Special G8 Double Feature -- Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?

(This weekly HACL includes two articles regarding issues discussed at this week's G8 summit)

With all the tension surrounding the upcoming G-8 Summit, namely environmental differences between the U.S. and the other participants, one can rest easy knowing that at least Russia is not again hosting the conference. The summit in St. Petersburg last year, where Russian President Vladimir hypocritically placed energy security as the main issue on the agenda after withholding gas supplies to his neighbors, was entertaining, but disastrous. And with Putin recently clamping down on pro-democracy protesters, being linked to the fatal poisoning of dissidents, and handpicking his potential successor, he would be hard pressed to find the time to host the international gala anyway.

Putin’s authoritarian streak and heavy-handed foreign policy, especially regarding Russia’s “near abroad” neighbors, has put him frequently at odds with the U.S. and much of Europe. The result has been a tit-for-tat shouting match between the two former Cold War adversaries on issues ranging from Iran to missile defense, with Russia attempting to divide Europe to further its aims—giving some pundits cause to warn of a new Cold War looming.

Russia’s concerns were laid out in a policy speech by Putin earlier this year at a security conference in Munich—attended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates—where he roasted U.S. foreign policy and denounced unilateral intervention. Putin declared: “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law…One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way,” and went on to beg the questions: “Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?” Apparently not Mr. Putin. Moscow has consistently wielded different sets of opinion than its western friends over a number of issues, such as the invasion of Iraq, Kosovo, how to deal with a nuclear Iran, and arms control, to name a few.

Of course, the U.S. and Europe are not at all pleased with Putin’s behavior either. Interference in the internal affairs of others, or “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions,” the Russian president warned in Munich, “have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”

Yet Putin has not heeded his own advice: intervening on the side of Victor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and later unilaterally shutting off energy supplies to the country, and deporting Georgians from Russia and placing a quasi-embargo on its tiny neighbor’s goods after Tbilisi arrested a few alleged Russian spies. Unilateralism has been met with more unilateralism. Indeed, Putin’s response to U.S. unilateralism is like confronting a friend’s alcoholism by becoming an alcoholic.

More specifically, the most contentious, and potentially the most dangerous, issue as of late has been Washington’s decision to place missile interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic as part of a missile defense shield. It is aimed at Iran, not Russia, as Bush administration officials contend. But Putin, predictably, is not convinced—at least not publicly. The Russian president has noted, “The U.S. said that this system is deployed to defend the threat from Iran, but the scope of Iran's missile could not reach Europe.” True, as far as we know, but this shield is for the future, planning for the worst should the Iranian nuclear talks go awry.

While the shield would be deployed near Russian borders, it is clearly a defensive weapon. Roughly ten missile defense interceptors and a radar system should not worry the Kremlin. Even if it was a defensive posture against Russia, nuclear warheads from Moscow—numbering in the thousands—could easily bypass the missile shield and obliterate European and American cities.

Furthermore, as Stephen Rademaker points out, if the U.S. truly wished to defend against Russia, it would not deploy the system in Europe. The former State Department official observes, “If Russia really is worried about the effect on its 2200-warhead strategic nuclear force of 10 additional interceptors, then it ought to applaud the decision to install them in Europe rather than Alaska, where most US interceptors are… Alaska is downrange from Russian ICBM bases, so interceptors launched from there would have better odds of shooting down incoming Russian warheads.”[1]

To be sure, the Kremlin should not have been expected to immediately warm to the idea of an American-led defense system mounting near its borders, but it is quite clear that the system is not meant to defend against a perceived Russian threat. Moreover, the Bush Administration has even asked the Russians to participate in the program. Missile Defense Agency head General Obering has stated, regarding the threat from ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), “If we were to combine with Russia to set up a common defense system to make these weapons basically unusable, that would be a perfect goal.”

Besides scathing rhetoric, the Kremlin’s response has been to threaten to pull out of Cold War-era arms treaties and aim weapons at Eastern Europe. Putin has warned that Russia maintains the right to withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, both initiatives sought to limit the Cold War military buildup in Europe.

