Reform Treaty Reveals EU Shortcomings

With last week’s agreement in Brussels on a “reform treaty” for the European Union, much of the rancorous debate on the moribund constitution and its slimmed down successor is now over.

The new treaty features: a new 2 ½-year term EU president; a high representative for foreign affairs, equipped with a diplomatic service; and a new voting system, in which measures pass with the support of 55% of member states and 65% of the overall EU population.

Although the acrimonious negotiations reached a fever pitch, a deal was salvaged. German Chancellor Angela Merkel—who has built up a reputation as a master deal-maker for her efforts at EU conferences and at the recent G8 Summit—once again was adept in bringing the feuding sides together to form a consensual compromise.

The skeptical Poles were appeased by delaying the full inception of the new voting system, which greatly dilutes their influence, until 2017. British interests were also protected, as Blair obtained opt-outs from criminal justice integration and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

For many, the agreement evoked sighs of relief. The EU could now put a halt to its introspection and get to work on the great issues of the day: climate change, terrorism, etc. And with updated institutions and a somewhat united front, the EU is now better able to flex its muscles on the world stage.

For others, however, the treaty represents yet another attempt by the European elite to further enhance its power by going over the heads of the citizenry. After the EU constitution was dismissed by the French and Dutch referendums in 2005, the document was repackaged and will be ratified in national parliaments rather than put to the people in referendums—except for perhaps in Ireland, one of the most pro-EU countries on the continent. This is further proof, in the minds of these critics, of the existence of a “democratic deficit” in the EU.

The democratic deficit is many things for many people. But a common thread in its line of linking is this: the EU is far removed from the people and extracts national sovereignty from member states without popular consent. And ratifying the new treaty—very similar to the constitution denied by the people only two years ago—through national parliaments rather than referendum, does indeed sound very undemocratic.

Yet the European project has always been an elite-driven process. What is new is the allegation of democratic deficiency. What gives? The most likely answer is that the European people were quite willing to surrender power to Brussels and open up national markets as long as their governments maintained large welfare states to protect them.

Now that growth rates across the continent are rather stagnant and the welfare states are at full capacity, the citizenry fears the perception of giving elites in Brussels further power to liberalize and put their jobs at risk. The “permissive consensus” for EU integration, once exhibited by the European populace, is largely over.

At the same time, it is partially the fault of national leaders for this rise in Euro-skepticism. By railing against the shadowy bureaucracy in Brussels, a quite attractive scapegoat, European leaders can shield themselves from blame. This has become a steady practice for national leaders, and has led in many instances to increased nationalism and Euro-skepticism.

Blaming Brussels also often infers a greater level of power onto the EU than it possesses. As a result, people come to expect too much from the EU, and are thus disappointed, as the EU is not a welfare state: it cannot tax and spend. Brussels does not exert much control over “hot-button” issues such as: pensions, education, and defense.

Dictating what constitutes “jam”—the EU indeed caused some consternation after it ruled that marmalade can only be composed of citrus fruits, preserves made of other “soft” fruits must be considered and labeled jam—and how big lawnmowers’ engines can be, does not elicit support or sympathy for one’s cause. To be fair, the EU does indeed do a lot more. Yet these mundane tasks do not inspire or garner popularity.

The EU is confusing to those who study it, so the common man on the street in Lisbon, if he or she even cares, must be bewildered by Brussels. A recent FT/Harris poll indicates that of those surveyed in the United Kingdom, over half had not heard of the EU Constitution or had just heard the name.[1] Yet despite their overwhelming ambivalence, roughly 70% of the Brits in the same poll stated their desire for a popular referendum on the new treaty.

Therein lies the paradox of the EU: many Europeans are either confused about the EU’s actions or do not care, but at the same time, are now against further EU integration. Manifested in the Dutch and French voters’ rejection of the constitutional treaty, this popular feeling of confusion and fear of EU integration is dangerous for the future of Europe. Globalization, added by Europeanization, has unleashed greater economic competition along with an erosion of national identity. And when combined with economic decline, the people, when asked, have unleashed their anger on the EU.

Many of the negative votes cast in France and the Netherlands, undoubtedly were attempts at discrediting the unpopular national governments at the time. But the rise in Euro-skepticism and ambivalence is largely a result of the combination of many factors: namely, the aforementioned end of the permissive consensus hastened by the decline of economic growth and the welfare state; the failure of national leaders to present the benefits of EU membership to the citizenry and their constant insults aimed at Brussels; and the “delivery deficit” of the EU—its incapacity to exert influence on many of the issues that matter to the European populace.

The EU is also at fault for its own unpopularity, through its structure and complexity: it is led by an unelected bureaucracy, the European Commission, which delivers numerous amounts of red tape, annexes and protocols that unnecessarily add to popular confusion.

However, it is difficult to see how else a regulatory body can be run, and aside from cutting red-tape—Jose Barrosso, the current EU Commission President, has promised to do the latter—the responsibility for helping to refurbish the image of the EU lies with national leaders, as ultimately, the member states control Brussels. Although a tough task, national leaders must cease unfair accusations of the EU, help steer the body toward solutions on central issues of the day, and better explain the advantages of EU membership.

Although as undemocratic as it may seem, the best way forward for Europe is the rapid ratification of the new treaty, so it can move on. New initiatives of importance to the citizenry, such as the recent EU agreement on climate change, need to be hashed out multilaterally in Brussels. And the new treaty helps the EU to do so, free from having to worry about constitutions and institutional reforms. As Philip Stephens has noted, “Anything is better than an argument about voting weights.”[2]



[1] Parker, George. “EU citizens want referendum on treaty.” The Financial Times. June 17, 2007.
[2] Stephens, Philip. “The debate about Europe is haunted by shared delusions.” The Financial Times. June 22, 2007.