News of Russian warships docking in the harbors of Venezuela, home to U.S. antagonist Hugo Chavez, understandably rang alarm bells in Washington this week. They preceded a visit by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, who became the first Kremlin leader to ever tour Caracas. Although nothing revolutionary transpired – an energy pact was signed and joint naval exercises were scheduled – this visit, along with Medvedev’s subsequent talks with Cuba’s Raul Castro, signaled an attempt to undermine U.S. leverage in the region, a move that harkens back to the Cold War.
In many respects, the Cold War offered a certain degree of predictability. Both sides, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, knew their enemy and their respective spheres of influence. A Soviet action in the U.S. backyard, Latin America, often warranted a rebuke in the Soviet sphere of influence, Eastern Europe, and vice-versa. For instance, when Moscow got wind of the U.S. placing missiles a mere 150 meters from the Soviet Union, in Turkey, it responded by stationing warheads in Cuba, strikingly close to U.S. borders, thus sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis.
This simple dichotomy, oddly enough, offered comfort to many policymakers – fears of nuclear holocaust notwithstanding. Now, after the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, unfortunately, U.S.-Russian relations show signs of reverting back to this tit-for-tat Cold War model.
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the creation of newly-independent states in the Former Soviet Union ushered in a period of unparallel Western influence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, what was previously the Soviet sphere of influence. NATO and the European Union gained members from across the region, spreading right up to Russia’s borders. Moscow, plagued by economic collapse and political turmoil, was then too weak to effectively withstand the Western march.
Putin’s Russia, fuelled by energy receipts and a resurgent nationalism, has recently pushed back. In April of this year, Putin, in no uncertain terms, deemed NATO expansion a menacing development, stating, “The emergence of the powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russia's security.” Coinciding with U.S. President-Elect Obama’s electoral victory, on November 5th, the current Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev, declared, “What we’ve had to deal with in the last few years – the construction of a global missile defense system, the encirclement of Russia by military blocs, unrestrained Nato enlargement and other gifts . . . The impression is we are being tested to the limit.”
This rhetoric has been backed up by tangible measures: military intervention in Georgia and close collaboration with American adversaries, notably Cuba and Venezuela. Indeed, Caracas has recently purchased arms from Moscow in vast quantities, racking up a bill of over $4 billion since 2005, including 100,000 Kalashnikov assault rifles and fighter aircraft.
What is Washington to make of this? Russia certainly views its relations with Havana and Caracas as a tool with which to retaliate for Western forays into its “near abroad”. Its most recent acts have been labeled by many as payback for Western support for Georgia, especially in the aftermath of the recent conflict in August, and the missile defense program in Poland and the Czech Republic. As Dmitry Simes, Russia Analyst at the Nixon Center, observes, "The Russians want to demonstrate that two can play at this game. Clearly, the visit is a gesture towards the US. While business is a consideration, and Russian clearly has business interests in Venezuela, I don't think you need to send President Medvedev for this. The trip is motivated by politics."
Venezuela and Cuba, for their part, are more than happy to join forces with Russia to thumb their noses at Washington. Both need the arms and investment that many in the West are unwilling to provide, but just as it is with Russia, the partnership is largely spurred by geopolitical reasons. Mutual interests have seemingly converged for these parties.
In concrete terms, naval exercises and small economic deals do not constitute a genuine security concern. As Johanna Mendelson Forman, from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, points out, “There is no immediate threat to US security.” Clearly, the Cold War is not back. The rivalry, geopolitical landscape and inherent dangers are largely incomparable.
However, it does indicate a willingness and ability by Moscow and some countries in the region to frustrate U.S. efforts. Moreover, the Cold War paradigm of U.S. and Russian spheres of influence – if it ever fully subsided – is back in full swing. Moscow, like the U.S., does not appreciate meddling in its backyard, and will act if necessary.
To be sure, there is an ongoing struggle for influence between Russia and the U.S., particularly in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The Kremlin will retaliate in some fashion if it sees its regional interests threatened by the U.S. At least the next time it does, Washington should not be caught off guard.
Friday, November 28, 2008
Thursday, November 6, 2008
The Upside of the Financial Crisis
The collapse of the U.S. sub-prime mortgage market has spiraled into a credit crunch and full-blown global financial crisis. While some have been hit harder than others, no nation is immune to the disastrous effects. Analysts and politicians alike have compared the current state of the economy to the great depression. Hundreds of billions of dollars have been earmarked to rescue banks worldwide. Yet amidst all this turmoil, one positive trend has emerged: a sharp decline in energy prices, which has temporarily weakened some of America’s adversaries.
