive energy and aid in return for full dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, sparking hopes, however faint, of perhaps the end of the crisis.

But, as seen in the fractious resolution of the money laundering ordeal, the devil is in the details. Officials on both sides must decide on the timing and reciprocity of the deal: when should North Korea shut down nuclear plants such as that in Yongbyon and when and how should they be rewarded for doing so?

As always, Kim wants to get a lot for a little, doing the bare minimum and demanding retribution. Predictably, he delayed the closure of the Yongbyon facility until he received the $25 million. Washington gave in to this demand, leading critics to cry appeasement.

Indeed, American hardliners such as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton decried the February pact, alleging: “It is rewarding bad behavior.” He went on to declare: "It's a bad signal to North Korea and it's a bad signal to Iran. It will say to countries like Iran and other would-be proliferators, if you just have enough patience, if you just have enough persistence, you’ll wear the United States down."

Former State Department official, Stephen Rademaker, was also pessimistic about the deal, noting: “No matter what incremental progress is made in coming months, it would defy experience to believe that a permanent diplomatic resolution to the nuclear stand-off is at hand.”

To be sure, negotiations with North Korea over the years have not fared well: arrangements have been broken, each side accusing the other of not living up to their end of the bargain.

Although Pyongyang has recently acquired actual nuclear weapons and Washington has accused Kim of a secret uranium enrichment program, the issues are essentially the same: North Korea wants fuel, aid, and restoration of diplomatic ties with the U.S., while Washington desires full de-nuclearization in return.

The 1993 Agreed Framework was an incremental agreement based on these points. Construction on a peaceful, light-water nuclear reactor and fuel oil shipments to North Korea began, and Kim froze the nuclear program—temporarily.

Things came to a head in 2002, as Pyongyang blamed the U.S. for lack of progress on the agreement and kicked out IAEA inspectors. Kim subsequently pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and sped up nuclear efforts. The Agreed Framework was in ashes.

The Bush Administration commenced six-party talks—involving the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea—to dissuade Kim’s regime from wielding nuclear weapons. Efforts were fruitless until September 2005, when an accord aimed at total disarmament was reached, followed by this February’s deal.

Although the road to Pyonyang has been wrought with pitfalls, does this mean, as critics of the recent pact seem to dictate, that the U.S. and others should stop trying? Refusing to negotiate with a cruel, dictatorial regime such as Kim’s may make officials in Washington feel better, but it does not keep nuclear weapons out of his hands. It may seem like succumbing to nuclear blackmail—in all reality, it is—but what is the alternative?

The fatal flaws of military-induced regime change do not need much reiteration. And isolating the regime and cutting off ties has not done the trick. The victims of this failed policy are, by and large, innocent North Korean citizens, who die of hunger while Kim eats steak and lobster in his palatial estates.

It is certainly not the duty of Washington and others to protect and feed the people of North Korea; it is Kim’s. But unfortunately the maltreatment of the populace has been an indirect consequence of this isolation strategy. South Korea and others constantly send food aid, but the more pragmatic and rational strategy would be to try to open up the North Korean economy so that citizens can feed themselves.

The political effects of economic and political engagement, contingent of course on reforms, would also be positive. Closing off the North Korean people to other cultures and news sources allows Kim to impose his views on the populace—without competition. With liberalization it would be more difficult for Kim to convince his people that a foreign adversary, such as the U.S., is the source of all their problems.

Change would be gradual. The economic and political structure would probably be similar to that of modern-day China: a relatively open, capitalist economy with strict political control—not the ideal situation, but certainly better for the North Korean people than present circumstances.

This clearly does not mean that Kim can ride rough-shod over the recent agreement and demand extraordinary concessions. But the sad truth is that, at some point, North Korea will need to be given carrots for disarmament; isolation has not and likely will not work. Washington cannot wish away this problem.

Libya in 2002 was rewarded with better relations for dismantling its program, which was much less advanced and dangerous. Pyongyang, and longer down the road, Tehran, will also have to be granted dispensation. Unfortunately, this is the nature of the beast.

Morality and idealism, especially in international relations, often must give way to pragmatism if problems are to be solved. It is inevitable that Kim and others will be paid off for giving up nuclear weapons. Regrettably, nuclear black-mail is here to stay.

A Faustian Deal in Pakistan?

