America's Balancing Act

Students of international relations are constantly bombarded with realist theory. It is undeniably the foremost school of thought in the field, informing many of the decisions of international statesmen.

After a period of neo-conservative excess, U.S. foreign policy may be reverting back to the realist model, as recently manifested in two initiatives: the India nuclear deal and the military assistance package to the Middle-East.

Realism and its successor neo-realism utilize the concept of power to predict relations between states, but differ on the cause of the struggle. Classical realism, which grew out of the WW2 era, posits that states are led by people who inherently lust for power.

Replacing this psychological premise with a structural one, neo-realists dictate that states struggle for power above all else because the international arena is anarchical—there is no global sovereign or mediator to restrain states.

Power, as a result, keeps the order of things. Only power prevents the domination of a state at the hands of another, as the world stage is a free for all in which states must largely depend on themselves to survive.

The balance of power naturally flows from this notion. To keep states from clashing with each other for greater power and status, they must wield similar capabilities. As the Roman general Vegetius once said: “If you want peace prepare for war.”

While states often build up their own capabilities to counter a powerful neighbor, others can also balance their rivals by encouraging or assisting allies in the region. The existence of the U.S. somewhat owes itself to this phenomenon. France sought to restrain the imperial ambitions of its continental foe Great Britain by aiding the American colonialists’ effort during the Revolutionary War.

Balancing has been a mainstay of US foreign policy since its inception. One could make the case—Woodrow Wilson’s idealistic aspirations notwithstanding—that American involvement in WWI was to restore the balance of power in Europe. In the same vein, the Cold War was fought via American and Soviet proxies in all regions of the world so as to prevent the tipping of the scales of power and influence too much in the other's favor.

The most strategic and ambitious balancing endeavor during the Cold War was Nixon’s opening of China in 1972—the brain child of Henry Kissinger, the arch-realist and then National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. By commencing relations between Washington and Beijing, Kissinger wished to drive a further wedge between the communist juggernauts China and the Soviet Union.

The Sino-American rapprochement predictably checked and frightened the Soviets into concessions. According to Kissinger, this triangular diplomacy clearly played a role in the ensuing arms control talks between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

China, the former balancing partner, is now paradoxically the target of a balancing effort by the US. The meteoric rise of China, spurred by double-digit annual economic growth rates, concerns American policymakers who fear the Asian power will frustrate US endeavors in the region and the world.

A strategic alliance with China’s neighbor and the biggest democracy in the world, India, could check Sino ambitions—or so the geopolitical thinking goes behind the recent nuclear agreement between Washington and New Delhi.

Two years ago, President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh struck a controversial deal over nuclear cooperation. As New Delhi is not a Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory, having tested nuclear weapons in the late 1990s, it is a nuclear pariah devoid of nuclear assistance and technology from the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

The new agreement helps reverse India’s nuclear isolation. In return for allowing International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on most of its civilian nuclear program, New Delhi receives, among other things, nuclear fuel and technology.

Opponents of the deal predict the drifting of the NPT into relative insignificance, encouraging Iran and others to flout its stipulations. It could also foster a nuclear arms race in the region. Getting the nuclear pact through a relatively hostile US Congress will, as a result, be a tough hurdle to clear.

But its supporters tout India’s clean proliferation record and the resulting strategic alliance—a.k.a. the balancing of China—in defense. Most realists, Kissinger included, unsurprisingly back the accord.

Another U.S. endeavor marked by realist thinking is the arms assistance package to the Middle-East. Washington proclaimed this past week its intention to provide $60billion in arms to regional allies, notably Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and—surprise, surprise—Israel.

While the numbers are astounding, this is nothing new. The U.S. has for decades supported the regimes in Riyadh, Cairo, and Tel Aviv. But the impetus for the increased aid is a rising and nuclear-ambitious Iran. As a Jerusalem Post editorial notes, “If Iran is the center of the axis of evil, then Saudi Arabia is the center of the axis of ‘realism' and the pre-9/11 worship of ‘stability' as the strategy for safeguarding Western interests.”[1]

Balancing Tehran, whose support for Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Iraq has frustrated America’s desires to remake the region and diminish terrorism, is the main priority. Using Sunni proxies in the region, who are also worried about a rising Shia Iran, to curb Tehran’s regional influence is a strategic, realist policy known as “offshore balancing”.

Leading realist Stephen Walt observes, “Offshore balancing …recognizes that the United States does not need to control these areas directly; it merely needs to ensure that they do not fall under the control of a hostile great power and especially not under the control of a so-called peer competitor.”[2]

The fallout from Iraq, which all but eliminates the case for invading Iran, shrinks Washington’s options, leading to a renewed emphasis on checking Iran through regional intermediaries. Hence, with the new arms program Washington hopes to balance Iran without doing the dirty work.

Whether these two realist undertakings truly succeed in enhancing regional stability and balancing China and Iran remains to be seen. To be sure, both enterprises are flawed and riddled with obstacles.

Beijing could seek to counter the nuclear deal with India by offering a similar agreement to Pakistan, which would likely destabilize the region. A nuclear arms race and renewed tension between the Islamic and Hindu nations could be the byproducts of such a deal.

Moreover, even if one conceded the fact that US-India ties will strengthen as a result of the pact, New Delhi will still exhibit independence from Washington, especially as its power grows.

Indeed, Indian Lt. General Satish Nambiar recently confirmed this suspicion, warning: “This must be a partnership, not an ‘alliance’. No blind allegiance, nor subservience.”[3] India is currently mulling a decision to build a $9billion oil pipeline in Iran—perhaps an early test for the nascent alliance.

Regarding Iran, the U.S. is unfortunately, because of Iraq, cleaning up partially its own mess. Tehran’s revolutionary goal of spreading its Islamic system of government and its links to terrorism, to be sure, are dangerous traits and point to the need for containment. But overthrowing the Sunni/secular regime of Saddam Hussein, which Washington utilized prior for similar purposes of balancing Iran—arming Baghdad in its eight year war with Tehran in the 1980s—has helped the Iranian theocracy.

Offshore balancing could be the answer. But the regional microcosm that is Iraq—warring Sunni and Shia factions—could spread to an all-out conflict. And arming Iran’s Sunni adversaries can have counterintuitive, negative results: leading Tehran to speed up its pursuit of a nuclear weapon to offset its heavily-armed and US-backed neighbors. Yet, Washington lacks alternatives: this may be the least bad one.

Democracy promotion, a chief tenet of neo-conservatism, will always be a US foreign policy goal. But the damage from Iraq could signal the revival of realism and lead to similar efforts to those described above. Containing China and Iran are near-term and long-term priorities for U.S. policy-makers and the result of these exercises will be a litmus test for the continuing viability of the US as the global hegemon. If the balancing act does not bear fruit, it will be a hard act to follow.

[1] Please see: http://www.fpa.org/topics_info2414/topics_info_show.htm?doc_id=512707
[2] Walt, Stephen. “In the National Interest.” Boston Review. February/March 2005. http://bostonreview.net/BR30.1/walt.html
[3] Luce, Edward, and Johnson, Jo. “Welcome to the Club.” The Financial Times. August 3, 2007.