A World Under Chinese Hegemony

After the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States was left alone at the top. Uni-polarity and American hegemony became popular phrases among foreign policy thinkers, stirring up comparisons—often ludicrous—between the U.S. and former dominant powers such as Rome and Napoleon’s France.

In this new international context, containment strategies became meaningless—there was no one to contain. Policymakers focused instead on what to do with all this power. Should Washington, as neo-conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer has suggested, utilize this “unipolar moment” to reshape the world in accordance to its values and desires, or follow a more realist dictum, staying out of entangling interventions to preserve hegemony for as long as it can?

Now, the heady days are gone. With a falling dollar, quagmire in Iraq, and constant and increasing international resentment to American power, other, less positive questions are being asked. Is U.S. hegemony coming to an end? How much longer will the U.S. continue to lead the world?

One country inevitably frames this debate: China. A rising China—growing economically at roughly ten percent a year and spending a large percentage of that revenue on revamping its military—frustrates American efforts in Darfur and Iran, to name a few.

More worrying, conventional international relations theory warns that the likelihood of conflict between great powers is heightened at the time of a declining hegemon and the ascendance of a worthy competitor. Washington’s stated goal, outlined in the 2002 NSS, is to prevent the emergence of a competitor—in other words, China. Accordingly, a sense of an inevitability of conflict thus looms, as the U.S. loses prestige and China picks up the slack. The die may be cast and Taiwan may be the trigger.

To be sure, there is a risk of a clash, but it is far from unavoidable. It is in neither country’s interests to fight a world—probably nuclear—war. Doomsday talk is all well and good, but it is unlikely that war will ensue between the powers for a plethora of reasons, economic interdependence being one, hence the statements coming from both governments on the need for strategic partnership and dialogue.

Washington is and will continue to be the leading power. Moreover, Beijing’s upsurge is littered with uncertainties. High economic growth rates are rarely continuous and the communist party’s grip on political power may be challenged by an ever-expanding middle class, threatening stability and the economy.

Be that as it may, China will be a force to be reckoned with, whether as a hegemon or rival superpower. As a result, U.S. policymakers must think about an international system dominated, or at least led, by China. What would such a world look like?

Unlike the U.S. and other past superpowers, China believes above all in sovereignty in foreign policy. One’s domestic problems are just that, domestic, and should be dealt with by one’s own government. This has much to do with China’s own human rights abuses and lack of democratic transparency, which constantly evoke Western criticism.

This non-interventionist zeal is currently playing itself out in Africa, which could serve as a microcosm of a Sino-dominated world. Beijing’s thirst for energy supplies brings it to Sudan and other parts of the continent and results in high levels of aid, investment, and trade, roughly $6 billion in FDI from 2000 to 2006 and over $1 billion in development assistance from 2004 to 2005—enough to inspire Bono to write a ballad.

Yet, Chinese efforts in Africa maintain one primary difference between those of the West. Beijing’s assistance comes with no political strings attached. World Bank and IMF support is usually contingent on political and economic reforms: take it or leave it. But China is filling the gap, becoming a preferable alternative for many regional leaders. Indeed, conditional free loans and aid seem to make the corrupt governments of Mugabe and others happy, while infuriating Western aid officers.

Perhaps the role of hegemon would change this stance, making China a more responsible broker. Perhaps not. The U.S. and EU both tacitly support dictators and those harboring precious energy commodities, Saudi Arabia comes to mind, but not to the extent of China.

This divergence frustrates relations between Beijing and the West, as seen in their impasse on how to proceed in regards to genocide in Darfur and the Iranian nuclear program. The European Union prides itself on pooling national sovereignty and resources and Washington is known for intercession, making the transatlantic alliance unlikely to collaborate with Beijing on many issues.

The U.S. would be left to counterbalance a dominant China by backing regional and fellow democratic powers such as India and Japan—the nuclear deal with the former is one such example of this strategy.

Western liberal interventionism, for all its faults, maintains a decent record: notably in the Balkans. An international system, dominated by China and its hands-off approach—as shown in its current dealings in Africa—would likely allow fraudulent tyrannies to feel at ease, perpetuating international insecurity and injustice. Those yearning for America’s fall from grace should be careful what they wish for.