Missile Defense Update: "Putin's Mysterious Proposal"

(This is a brief update to the article: "Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?")

With Russian President Vladimir Putin, one never knows what to expect—hence the reason for this update. The most recent posting, titled “Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?”, discussed the ever-increasing acrimony between Russia and the West, specifically regarding the debate over missile defense.

In the run-up to this week’s G8 Summit, Putin and Bush seemed to have dug in their heels, rearing for a fight over the controversial missile defense shield. Bush appeared dead-set on deploying the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic while Putin said he would respond in kind by pulling out of related treaties and targeting nuclear weapons at Eastern Europe.

But then Putin, to the astonishment of Washington and others, came out with a proposal to base the radar system for the missile defense shield in neighboring Azerbaijan. This would diminish Russia’s security concerns and as a result, Moscow would no longer need to point nuclear weapons at its western neighbors—ending the war of words between the two sides.

The US had previously attempted to enlist the cooperation of Russia on this project, but to no avail. Putin’s offer, thus, surprised the Bush Administration. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated shortly after hearing of the Russian proposal, “It is a bold proposal. We have to have our experts look at it.”

At first glance, the deal is the best of both worlds: it protects all of Europe from Iranian missiles and does not antagonize Moscow. Yet it is a less than advantageous alternative for Washington. For one, placing the radar system in Azerbaijan increases the distance between the radar and the missile defense interceptors in Poland, thereby weakening its efficiency. An additional geographical problem is that the radar would be too close to Iran, from which the shield would be likely intercepting missiles. And politically, basing an essential part of the system in Azerbaijan, a dictatorial and former Soviet state, is certainly less attractive than doing so in the more pro-American and democratic Czech Republic.

Given its flaws, outlined above, Washington is likely to take issue with the proposal. Yet Washington must seem flexible and willing to listen to the alternative—especially given its reputation for stubborn unilateralism and the primacy of this issue. At the end of the day, however, Bush will likely refuse the Kremlin’s overture. As the Moscow-based defense analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, points out, “The Pentagon won’t want this at all.”

What, then, is Putin’s rationale for putting forward this new plan? Indeed, this may seem to be a breakthrough compromise brokered by Putin, but it is most likely another ploy by the crafty president. The Kremlin sees yet another opportunity to paint the Bush Administration as unilateralist and insensitive to others’ security concerns.

In making an offer Bush has to refuse, Putin will be seen as the more compromising and cool-headed of the two leaders, offering a reasonable alternative that the imperialist Americans characteristically dismiss. Russia will appear to be less belligerent, enlisting—in theory—more international support, and engendering more legitimacy for its objections to the deployment of the system in Europe, which will in turn further divide Europeans on the issue.

This could turn out to be yet another victory for the Kremlin’s divide and conquer strategy, which has shown itself largely via the use of energy supplies. While Putin is quite unpredictable in general, the West should be catching on to his shrewd, deceptive ways.