As global prosperity has waned, so too has the demand for oil, which in turn has driven down prices. Oil now trades for roughly $65 a barrel – a far cry from its peak in July of over $145 a barrel – and should continue to fall. OPEC’s recent cut in production has so far failed to stem the tide. Michael Lewis, commodity strategist at Deutsche Bank, forecasts, “Production cuts will not rescue the oil price over the coming year. We target WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude hitting $50 a barrel next year.”
Oil producing nations, unsurprisingly, have taken a financial hit. Many of them depend on relatively high oil prices to fuel their domestic economies and project power and influence on the world stage – both of which are momentarily undermined by the international economic climate.
U.S. foes, Iran and Venezuela, who have been among the most vociferous advocates of the OPEC slash in supplies, will be particularly vulnerable if this trend continues. Iranian President Mahmoud AhmadiNejad campaigned three years ago on redistributing his country’s vast oil wealth to the poor. Although his economic policies, notably the pressuring of banks to offer cheap loans, have led to skyrocketing inflation, he has still utilized oil windfalls to preserve his positive image among the downtrodden.
But the decrease in energy receipts may force him to reevaluate – just in time for the looming presidential election. As Iran analyst, Ali Ansari, asserts, “The one thing that will sabotage AhmadiNejad’s chances of re-election is the economy. It’s his Achilles heel that he has not delivered during this oil boom.”
Whether or not the price of oil will dip down to the dangerous level of $55 a barrel, upon which the Iranian budget relies, remains to be seen. Yet the political vulnerability of AhmadiNejad and the country’s over-reliance on energy exports have been exposed.
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has gone on a similar spending spree in order to endear himself to his poverty-stricken constituency. With oil prices hovering above $100 a barrel, he could spend like a drunken sailor. He can no longer afford to do so.
Given the country’s extreme dependence on energy funds - oil constitutes almost 95 percent of total exports – Chavez could find himself in dire political and economic straits if oil prices do not rebound dramatically. Failing to diversify the economy, while at the same time scaring away many foreign investors, Chavez has ensured that the country’s energy dependence will continue.
Exacerbating these conditions, Caracas is having trouble even maintaining current oil production levels. Venezuela’s state-led energy group, PDVSA, cannot keep up, largely due to a dearth of new and efficient technology, which would normally be provided by foreign investors. If new resources are not tapped, the country’s economic lifeline will be jeopardized. All these factors point to the need for Chavez to adjust his statist economic model and may trigger his eventual demise.
Economic troubles at home would refocus these two regimes - and other prominent oil exporting countries such as Russia - away from the international scene. And without the financial and political bravado provided by high energy prices, their aggressive international forays, which are often contrary to U.S. interests, would likely subside. It is unfortunate that it took an economic meltdown, leaving many people hurting across the globe, to highlight these opportunities.
Energy prices fluctuate; the recent drop will not last forever. The world still needs oil, and nations such as Iran and Venezuela are more than happy to provide it. Yet recent events offer a preview of the tangible benefits that U.S. foreign policy could reap if Washington did finally take steps to achieve energy independence.
As global prosperity has waned, so too has the demand for oil, which in turn has driven down prices. Oil now trades for roughly $65 a barrel – a far cry from its peak in July of over $145 a barrel – and should continue to fall. OPEC’s recent cut in production has so far failed to stem the tide. Michael Lewis, commodity strategist at Deutsche Bank, forecasts, “Production cuts will not rescue the oil price over the coming year. We target WTI (West Texas Intermediate) crude hitting $50 a barrel next year.”
Oil producing nations, unsurprisingly, have taken a financial hit. Many of them depend on relatively high oil prices to fuel their domestic economies and project power and influence on the world stage – both of which are momentarily undermined by the international economic climate.
U.S. foes, Iran and Venezuela, who have been among the most vociferous advocates of the OPEC slash in supplies, will be particularly vulnerable if this trend continues. Iranian President Mahmoud AhmadiNejad campaigned three years ago on redistributing his country’s vast oil wealth to the poor. Although his economic policies, notably the pressuring of banks to offer cheap loans, have led to skyrocketing inflation, he has still utilized oil windfalls to preserve his positive image among the downtrodden.