While presidential contenders in the U.S. debate the record of Pakistan in supporting the fight against Al-Qaeda, Islamabad prepares for elections. The last few months have put President Musharraf’s military dictatorship in a tough spot, putting into question the general’s re-election hopes.

Pakistan’s Supreme Court overturned—much to the delight of an emerging civil society that turned out in droves to protest Musharraf—the administration’s decision to remove regime critic Iftikhar Chaudhry on apparently trumped up charges.

In addition, the court has allowed for the return of exiled opposition party leaders Bhenazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League respectively, to campaign for the approaching election.

Although Ms. Bhutto has yet to voyage back to her country, she has been busy maneuvering for the election. This week, former Prime Minister Bhenazir Bhutto reached an electoral agreement with Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf. The deal is simple: Bhutto offers her support in the upcoming election in exchange for Musharraf stepping down as general, giving up his dual role of military commander and president.

The Musharraf-Bhutto accord raises three important questions. First, is Bhutto selling her soul to the devil, denigrating democracy by aligning herself and her party with a dictatorship for electoral gain? Second, will this extend the life of the Musharraf regime? And finally, will this strengthen Musharraf, allowing him to better take the fight to terrorists taking sanctuary in Pakistan?

Bhutto is certainly no supporter of Pakistani military autocracies, as her father was executed by a former military regime and she herself was thrown out of the country and accused of corruption in 1999 after Musharaff took power in a bloodless coup. So why is she seemingly allowing the administration to continue governing?

Her former rival Sharif has indeed characterized, in so many words, her negotiations with the regime as a Faustian betrayal of democracy, declaring it a “clear violation” of an agreement that “says no deals with military dictatorships.” Yet the PPP leader’s decision is a shrewd one, which could perhaps lead to the full return of democracy to Islamabad.

By forcing Musharaff to slip out of his military uniform, in return for short-term support, she has weakened his backing from the powerful military, which could lead to his eventual downfall.

She has also bought her way back to Pakistan, allowing herself the opportunity to rally the troops and plant seeds for democracy—she was the one who actually made progress in forcing the regime to reform, albeit slowly. Moreover, the move distances herself from potential adversary Sharif.

What does Musharraf stand to gain from acceding to Bhutto’s demand that he end his military career? The (former) general wishes to shore up support for this important election after a shaky few months has endangered his stay in power. Musharraf thinks he solidifies his position with the assistance of the popular Bhutto.

Whether it backfires in this election is doubtful but remains to be seen. His military removal, however, could certainly undermine his long-term legitimacy in the eyes of the armed forces and lead to democracy.

Some American officials would like to see the restoration of Pakistani democracy. Democratic presidential hopeful Barak Obama recently stated: “our goal is not simply an ally in Pakistan, it is a democratic ally.”

His opponents quickly jumped on him for this remark. Senator and Democratic Presidential Candidate Chris Dodd scolded: “While General Musharraf is no Thomas Jefferson, he may be the only thing that stands between us and having an Islamic fundamentalist state in that country.”

The remarks from Obama and Dodd sum up the classic quandary in American foreign policy in general, and specifically in regards to current relations with Pakistan: should we push for democracy in a country in which the results are unpredictable or do we continue supporting an allied, yet autocratic, dictatorship?

Dodd’s statement that democracy would bring radical Islamic sentiment to power in Pakistan is likely untrue. Islamists, when running, have never garnered more than ten percent in national elections, and would unlikely do so in the near-future.

At the same time, Obama’s comments could be described as naïve. Democracy, as seen in Iraq, is not a panacea for the country’s problems, and the fact that Pakistan is host to nuclear weapons should preach caution and stability. While Musharraf, to be sure, could do more, he has been an erstwhile American ally.

Musharraf needs support, and Bhutto’s sponsorship will give the president more room to fight extremism, and Washington should be happy about the deal. Democratization should be homegrown and gradual.

The U.S. should support democratic institutions and civil society in Pakistan, hopefully leading to a stable democracy in the long-term. Musharraf and Bhutto’s agreement, while perhaps Faustian on Bhutto’s part in the short-term, could lay the foundation for this to come to fruition.

History's Straightjacket

The age-old quip tells us: “History always repeats itself.” But when is history allowed the opportunity to repeat itself? In other words, when can countries be forgiven for painful historical events and truly move on?

