Rewarding North Korea Is Inevitable

After much wrangling, the $25 million in allegedly illicit funds were unfrozen and returned to North Korea a few months ago, allowing the nuclear disarmament process to continue.

This followed a landmark agreement in February in which leader Kim Jong Ill signed up to receive energy and aid in return for full dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, sparking hopes, however faint, of perhaps the end of the crisis.

But, as seen in the fractious resolution of the money laundering ordeal, the devil is in the details. Officials on both sides must decide on the timing and reciprocity of the deal: when should North Korea shut down nuclear plants such as that in Yongbyon and when and how should they be rewarded for doing so?

As always, Kim wants to get a lot for a little, doing the bare minimum and demanding retribution. Predictably, he delayed the closure of the Yongbyon facility until he received the $25 million. Washington gave in to this demand, leading critics to cry appeasement.

Indeed, American hardliners such as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton decried the February pact, alleging: “It is rewarding bad behavior.” He went on to declare: "It's a bad signal to North Korea and it's a bad signal to Iran. It will say to countries like Iran and other would-be proliferators, if you just have enough patience, if you just have enough persistence, you’ll wear the United States down."

Former State Department official, Stephen Rademaker, was also pessimistic about the deal, noting: “No matter what incremental progress is made in coming months, it would defy experience to believe that a permanent diplomatic resolution to the nuclear stand-off is at hand.”

To be sure, negotiations with North Korea over the years have not fared well: arrangements have been broken, each side accusing the other of not living up to their end of the bargain.

Although Pyongyang has recently acquired actual nuclear weapons and Washington has accused Kim of a secret uranium enrichment program, the issues are essentially the same: North Korea wants fuel, aid, and restoration of diplomatic ties with the U.S., while Washington desires full de-nuclearization in return.

The 1993 Agreed Framework was an incremental agreement based on these points. Construction on a peaceful, light-water nuclear reactor and fuel oil shipments to North Korea began, and Kim froze the nuclear program—temporarily.

Things came to a head in 2002, as Pyongyang blamed the U.S. for lack of progress on the agreement and kicked out IAEA inspectors. Kim subsequently pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and sped up nuclear efforts. The Agreed Framework was in ashes.

The Bush Administration commenced six-party talks—involving the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea—to dissuade Kim’s regime from wielding nuclear weapons. Efforts were fruitless until September 2005, when an accord aimed at total disarmament was reached, followed by this February’s deal.

Although the road to Pyonyang has been wrought with pitfalls, does this mean, as critics of the recent pact seem to dictate, that the U.S. and others should stop trying? Refusing to negotiate with a cruel, dictatorial regime such as Kim’s may make officials in Washington feel better, but it does not keep nuclear weapons out of his hands. It may seem like succumbing to nuclear blackmail—in all reality, it is—but what is the alternative?

The fatal flaws of military-induced regime change do not need much reiteration. And isolating the regime and cutting off ties has not done the trick. The victims of this failed policy are, by and large, innocent North Korean citizens, who die of hunger while Kim eats steak and lobster in his palatial estates.

It is certainly not the duty of Washington and others to protect and feed the people of North Korea; it is Kim’s. But unfortunately the maltreatment of the populace has been an indirect consequence of this isolation strategy. South Korea and others constantly send food aid, but the more pragmatic and rational strategy would be to try to open up the North Korean economy so that citizens can feed themselves.

The political effects of economic and political engagement, contingent of course on reforms, would also be positive. Closing off the North Korean people to other cultures and news sources allows Kim to impose his views on the populace—without competition. With liberalization it would be more difficult for Kim to convince his people that a foreign adversary, such as the U.S., is the source of all their problems.

Change would be gradual. The economic and political structure would probably be similar to that of modern-day China: a relatively open, capitalist economy with strict political control—not the ideal situation, but certainly better for the North Korean people than present circumstances.

This clearly does not mean that Kim can ride rough-shod over the recent agreement and demand extraordinary concessions. But the sad truth is that, at some point, North Korea will need to be given carrots for disarmament; isolation has not and likely will not work. Washington cannot wish away this problem.

Libya in 2002 was rewarded with better relations for dismantling its program, which was much less advanced and dangerous. Pyongyang, and longer down the road, Tehran, will also have to be granted dispensation. Unfortunately, this is the nature of the beast.

Morality and idealism, especially in international relations, often must give way to pragmatism if problems are to be solved. It is inevitable that Kim and others will be paid off for giving up nuclear weapons. Regrettably, nuclear black-mail is here to stay.