But the decrease in energy receipts may force him to reevaluate – just in time for the looming presidential election. As Iran analyst, Ali Ansari, asserts, “The one thing that will sabotage AhmadiNejad’s chances of re-election is the economy. It’s his Achilles heel that he has not delivered during this oil boom.”
Whether or not the price of oil will dip down to the dangerous level of $55 a barrel, upon which the Iranian budget relies, remains to be seen. Yet the political vulnerability of AhmadiNejad and the country’s over-reliance on energy exports have been exposed.
In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez has gone on a similar spending spree in order to endear himself to his poverty-stricken constituency. With oil prices hovering above $100 a barrel, he could spend like a drunken sailor. He can no longer afford to do so.
Given the country’s extreme dependence on energy funds - oil constitutes almost 95 percent of total exports – Chavez could find himself in dire political and economic straits if oil prices do not rebound dramatically. Failing to diversify the economy, while at the same time scaring away many foreign investors, Chavez has ensured that the country’s energy dependence will continue.
Exacerbating these conditions, Caracas is having trouble even maintaining current oil production levels. Venezuela’s state-led energy group, PDVSA, cannot keep up, largely due to a dearth of new and efficient technology, which would normally be provided by foreign investors. If new resources are not tapped, the country’s economic lifeline will be jeopardized. All these factors point to the need for Chavez to adjust his statist economic model and may trigger his eventual demise.
Economic troubles at home would refocus these two regimes - and other prominent oil exporting countries such as Russia - away from the international scene. And without the financial and political bravado provided by high energy prices, their aggressive international forays, which are often contrary to U.S. interests, would likely subside. It is unfortunate that it took an economic meltdown, leaving many people hurting across the globe, to highlight these opportunities.
Energy prices fluctuate; the recent drop will not last forever. The world still needs oil, and nations such as Iran and Venezuela are more than happy to provide it. Yet recent events offer a preview of the tangible benefits that U.S. foreign policy could reap if Washington did finally take steps to achieve energy independence.
Friday, May 2, 2008
Welcome to the Club
This year was supposed to mark China’s coming out party. With the premier athletes from across the globe descending upon Beijing this summer for the Olympics, the world was set to take notice of China’s growing economic and political clout. Problem is, it has—but not of its positive aspects, as Beijing had originally hoped.
China has gotten more than it bargained for. The voyage of the Olympic torch through the West has brought Beijing more news coverage, but has also been accompanied by rowdy demonstrations, railing against Beijing’s perceived indifference to suffering in Sudan and Tibet.
This in turn has prompted a nationalist backlash by Chinese at home and abroad. Because of the anti-Beijing rallies in Paris, where a disabled Chinese man carrying the torch was accosted by pro-Tibetan protesters, a Chinese boycott of French supermarket chain Carrefour has gained credence. Western business and media outlets in the country are now increasingly under attack.
A rise in Chinese nationalism, from Beijing's point of view, could be seen as a welcome byproduct of the Sino-Western tensions. But politburo members in Beijing know that the dissent could easily turn toward the autocratic government, as it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989. All in all, the crowning achievement of attaining the Olympics appears to have backfired on Beijing, largely in the form of increased Western hostility.
Unfortunately, for China, this is just the beginning. With power, comes responsibility--and more importantly, attention. As Mark Leonard points out, “China is now living in a goldfish bowl where everything they do is being looked at very closely.”
The message is clear: the days of quietly funding corrupt dictators in Africa in return for oil, with little or no criticism, is over. In a globalized world, word travels fast, and Beijing, despite its best efforts, cannot block out all the bad press.
Unlike previous empires, even recent ones such as 19th century Britain, global powers cannot toil abroad without the rest of world's eyes fixed upon them. And the best of intentions do not matter on the international stage. Having a global presence often provokes indigenous antagonism—just ask Washington.
Indeed, American policymakers must be reveling in sharing the burden of global resentment with Bejing. China’s declining international popularity was recently borne out in a FT/Harris poll. The majority of the populations in Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, now, for the first time, view China as the biggest threat to global stability—a crown happily relinquished by Washington.
With an expanding military and economy, represented internationally by an aggressive sovereign wealth fund, Beijing should expect greater global enmity. Anti-Chinese economic protectionism is on the rise in Western capitals, and is not due to ebb anytime soon.