WWII aggressors Germany and Japan are still paying their dues over sixty years later. Although much has been forgiven, both are still regarded with a degree of contempt and suspicion by their neighbors.

Germany’s post WWII experience has been slightly easier than that of Japan in this regard, namely because of EU integration and the Cold War. Western Europe, which was ravaged twice by German expansionism in a span of just over two decades, was rightly concerned after the war about containing Germany.

To that end, ambitious officials created the European Coal and Steel Community in 1950. The main aim of the new supranational entity was to take these two precious commodities, which are essential for war, out of Germany’s (by then Western Germany) hands and put them in the joint control of the community’s six participants: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Italy.

The ECSC then progressed into the European Economic Community with the 1957 Treaty of Rome, further integrating the economy of Western Germany with much of the rest of Western Europe. This was a further check on the country’s ambitions.

Economic collaboration was also backed up by security cooperation in the form of NATO. A popular motto for the mutual security agreement at its inception in 1949 was: “Keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Soviets out.” As a result, Western Germany was devoid of a fully sovereign military, and the Soviet threat helped convince the U.S. to station troops in the country for an indefinite period of time.

These two initiatives helped allay European suspicion of Germany, and allowed its former, bitter enemy France to seek rapprochement. The two countries signed the Elysee Treaty in 1963, pledging alliance between the two countries. Although this did not stop some from being frightened about the reunification of Germany in the early 1990s, now, popular contempt for Germany is an exception. Many on the continent, however, still fear and or envy its economic might.

Germany’s Nazi past still limits popular and governmental support for committing German troops abroad. Deploying troops in the Balkans in 1990 was a big step, but Germans and others are still extremely wary of doing so—as shown in the rancorous political debate over the country’s current NATO commitment in Afghanistan.

Although much of Germany’s criticism is self-inflicted, Japan, on the other hand, is still routinely pressured by its neighbors, namely China and South Korea, to apologize for its war crimes. This is in part because of the Japanese-right’s stubborn attempts to whitewash its WW2 history from school textbooks and former Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to the Yasakuni Shrine, which honors WWII dead, including war criminals.

Although Koizumi’s successor, Shinzo Abe, has yet to visit the controversial shrine, his nascent administration has pledged to make Japan a “beautiful country” and in doing so put its WWII guilt to rest. The constitution, largely written by American “new-dealers” after WWII, lies in his way.

Article nine of that document dictates that Japan cannot wield an army, only a self-defense force. However, Abe has committed self-defense forces to Iraq for reconstruction efforts, and the Defense Department was recently promoted to a cabinet-level department—much to the dismay of its neighbors.

Japan’s historical revisionism is partly to blame for frosty relations with its Asian neighbors. Although China is certainly still bitter about Japan’s imperial excess, specifically the “rape of Nanking”, historical references are partially a guise for Chinese regional power concerns.

China fears a U.S. backed, powerful Japan wielding an army and perhaps nuclear weapons in the region. Allusion to Japanese war crimes is a sympathy-invoking façade for unease about Japan’s potential threat to China’s hegemonic status in the region

So what will it take for these countries and others to forgive and forget? It is unlikely that those countries afflicted by WWII abuses will ever forget, but they may forgive.

Those born well after WWII will not have the chance to forget, they never experienced the horrors or national suspicions caused by that war. Consequently, post WWII generations, especially the “Euro-generation” in Europe, are unlikely to invoke WWII gripes too often.

Historical grievances, however, are still alive and well in many parts of Europe, especially in the East. In general, much of Central and Eastern Europe is expectedly anxious about an increasingly bellicose Russia, and still bitter about Soviet post-war occupation.

Yet Poland, invaded by Germany and Russia numerous times, seems the most resentful of its troubled past, recently using WWII era historical references to defend its national interests.

Poland’s defense minister, Radek Sikorski, compared the German-Russian Baltic Sea pipeline, which conspicuously bypasses Poland, to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the 1939 agreement between Germany and Russia to split up Polish territory between them.

And in defense of his country’s unwillingness to accept a diminished voting status in the EU, an electoral framework based on population, Polish Prime Minister Lech Kacynski declared, “"If Poland had not had to live through the years of 1939-45, Poland would today be looking at the demographics of a country of 66million."