The Kremlin has followed this up by declaring its intention to direct its military might at Eastern Europe. Putin gave notice that “if the American nuclear potential grows in European territory, we will have to have new targets in Europe.” Russia does have a right to reexamine the treaties above, as the Bush Administration did indeed pull out of the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia, which limited anti-ballistic missile defenses, in 2002. But Putin agreed to it, and again, it does not make much sense for Putin to rail against American unilateralism and then act unilaterally.

Putin’s threats were then matched by action. Last week, Russia test-fired new missiles, which the Kremlin said were a necessary reaction to the missile defense shield. Putin’s defense was, “It wasn't us who initiated a new round of arms race.” But in seeking to demonstrate its invulnerability to the missile defense shield, Russia has only strengthened the U.S. argument that the shield is not aimed at Moscow. Russian Defense Minister and potential Putin successor, Sergei Ivanov, cautioned, “A more efficient sword can be found for every shield.” Precisely. Bush Administration spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said the same thing in so many words, “Russia's strong missile capabilities are no match for our European missile defense plans and will not upset the strategic balance in the region.”

Where is Europe in all of this? As has been the norm, much of Europe is divided over missile defense. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has advised the U.S. to better inform Russia and NATO on the details of the shield and her foreign minister Kurt Beck has warned of a new arms race in Europe, while the Czechs and Poles seem more than willing to host the system.

This division between much of Eastern and Western Europe underlines the EU’s troubled relationship with Russia. Germany and France, among others in Western Europe, have been known to favor a less confrontational approach to Moscow than their Eastern European neighbors, whose current antagonism toward Russia is only natural given the Soviet Union’s former occupation and oppression of Eastern Europe during the Cold War.

Poland has refused to allow for a new EU-Russia partnership agreement until Moscow ends its unnecessary embargo on Polish meats. Meanwhile, Estonia’s decision to remove a Soviet WWII monument from its current site sparked widespread condemnation from the Kremlin. The EU has only tepidly supported its eastern members in their current plights with Russia. Regarding the Estonian dispute, Jonathan Eyal observed, “At every stage, the Union has given the indication that it is prepared to compromise over the interests of its new members in order to maintain good links with Moscow.”[2]

Putin relishes European division, and frequently has sought to bring it about—largely through energy supplies. And as Philip Stephens argues, “In missile defense, he sees another opportunity to create division.”[3] A weak, divided Europe allows the Kremlin to regain old clout and wrest more influence over its former Soviet possessions and Eastern European satellites.

While much easier said than done, especially when discussing 25 different states, the EU needs to unify and create a more common approach to Russia—chiefly regarding energy policy, Kosovo, and the U.S. missile defense shield. Brussels should stand up for its member states when they are unjustly affronted by the Kremlin, but at the same time, the newly-acceded Eastern European members should not let a cruel history justify unwarranted provocation of Moscow.

On the other side of the pond, the U.S. needs to take into account Russia’s security imperatives, but should not cower to Putin’s harsh rhetoric. Bush famously stated after his first face to face with the Russian president that he looked at Putin and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” Well, it is doubtful that Bush would be happy if he took another look.

However, Bush needs the Kremlin’s help on a wide range of issues, namely nuclear talks with Iran and non-proliferation of their respective nuclear weapon arsenals. The recent tit-for-tat escalation between Washington and Moscow, largely over missile defense, is counterproductive and each side is not likely to stand down, making their upcoming meeting at the G8 quite tense. But the two sides’ differences are nowhere near Cold-War levels, and there is no realistic threat of nuclear annihilation. Hence, while certainly not a new Cold War; unfortunately, relations between Russia and the West are getting frostier by the minute.

[1] Rademaker, Stephen. “America and Russia need a wider deal on missiles.” The Financial Times. May 24, 2007.
[2] Eyal, Jonathan. “European appeasement will worsen Russian aggression.” The Financial Times. May 18, 2007.
[3] Stephens, Philip. “The Putin Strategy is to divide Europe over missile defense.” The Financial Times. April 13, 2007.