Terrorism: En Español

This past weekend’s terrorist attacks in the U.K., perpetrated in London and Glasgow, dominated the headlines. Saturday's bomb threat conducted by ETA, the Basque militant group which has terrorized Spain for over forty years, at the Ibiza airport, as a result, was secondary news. It was just another day for Spaniards living under the wrath of ETA, underlining both the steady reality and political impact of terrorism in Spain.

ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which roughly translates to Basque Homeland and Liberty, emerged from a Basque youth group in the late 1950s, and carried out its first violent operation in 1961 by attempting to derail a train full of pro-Franco Civil War veterans. It has been traumatizing Spain in its quest for an independent Basque state ever since, claiming over 800 victims.

Many tactics have been employed by Madrid over the years in an effort to eradicate the group and lessen its popularity. Francisco Franco, the dictator who ruled the country from 1939 until his death in 1975, chose the iron fist, making illegal any manifestation of “Basqueness”: language, symbols, festivals, etc. This subjugation of Basque rights undoubtedly had a hand in the birth of ETA.

After the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the Basques were granted a high degree of sovereignty in the form of the Basque Statute of Autonomy. Yet shortly thereafter, ETA’s body count increased dramatically.

This led the Felipe Gonzalez’s socialist government in the 1980s to engage in what was known as the “dirty war”. Under its auspices, the government sponsored death squads to stamp out ETA, an effort which not only resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians, but also fuelled a new generation of Basques to hate Madrid and militarize. Ceasefires have since been negotiated and broken. In the end, neither devolution nor repression has successfully led to the end of ETA, leaving the Spanish authorities clutching for options.

Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the current Spanish Prime Minister, drew the ire of many, especially on the right, when he began a direct dialogue with ETA. Negotiations then resulted in the terrorist group’s announcement of a “permanent ceasefire” in the spring of 2005. Yet hopes of a lasting peace were dashed last December when ETA bombed the Barajas airport in Madrid, killing two Ecuadorians. And now the ceasefire has been completely nullified by the Basque militants, hence the recent attack in Ibiza.

Thanks to ETA, Spaniards have had to learn to live with terrorism—as harsh as that may sound. Spain is unique in this regard. It is indeed one of the few countries home to an Association of Victims of Terrorism (ATV) group, which wields political clout in regards to government policy on ETA. Add to the mix the recent threat from militant Islam—embodied in the devastating attacks of March 11, 2004—and Spain is ensconced with terrorism.

The 2004 election results, which catapulted the likely runner-up Zapatero to the Moncloa Palace, literally were a byproduct of terrorism. Terrorist attacks by Islamic militants three days prior and the PP-led government’s inept insistence on linking ETA to the bombings despite evidence to the contrary led Spaniards to punish the Popular Party at the ballot box.

Given the age-old threat from ETA and the recent targeting of Spain by Islamic militants, it is safe to say that Spanish politics is dominated by terrorism. Similar to the current political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere, in Spain a potential terrorist attack results in a drop in the approval rating of the standing government.

But this was not always the case. For the most part, Madrid’s ETA strategy was agreed upon on a bi-partisan basis between the center-right Popular Party and the center-left Socialists, a strategy recently approved in writing via the 2000 Anti-Terrorism Pact.

However, intense political polarization has been the norm in Spain, particularly after the March 11th attacks, poisoning consensual relations between the two sides. Moreover, since Zapatero went against the advice of PP in negotiating with ETA—and attempted to garner the glory and title of the leader who provided an end to the most persistent problem in Spain—he staked his government’s reputation on the successful outcome of the negotiations.

When they went afoul and ETA perpetrated the attack on Barajas Airport, his popularity consequently took a major hit. Meanwhile, PP leader Mariano Rajoy’s previous accusations of naiveté on the part of the Socialist administration for talking to terrorists were given more credence, producing a poll bounce for the opposition conservatives.

Zapatero has since railed against ETA’s breaking of the ceasefire and called off negotiations, and even reached out to Rajoy in an attempt to renew the bi-partisan anti-terrorism strategy. But the PP leader’s hard-line approach on ETA is a vote-winner.
And he recognizes that reuniting his party with the Socialists largely prevents him from continuing to score political points by denouncing Zapatero’s stance on the Basque group. As such, Rajoy has stipulated stringent conditions for his support, complicating the fence-mending negotiations with Zapatero.

Because of its tumultuous past and current experience with ETA, Spain is better prepared to handle the Islamic terrorist threat, which will take good intelligence and ruthless enforcement of the law. And regarding ETA, its popularity and therefore also its finances and manpower, are greatly diminished as a result of its indiscriminate death toll and effective Spanish policing.

As in the case of US relations (or lack thereof) with Iran, negotiations with ETA are needed. Talking, in and of itself, does not reward bad behavior, and it is doubtful that ETA will unilaterally dismantle without dialogue and incentives—the carrot must go along with the stick. Furthermore, in contrast to Al Qaida and its more independent conspirators, ETA’s goals are known: an independent and united Basque state.

This makes it easier for negotiations—Madrid knows what it wants—and tougher as well, as the group appears dead-set on a dream that Spain will not fully grant. Yet given its relative weakness, ETA may opt for something less than its stated goal, perhaps a power-sharing agreement a la the peace agreement in Northern Ireland. But it takes consultation to hammer these things out. Hence, in essence Zapatero was not wrong in reaching out to ETA.

But the manner in which he did it, secretively offering almost unconditional talks with the terrorist group while keeping PP out of the discussion, was naïve and counterproductive. For his part, Rajoy has not helped the situation by making Zapatero and Spain’s loss his political gain. But unfortunately that is politics. Nonetheless, only by banding together in a bi-partisan approach, offering talks with incentives and disincentives, will ETA be closer to its demise. And the Spanish people, after years of trauma, will be grateful.