History will always be used for political gain and people will attempt to use it to compare and contrast current events—witness the rampant analogy between Vietnam and Iraq. And historical abuses cannot be swept under the rug. Victims have a right to bring up painful historical events so that the ill-treatment does not happen again. But WWII-era cruelty should not disbar reformed countries such as Japan and Germany from becoming normal countries again.

Will these countries shrug off their historical straightjackets? As with most things in history, only time will tell.

Rove's Legacy Can Only Be Seen on This Side of the Atlantic

The departure of Karl Rove, Bush’s most trusted advisor, from the White House was followed by a flurry of commentary on the boy genius' legacy. The American press is unsurprisingly having a field day. But major media outlets across the pond in Europe are also taking great interest in the announcement, leading one to wonder what effect, if any, the “architect” has had on the European political scene.

El Pais, the largest and most influential Spanish newspaper, featured an op-ed this week on Rove’s political tenets. The paper, which usually offers thoughtful and on-point analysis, dropped the ball on this one. Aside from gratuitously concentrating on the Iraq War, an endeavor that Rove certainly helped sell to the American public but was not his brainchild, the op-ed drastically overestimates his political influence outside of the United States.

Its author, Jose Ridao, notes that Rove’s modus operandi is to “bank on the radical mobilization of one’s own side, concentrating political debate on those issues in which, according to the principle of moral clarity, the other side had a limited capacity to offer alternatives.” This general observation is fairly accurate. Rove certainly polarized the electorate, focusing on divisive issues to rally the base to the voting booths.

But this is where the article’s utility ends. After the general synopsis, the author tries to link Rove’s strategy with that of European conservatives. Ridao argues, “The model based on the Rove hypothesis has, in large part, been imported by the conservative parties of Europe, who have sought inspiration for their policies on the other side of the Atlantic.”

While lumping together the political strategy of the entire continent’s center-right parties, he tries to illustrate his point by only focusing on his home country’s political situation. “Spain is one of those European countries in which Rove’s electoral strategy has been implemented, and where its power of polarization has been most apparent,” Ridao declares.

To be sure, Spain is the most polarized it has been since the democratic transition in the late 1970s. Until a few years ago, the two main parties, the center-right Popular Party and the center-left Socialist Party, came together to formulate a largely bi-partisan strategy on important issues such as terrorism and immigration.

This, for the most part, is no longer the case. But it is not because Spanish conservatives are using Rove as their ideological brain-trust. It is, on the contrary, the confluence of two primary factors.

First, the attacks of March 11th poisoned the entire political process. The Socialists, and many Spaniards, connected the train bombings with the Popular Party’s support of the Iraq War. They then accused the PP of covering up the fact that Islamic jihadists were to blame for the attacks, as government officials incessantly accused the homegrown terrorist group, ETA, for the bombings despite evidence clearly linking Islamists to the attacks.

PP has denied these charges and some of its back-benchers still offer conspiracy theories insisting on ETA’s guilt. More importantly, they are still bitter about the surprise election of Socialist Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, three days after the terrorist attacks, alleging the administration won only because of terrorism.

Second, after taking office, Zapatero passed radical initiatives that have further widened the partisan divide. By implementing controversial measures—in a largely catholic country—such as legalizing gay marriage and cutting off public funds to the Catholic Church, the new Prime Minister naturally drew the ire of many Catholics and the conservative Popular Party. Devolving more power to the regions, especially Catalonia, was also another point of departure for the nationalist PP, as the center-right predicted the “Balkanization of Spain.”

For its part, the PP has also overreacted to many of these measures and has predictably used any Zapatero slip-up for political gain. Here is a case in point: when ETA bombed the Madrid airport last December, the PP used the tragedy to rail against Zapatero’s peace process and dialogue with the terrorist group.

Thus, in sum, the March 11th attack and its effects, Zapatero’s radical agenda and PP’s heavy-handed response to that agenda are largely to blame for the electoral divide in Spain. Perhaps PP is now taking advantage of the ensuing polarization in a Rove-esque manner, but it was clearly not the party’s unilateral and deliberate strategy to divide the country, as Ridao asserts.

Looking around the rest of Europe, Ridao’s hypothesis does not garner much validity either. In the United Kingdom, the conservative Tory Party has not tacked to the right in lieu of Rove’s success; it has modernized in an effort to fight the Labour Party for Middle England. To that end, new Tory leader David Cameron seems to talk more about global warming than tax cuts and family values.