Principally, there are two options available to the ruling Communists. They could tread lightly and avoid making international waves. Or they could utilize their power to gain more global influence, taking on the augmented criticism. This power paradox comes with the territory. Welcome to the club.
China has gotten more than it bargained for. The voyage of the Olympic torch through the West has brought Beijing more news coverage, but has also been accompanied by rowdy demonstrations, railing against Beijing’s perceived indifference to suffering in Sudan and Tibet.
This in turn has prompted a nationalist backlash by Chinese at home and abroad. Because of the anti-Beijing rallies in Paris, where a disabled Chinese man carrying the torch was accosted by pro-Tibetan protesters, a Chinese boycott of French supermarket chain Carrefour has gained credence. Western business and media outlets in the country are now increasingly under attack.
A rise in Chinese nationalism, from Beijing's point of view, could be seen as a welcome byproduct of the Sino-Western tensions. But politburo members in Beijing know that the dissent could easily turn toward the autocratic government, as it did in Tiananmen Square in 1989. All in all, the crowning achievement of attaining the Olympics appears to have backfired on Beijing, largely in the form of increased Western hostility.
Unfortunately, for China, this is just the beginning. With power, comes responsibility--and more importantly, attention. As Mark Leonard points out, “China is now living in a goldfish bowl where everything they do is being looked at very closely.”
The message is clear: the days of quietly funding corrupt dictators in Africa in return for oil, with little or no criticism, is over. In a globalized world, word travels fast, and Beijing, despite its best efforts, cannot block out all the bad press.
Unlike previous empires, even recent ones such as 19th century Britain, global powers cannot toil abroad without the rest of world's eyes fixed upon them. And the best of intentions do not matter on the international stage. Having a global presence often provokes indigenous antagonism—just ask Washington.
Indeed, American policymakers must be reveling in sharing the burden of global resentment with Bejing. China’s declining international popularity was recently borne out in a FT/Harris poll. The majority of the populations in Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Germany, now, for the first time, view China as the biggest threat to global stability—a crown happily relinquished by Washington.
With an expanding military and economy, represented internationally by an aggressive sovereign wealth fund, Beijing should expect greater global enmity. Anti-Chinese economic protectionism is on the rise in Western capitals, and is not due to ebb anytime soon.
Principally, there are two options available to the ruling Communists. They could tread lightly and avoid making international waves. Or they could utilize their power to gain more global influence, taking on the augmented criticism. This power paradox comes with the territory. Welcome to the club.
Tuesday, March 4, 2008
Fidel Leaves, Embargo Stays
When a policy fails to achieve its stated goal, it is usually changed. Pragmatism ultimately trumps ideology. Or so rationalism dictates. America’s Cuba policy, largely embodied by the 1962 trade embargo, does not follow this course. But with the recent abdication of Fidel Castro, handing over the reigns of government to his brother Raul after over four decades of autocratic rule, there might be an opening to correct the misguided policies of the past and ease the embargo.
After the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s, when communist rebel Fidel Castro deposed the pro-US military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the U.S. reevaluated relations with Cuba. With the Cold War in full force and the Soviets quickly lending support to Havana, the U.S. pulled out all the stops to quell the revolution raging in its backyard.
In the 1960s, the communist regime and the embargo withstood the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Cuban missile crisis; and several assassination attempts on Castro—some did not seek to kill him, one plot involved thallium salts in an effort to emasculate the charismatic leader by forcing his hair, beard and all, to fall out.
Despite America’s best efforts, Castro remained—emboldened from survival. Yet when Castro’s main benefactor and bankroller, the Soviet Union, crumbled in the early 1990s, Cuba was mired in political and economic chaos. Without subsidies from its communist comrades in Moscow, Christopher Caldwell notes, “Cuba turned into a basket case. People worked by candlelight and in restaurants the silverware was chained to the tables.”
In Washington, the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union should have resulted in a re-think, but the opposite resulted: a strengthened embargo. Indeed, rather than stepping in to help them pick up the pieces, hardliners determined the embargo was needed now more than ever. The thinking was: Castro is going under; all he needs is a little push.
This nudge came in the form of the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. The former stated that the fall of Castro and the inception of democracy on the island had to precipitate the lifting of the embargo, while the latter added sanctions on third countries which trade with Cuba.
