The Denouement of De Gaulle's Influence

Charles De Gaulle, former French President and architect of the fifth republic, once said: “France cannot be France without greatness.” Self proclaimed Gaullist and current French premier, Nicolas Sarkozy, campaigned on a similar pledge to make France great, and in doing so, project more power to the world. But the two differ on the means to this end.

For De Gaulle, greatness was best achieved in frequent opposition to the United States. The general likely drew this lesson from the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which the U.S. intervened—after not being consulted—to stop the French, British, and Israeli-led effort to regain control of the canal from Egyptian nationalist president Nasser.

After this rebuff, France and Great Britain were in similar, dire straits: their colonial possessions were disappearing and the United States was emerging as the great power, willing and able to frustrate their imperial endeavors.

Great Britain, henceforth, decided to cling to Washington in order to preserve some of its declining prestige—and the “special relationship” was born. Another viable strategy was to go against the new superpower and seek independence from her, which is the route De Gaulle ended up taking.

France would build up Europe, and a powerful Europe would stand up to the United States and maintain French greatness in the world, a concept which led former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to later remark about De Gaulle: "He talks of Europe and means France." As British historian Timothy Garton Ash observes, "France's rank was to be secured through the institutions of Europe, with French political leadership supported by Germany's economic weight."

It was largely through this framework that France withdrew from the NATO integrated military command in 1966 and forced the mutual security organization to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels; twice denied Great Britain’s application to the European Community in the 1960s, claiming its membership would be like an American “Trojan horse” in the organization; and commenced a rapprochement with Western Germany in the form of the 1963 Elysee Treaty. De Gaulle also flirted with the Soviets, visiting Moscow in 1966.

This is to not to say that De Gaulle openly opposed U.S. foreign policy in all its forms and backed the Soviet Union in the battles of the Cold War. Instead, he actively pursued selective antagonism, attempting to force Washington to take into account French interests.

Sarkozy’s predecessor, Jacques Chirac, carried the Gaullist banner in his calls for a “multilateral world” and resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq—again, not like Hugo Chavez, but nowhere near as friendly to American policy as Tony Blair. A French-led European counterweight was Chirac’s—and De Gaulle’s—ultimate goal.

But this did not happen. Europe has long been divided between Atlanticists who wish to align with Washington on most issues and those who seek to increase European capabilities to balance American power. To be sure, this wedge is not clear-cut, it is not anti-Americans versus Washington lap-dogs—there are different shades.

Nonetheless, there is a rift. The run-up to the Iraq War—with Great Britain, Spain, and Italy, along with many Eastern European countries backing Washington, and France, Germany and others opposing the invasion—highlighted the disunity. But Iraq also showed how fragile these allegiances are, varying from administration to administration.

The European balance of power—not in the conventional sense—of Atlanticists and Gaullists is constantly changing. Spain and Italy are now run by center-left governments who oppose the war and after gaining office quickly withdrew their country’s troops, deployed by former sympathetic conservative leaders, from Iraq. Meanwhile, Germany and France, the main antagonists before the war, are now run by Atlanticists Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy.

One might expect Sarkozy, leader of the Gaullist UMP party to continue De Gaulle and Chirac’s strategy. But this largely has not been the case. Symbolically, he passed over southern France and Europe to vacation in New Hampshire in August. And on the economic side, the new French president is an open admirer of the U.S. and its entrepreneurial spirit and favors American-style reforms of the French labor market.

Sarkozy’s foreign policy, however, is the primary departure from Gaullist ideology. In fact, the French general is likely rolling in his grave after Sarkozy’s recent statements. Opening up old wounds, Sarkozy stated that France should perform a “full role” in NATO, which could lead to the reinstatement of France in the integrated military structure and the reversal of De Gaulle’s 1966 decision.

Moreover, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner frightened many Europeans by alluding to the possibility of military conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, stating: "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war.” He has since moved away from these remarks a bit, but there is a marked change of policy towards Iran.

Kouchner’s declaration has been backed up by threats of more sanctions—outside of the UN Security Council if necessary—if Iran does not comply; similar to Bush’s stance. Washington is no doubt delighted by this somewhat volte-face in French foreign policy, but Gaullists like Chirac are probably not.

Does this truly constitute a repudiation of Gaullist foreign policy? Perhaps not. For all his musings on NATO and Iran, Sarkozy is still an economic nationalist in favor of protection of state-led industry, much like De Gaulle. The French President’s attempts to guard against globalization and build up French and European champions fit the bill. In this sense, American and French interests do not coincide.

Yet, to be sure, no French president has ever appeared so friendly to U.S. foreign policy. Aligning with Washington on a tougher stance vis-à-vis Iran and possibly bringing France back to the forefront of the transatlantic security alliance, NATO, is a clear deviation from De Gaulle and is undoubtedly welcomed by Washington.

Whether the French people will continue to go along with these and other controversial Sarkozy initiatives—his approval rating is roughly in the 60s—remains to be seen. But De Gaulle’s stranglehold on French foreign policy, certainly under Sarkozy, is nearing its end, or to be fitting, its denouement.