In any event, European conservatives simply could not follow Rove’s strategy even if they wanted to. What were the divisive issues in which Rove trumpeted to rally the faithful? Gay marriage, the Terry Schiavo case, and stem-cell research featured prominently in the 2004 election. These matters whipped up evangelical, counter-establishment fervor for Rove and the republicans’ cause.

In Europe, there are not many church-going Christians, let alone evangelicals, left. Aside from perhaps the more catholic and conservative countries in southern Europe, such as Spain, Portugal and Italy, religion rarely enters the political discourse. Center-right politicians campaigning on these issues, as Rove suggests, would at best be laughed at. Hence, there is simply no comparison between Rove’s tactics and European conservatives.

However, in the United States, he has undoubtedly shaped the political landscape. Critics and admirers alike cannot refute Mr. Rove’s electoral success: victories in two Texas gubernatorial races, two presidential contests, and the 2002 mid-term landslide. Democratic consultant James Carville affirms, “He has pulled off some of the most unexpected and impressive victories of modern political history.” As a result, before the Democrats’ “thumping” of republicans in the mid-term elections last autumn, Rove predicted a permanent majority for the GOP.

Yet, the recent election results and the failure of Bush’s second term agenda—social security, immigration, etc.—should force him to retract that statement. Bush's lame-duck status is proof, according to detractors, that “Rovianism”—divide and conquer politics—may be good for elections but poor for governing.

The republicans are now trailing democrats in generic and presidential polls, and will face an uphill battle in 2008. Rove’s success was short-lived, and his political approach is not likely to be utilized in upcoming races. The country is definitely, partially because of Mr. Rove, more polarized—red versus blue. So, Ridao may be right about one thing after-all: “His [Rove’s] hypothesis will not survive his political career for too long.”

America's Balancing Act

Students of international relations are constantly bombarded with realist theory. It is undeniably the foremost school of thought in the field, informing many of the decisions of international statesmen.

After a period of neo-conservative excess, U.S. foreign policy may be reverting back to the realist model, as recently manifested in two initiatives: the India nuclear deal and the military assistance package to the Middle-East.

Realism and its successor neo-realism utilize the concept of power to predict relations between states, but differ on the cause of the struggle. Classical realism, which grew out of the WW2 era, posits that states are led by people who inherently lust for power.

Replacing this psychological premise with a structural one, neo-realists dictate that states struggle for power above all else because the international arena is anarchical—there is no global sovereign or mediator to restrain states.

Power, as a result, keeps the order of things. Only power prevents the domination of a state at the hands of another, as the world stage is a free for all in which states must largely depend on themselves to survive.

The balance of power naturally flows from this notion. To keep states from clashing with each other for greater power and status, they must wield similar capabilities. As the Roman general Vegetius once said: “If you want peace prepare for war.”

While states often build up their own capabilities to counter a powerful neighbor, others can also balance their rivals by encouraging or assisting allies in the region. The existence of the U.S. somewhat owes itself to this phenomenon. France sought to restrain the imperial ambitions of its continental foe Great Britain by aiding the American colonialists’ effort during the Revolutionary War.

Balancing has been a mainstay of US foreign policy since its inception. One could make the case—Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic aspirations notwithstanding—that American involvement in WWI was to restore the balance of power in Europe. In the same vein, the Cold War was fought via American and Soviet proxies in all regions of the world so as to prevent the tipping of the scales of power and influence too much in the other's favor.

The most strategic and ambitious balancing endeavor during the Cold War was Nixon’s opening of China in 1972—the brain child of Henry Kissinger, the arch-realist and then National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. By commencing relations between Washington and Beijing, Kissinger wished to drive a further wedge between the communist juggernauts China and the Soviet Union.

The Sino-American rapprochement predictably checked and frightened the Soviets into concessions. According to Kissinger, this triangular diplomacy clearly played a role in the ensuing arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

China, the former balancing partner, is now paradoxically the target of a balancing effort by the US. The meteoric rise of China, spurred by double-digit annual economic growth rates, concerns American policymakers who fear the Asian power will frustrate US endeavors in the region and the world.

A strategic alliance with China’s neighbor and the biggest democracy in the world, India, could check Sino ambitions—or so the geopolitical thinking goes behind the recent nuclear agreement between Washington and New Delhi.