These acts did little to curb Castro’s autocracy. And despite the end of Soviet support and the strengthening of the embargo, the regimes obituary was never written. Now, Fidel has stepped aside, and still Washington will not budge. Why?
If the policy was dictated by geopolitics, in a rational goal-oriented fashion, the embargo would have been lifted after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the small island was no longer threatening. Another paradox lies in the fact that Cuba has become an outlier among communist nations: U.S. relations with China and Vietnam have warmed by leaps and bounds and are now marked by burgeoning trade flows. Moreover, there would be no embargo if economics took precedence—American exporters stand to gain from access to the Cuban market. Agricultural trade was loosened in 2000, and now U.S. food exports to Havana total over $400 million.
The primary answer to this foreign policy question, however, oddly enough lies in the domestic realm. As the importance of Cuba as a Cold War strategic battleground waned, domestic politics gained precedence. The Cuban-American lobby—chiefly made up of hard line exiles represented by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)—stepped in to fill the power vacuum, funding and pressuring candidates to support anti-Castro policies.
The strategic location of these hardliners—concentrated in the swing states, Florida and New Jersey—gives them an electoral advantage. It is telling that the two major pieces of legislation above passed in election years: 1992 and 1996. No candidate attempting to win the presidency can fully support lifting the embargo without the fear of losing votes in Florida, where less than a thousand votes separated Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 election.
Recent case in point: Mike Huckabee. As Arkansas governor in 2002, he wrote a letter to President Bush in favor of lifting the embargo. Now, in the race for the presidency, he approves of the economic sanctions on Cuba, a stance he defended just prior to the Florida Republican Primary, declaring, “Rather than seeing it as some huge change, I would call it, rather, the simple reality that I'm running for president of the United States, not for reelection as governor of Arkansas.” Unfortunately, he is dead right.
Other than in Miami during election time, does Cuba even matter? It was pertinent in 1962 when the Soviets maintained nuclear missiles, and during the Cold War in general when it was a communist ally to Moscow. But now, Cuba seems irrelevant on the international stage. Not so—Cuba still looms large in the region, where an ideological conflict is brewing between Anti-American populists, led by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, and more centrist, Pro-American countries like Colombia. Opening up to Cuba, which receives subsidized oil from Caracas and publicly backs Chavez, would send a positive signal and could do wonders for regional diplomacy.
In more abstract terms, Cuba also gets to the heart of a crucial foreign policy debate. What is the best way to induce positive change in other countries: isolation or engagement? Washington currently tends to support the former when dealing with rival dictatorships—witness U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, North Korea and, of course, Cuba. Autocrats only respond to pressure; so crank it up. Critics, many residing in Brussels, disagree. Leverage is lost when relations are broken; engagement can help change things from the inside.
Both views are well-argued, but regarding Cuba, the debate should be over. Isolation clearly has not reached its goal of triggering the end of communism in Cuba. It is time to give engagement, at least economically, a try. Softening the policy would not only make economic sense, but would also make it more difficult for the regime to use the embargo and the U.S. as scapegoats for its failings.
Fidel’s abdication gives Washington an excuse to readjust the policy. Shifting Cuban-American sentiment, particularly among the younger generation, may help provide political cover. According to a Florida International University poll from last year, 57.5% of Cuban-Americans support the embargo, nearly a ten point drop from the year before. All these factors point to the need for a change in policy.
Former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston once quipped that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Ending the embargo is in America’s interest and may eventually gain it a friend. Hopefully the next president will agree.
After the Cuban revolution in the late 1950s, when communist rebel Fidel Castro deposed the pro-US military dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, the U.S. reevaluated relations with Cuba. With the Cold War in full force and the Soviets quickly lending support to Havana, the U.S. pulled out all the stops to quell the revolution raging in its backyard.
In the 1960s, the communist regime and the embargo withstood the Bay of Pigs invasion; the Cuban missile crisis; and several assassination attempts on Castro—some did not seek to kill him, one plot involved thallium salts in an effort to emasculate the charismatic leader by forcing his hair, beard and all, to fall out.
Despite America’s best efforts, Castro remained—emboldened from survival. Yet when Castro’s main benefactor and bankroller, the Soviet Union, crumbled in the early 1990s, Cuba was mired in political and economic chaos. Without subsidies from its communist comrades in Moscow, Christopher Caldwell notes, “Cuba turned into a basket case. People worked by candlelight and in restaurants the silverware was chained to the tables.”
