NIE Findings On Iran Are Good—But Not Great

Finally there is a report somewhat praising the regime in Tehran. According to a newly-declassified National Intelligence Estimate, Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, after succumbing to Western diplomacy, and could make further concessions given the right pressure and incentives.

The good news traveled fast—well, unless you are Mike Huckabee. Less than twenty-four hours after the NIE became available, politicians and analysts alike were jumping for joy. Senator Hillary Clinton declared: “I'm relieved that the intelligence community has reached this conclusion.”

But other Democrats were tougher in their tone, utilizing the information to make the case that the Bush Administration was overestimating the threat from Iran to further its case for regime change. Clinton’s fellow Democratic presidential contender John Edwards noted, in reference to the administration, “It's absolutely clear and eerily similar to what we saw with Iraq, where they were headed." "The last seven years in the Mideast by this administration have been the lost seven years when you see on every front a reversal,” said Rahm Emanuel, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus.

Not so fast. While certainly a welcome development, the NIE does not close the case on Iran and its nuclear program—not even close. While certainly understandable, the Democrats should wait before using the findings for political vindication, just as the Republicans should not act as if the news is insignificant.

Indeed, the NIE does not alter many of the troubling circumstances surrounding Iran. First, Iran is still a sponsor or terrorism, funding and supporting Hizbollah; less than helpful in Iraq, shipping weapons to the country for attacks on Sunni and coalition forces; and has belligerent regional ambitions.

Second, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the country continues to produce highly-enriched uranium, which can be weaponized and made into a bomb. The NIE stated that there was indeed a covert nuclear weapons program, albeit suspended in 2003, a finding which sows doubt about Iranian claims of a peaceful program in and of itself. Moreover, Tehran hid its nuclear program for over 20 years; is known to have received information from AQ Khan, the Pakistani who ran a black market nuclear bazaar; and is not fully cooperating with the UN and IAEA—just ask Mohammed El-Bareidi.

The IAEA chief a few months back gave Iran the benefit of the doubt and the chance to come clean about its troubled past, but was somewhat rebuked. His recent report, while not entirely damning, notes, Iran’s “cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,” and “since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing.”

No sideswipe at the intelligence community whatsoever, but intelligence is inherently flawed—and in this case, perhaps even more so. Primarily because the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, it lacks intelligence resources in Tehran. Iran is also thought to be mindful of the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq, where Israeli planes took out Saddam's nascent nuclear plant, so it disperses and hides its nuclear facilities underground, making them almost impervious to inspection and military strikes. Hence, the NIE's conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt.

In fact, the NIE could even have a negative net effect. It has been seized upon by the Iranians for a media tool. They can now play the victims of baseless Western accusations and hostility. Firebrand Iranian president Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "This is a declaration of victory for the Iranian nation against the world powers over the nuclear issue…a final shot to those who, in the past several years, spread a sense of threat and concern in the world through lies of nuclear weapons.”

Also, the intelligence disclosure will likely disrupt the relative international unity at the UNSC, which recently saw China and Russia, previously dragging their feet, come on board for new sanctions. Do not be surprised when Putin references the NIE for his reluctance to agree to more sanctions.

So where does that leave us? Well, Iran continues to produce highly enriched uranium and has not come clean about its nuclear past and future ambitions. The problem has not gone away.

Iran has the distinct advantage of being able, through Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty, to legally wield a civilian uranium enrichment process on its soil. There is the rub. Any solution will thus have to involve talking Tehran out of doing something perfectly legal, in order to prevent it from using that as a front for a covert, illegal weapons program. And to do so the U.S. must offer a package of carrots and sticks.

As has been the case for years, a grand bargain is needed, one which addresses Iranian energy and security. While one of the biggest energy producing nations, Tehran still complains of the need to diversify its energy through a nuclear program. Iran also has legitimate security concerns: the U.S. maintains a military presence on its borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is almost fully surrounded by ideologically hostile Sunni-Arab states; add Israel to the mix and one could say the neighborhood is quite dangerous.

An energy solution would allow for a limited uranium enrichment facility in Iran—a nationalist prerequisite—or enriching it somewhere else, Russia perhaps, as has been proposed, and sending it back to Tehran. A regional security conference or regime, which would regularly bring these neighbors together to discuss differences and security conditions, could be a good start. But at the end of the day, the U.S. must engage Iran and put everything on the table: economic incentives, possibility of renewed diplomatic relations, security guarantees, and more.

In return, Iran must give up its expansive uranium enrichment program, disclose any and all information on its past and present nuclear undertakings, and scale back its links with Hizbollah and Shia militias in Iraq. To be sure, this is a daunting task. But if the U.S. directly intervened and put forward a grand bargain and Iran balked, the U.S. would no longer be subject to criticism for its lack of engagement and carrots, and Iran would truly be isolated. It is indeed worth a try.

For all Bush’s sabre-rattling, Washington is in no mood for another occupation—especially of a country with roughly three times the landmass and the population of Iraq, not to mention a more fervent nationalist streak. Yet neither is it content with the possibility of a nuclear Iran.

As such, all must be done to strike an accord. The NIE does hold out chances for success, given the mullah’s supposed positive response to Western pressure, but does not fully change or alleviate the situation. This good news only turns to great when the problem is close to being resolved.