Two years ago, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh struck a controversial deal over nuclear cooperation. As New Delhi is not a Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory, having tested nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, it is a nuclear pariah devoid of nuclear assistance and technology from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The new agreement helps reverse India’s nuclear isolation. In return for allowing International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on most of its civilian nuclear program, New Delhi receives, among other things, nuclear fuel and technology.

Opponents of the deal predict the drifting of the NPT into relative insignificance, encouraging Iran and others to flout its stipulations. It could also foster a nuclear arms race in the region. Getting the nuclear pact through a relatively hostile US Congress will, as a result, be a tough hurdle to clear.

But its supporters tout India’s clean proliferation record and the resulting strategic alliance—a.k.a. the balancing of China—in defense. Most realists, Kissinger included, unsurprisingly back the accord.

Another U.S. endeavor marked by realist thinking is the arms assistance package to the Middle-East. Washington proclaimed this past week its intention to provide $60billion in arms to regional allies, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and—surprise, surprise—Israel.

While the numbers are astounding, this is nothing new. The U.S. has for decades supported the regimes in Riyadh, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. But the impetus for the increased aid is a rising and nuclear-ambitious Iran. As a Jerusalem Post editorial notes, “If Iran is the center of the axis of evil, then Saudi Arabia is the center of the axis of ‘realism' and the pre-9/11 worship of ‘stability' as the strategy for safeguarding Western interests.”[1]

Balancing Tehran, whose support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Iraq has frustrated America’s desires to remake the region and diminish terrorism, is the main priority. Using Sunni proxies in the region, who are also worried about a rising Shia Iran, to curb Tehran’s regional influence is a strategic, realist policy known as “offshore balancing”.

Leading realist Stephen Walt observes, “Offshore balancing …recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor.”[2]

The fallout from Iraq, which all but eliminates the case for invading Iran, shrinks Washington’s options, leading to a renewed emphasis on checking Iran through regional intermediaries. Hence, with the new arms program Washington hopes to balance Iran without doing the dirty work.

Whether these two realist undertakings truly succeed in enhancing regional stability and balancing China and Iran remains to be seen. To be sure, both enterprises are flawed and riddled with obstacles.

Beijing could seek to counter the nuclear deal with India by offering a similar agreement to Pakistan, which would likely destabilize the region. A nuclear arms race and renewed tension between the Islamic and Hindu nations could be the byproducts of such a deal.

Moreover, even if one conceded the fact that US-India ties will strengthen as a result of the pact, New Delhi will still exhibit independence from Washington, especially as its power grows.

Indeed, Indian Lt. General Satish Nambiar recently confirmed this suspicion, warning: “This must be a partnership, not an ‘alliance’. No blind allegiance, nor subservience.”[3] India is currently mulling a decision to build a $9billion oil pipeline in Iran—perhaps an early test for the nascent alliance.

Regarding Iran, the U.S. is unfortunately, because of Iraq, cleaning up partially its own mess. Tehran’s revolutionary goal of spreading its Islamic system of government and its links to terrorism, to be sure, are dangerous traits and point to the need for containment. But overthrowing the Sunni/secular regime of Saddam Hussein, which Washington utilized prior for similar purposes of balancing Iran—arming Baghdad in its eight year war with Tehran in the 1980s—has helped the Iranian theocracy.

Offshore balancing could be the answer. But the regional microcosm that is Iraq—warring Sunni and Shia factions—could spread to an all-out conflict. And arming Iran’s Sunni adversaries can have counterintuitive, negative results: leading Tehran to speed up its pursuit of a nuclear weapon to offset its heavily-armed and US-backed neighbors. Yet, Washington lacks alternatives: this may be the least bad one.

Democracy promotion, a chief tenet of neo-conservatism, will always be a US foreign policy goal. But the damage from Iraq could signal the revival of realism and lead to similar efforts to those described above. Containing China and Iran are near-term and long-term priorities for U.S. policy-makers and the result of these exercises will be a litmus test for the continuing viability of the US as the global hegemon. If the balancing act does not bear fruit, it will be a hard act to follow.

[1] Please see: http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=512707
[2] Walt, Stephen. “In the National Interest.” Boston Review. February/March 2005. http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html
[3] Luce, Edward, and Johnson, Jo. “Welcome to the Club.” The Financial Times. August 3, 2007.