In Washington, the end of Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union should have resulted in a re-think, but the opposite resulted: a strengthened embargo. Indeed, rather than stepping in to help them pick up the pieces, hardliners determined the embargo was needed now more than ever. The thinking was: Castro is going under; all he needs is a little push.
This nudge came in the form of the 1992 Cuba Democracy Act (CDA) and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act. The former stated that the fall of Castro and the inception of democracy on the island had to precipitate the lifting of the embargo, while the latter added sanctions on third countries which trade with Cuba.
These acts did little to curb Castro’s autocracy. And despite the end of Soviet support and the strengthening of the embargo, the regimes obituary was never written. Now, Fidel has stepped aside, and still Washington will not budge. Why?
If the policy was dictated by geopolitics, in a rational goal-oriented fashion, the embargo would have been lifted after the fall of the Soviet Union, when the small island was no longer threatening. Another paradox lies in the fact that Cuba has become an outlier among communist nations: U.S. relations with China and Vietnam have warmed by leaps and bounds and are now marked by burgeoning trade flows. Moreover, there would be no embargo if economics took precedence—American exporters stand to gain from access to the Cuban market. Agricultural trade was loosened in 2000, and now U.S. food exports to Havana total over $400 million.
The primary answer to this foreign policy question, however, oddly enough lies in the domestic realm. As the importance of Cuba as a Cold War strategic battleground waned, domestic politics gained precedence. The Cuban-American lobby—chiefly made up of hard line exiles represented by the Cuban-American National Foundation (CANF)—stepped in to fill the power vacuum, funding and pressuring candidates to support anti-Castro policies.
The strategic location of these hardliners—concentrated in the swing states, Florida and New Jersey—gives them an electoral advantage. It is telling that the two major pieces of legislation above passed in election years: 1992 and 1996. No candidate attempting to win the presidency can fully support lifting the embargo without the fear of losing votes in Florida, where less than a thousand votes separated Al Gore and George W. Bush in the 2000 election.
Recent case in point: Mike Huckabee. As Arkansas governor in 2002, he wrote a letter to President Bush in favor of lifting the embargo. Now, in the race for the presidency, he approves of the economic sanctions on Cuba, a stance he defended just prior to the Florida Republican Primary, declaring, “Rather than seeing it as some huge change, I would call it, rather, the simple reality that I'm running for president of the United States, not for reelection as governor of Arkansas.” Unfortunately, he is dead right.
Other than in Miami during election time, does Cuba even matter? It was pertinent in 1962 when the Soviets maintained nuclear missiles, and during the Cold War in general when it was a communist ally to Moscow. But now, Cuba seems irrelevant on the international stage. Not so—Cuba still looms large in the region, where an ideological conflict is brewing between Anti-American populists, led by Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, and more centrist, Pro-American countries like Colombia. Opening up to Cuba, which receives subsidized oil from Caracas and publicly backs Chavez, would send a positive signal and could do wonders for regional diplomacy.
In more abstract terms, Cuba also gets to the heart of a crucial foreign policy debate. What is the best way to induce positive change in other countries: isolation or engagement? Washington currently tends to support the former when dealing with rival dictatorships—witness U.S. policy toward Iran, Syria, North Korea and, of course, Cuba. Autocrats only respond to pressure; so crank it up. Critics, many residing in Brussels, disagree. Leverage is lost when relations are broken; engagement can help change things from the inside.
Both views are well-argued, but regarding Cuba, the debate should be over. Isolation clearly has not reached its goal of triggering the end of communism in Cuba. It is time to give engagement, at least economically, a try. Softening the policy would not only make economic sense, but would also make it more difficult for the regime to use the embargo and the U.S. as scapegoats for its failings.
Fidel’s abdication gives Washington an excuse to readjust the policy. Shifting Cuban-American sentiment, particularly among the younger generation, may help provide political cover. According to a Florida International University poll from last year, 57.5% of Cuban-Americans support the embargo, nearly a ten point drop from the year before. All these factors point to the need for a change in policy.
Former British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston once quipped that nations have no permanent friends, only permanent interests. Ending the embargo is in America’s interest and may eventually gain it a friend. Hopefully the next president will agree.
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