The deadline for an agreed settlement over Kosovo, thrown down by Kosovar separatists to the Serbs and the world, has passed. Tensions are at a high point and neither side seems willing to give in to the other, raising the threat of ethnic violence, which marred the region for much of the 1990s.
Kosovo’s status has been unresolved since NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign pushed out Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian forces and resulted in a UN administrative presence to keep the peace.
In an area roughly split between the 90% ethnic Albanian population and the 10% Serbian minority, demographics were always going to be a problem. Serbia’s historical attachment and geographic integrity, along with an ardent nationalism and responsibility to protect its brethren in the province, push it toward intransigence over the issue. For its part, Kosovar separatists’ desire for nothing short of independence reduces the possibility for compromise. Deadlock unfortunately was foreseeable.
On top of that, international politics complicates things. The U.S. and much of the European Union have backed independence for Kosovo, while Russia supports its fellow Slavs by threatening to veto any UNSC action that does not have Serbian endorsement. Kosovo is now part of a wider regional struggle—seen in Ukraine, Georgia, and elsewhere—for influence between the Kremlin and the West.
Fears that an independent Kosovo would set a dangerous precedent, leading to more separatist declarations in other countries, also underline the small province’s international ramifications. For the most part, the EU members states wary of recognizing a sovereign Kosovoa, a group including Cyprus, Spain and Romania, to name a few, are those home to restive nationalist minorities. Moreover, Russia specifically warns that if Kosovo gains autonomy it will have no choice but to push independence for separatist enclaves in Georgia, a measure Tbilisi would likely respond to with military force.
The good news is that Kosovar officials have shown public restraint since the December 10 deadline lapsed, promising to coordinate its decisions with the European Union. But this deference will not likely last too long; the status-quo must be changed. Unfortunately, all potential solutions risk violence and upheaval.
The lack of a resolution on Kosovo’s status endangers the Serbian minority, who could be subject to forceful reprisal by angry and frustrated Kosovars, which could then be met with a bloody Serbian intervention—a slippery slope indeed. The plan put forth by U.N. Special Envoy Martti Ahtisaari, which envisions an independent, yet internationally supervised, Kosovo, failed to secure Russian and Serbian backing. In response, government officials in Belgrade routinely offer autonomy, short of independence, to skeptical Kosovars.
A likely scenario is a declaration of independence, supported by the EU and U.S., but rejected by Russia and Serbia. Both could possibly be bought off: Russia with leniency on another issue such as missile defense or Iran, Kosovo with financial incentives and warmer relations with the European Union, in the form of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a way-station to EU membership.
Washington and the EU have to prioritize. Is Kosovar independence worth giving ground on other important issues? Certainly, a SAA, which Brussels seemed likely to grant sometime in the future anyway, would be well worth it to prevent the risk of violence on Europe’s doorstep. Washington has a tougher decision, although the consequences would be just as dire. Then again, Russia and Serbia could dismiss any attempt to obtain their acquiescence. Violence would then likely ensue, unfortunately, an all too familiar occurrence in the region.
Thursday, December 20, 2007
Friday, December 7, 2007
NIE Findings On Iran Are Good—But Not Great
Finally there is a report somewhat praising the regime in Tehran. According to a newly-declassified National Intelligence Estimate, Iran ended its nuclear weapons program in 2003, after succumbing to Western diplomacy, and could make further concessions given the right pressure and incentives.
The good news traveled fast—well, unless you are Mike Huckabee. Less than twenty-four hours after the NIE became available, politicians and analysts alike were jumping for joy. Senator Hillary Clinton declared: “I'm relieved that the intelligence community has reached this conclusion.”
But other Democrats were tougher in their tone, utilizing the information to make the case that the Bush Administration was overestimating the threat from Iran to further its case for regime change. Clinton’s fellow Democratic presidential contender John Edwards noted, in reference to the administration, “It's absolutely clear and eerily similar to what we saw with Iraq, where they were headed." "The last seven years in the Mideast by this administration have been the lost seven years when you see on every front a reversal,” said Rahm Emanuel, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus.
Not so fast. While certainly a welcome development, the NIE does not close the case on Iran and its nuclear program—not even close. While certainly understandable, the Democrats should wait before using the findings for political vindication, just as the Republicans should not act as if the news is insignificant.
Indeed, the NIE does not alter many of the troubling circumstances surrounding Iran. First, Iran is still a sponsor or terrorism, funding and supporting Hizbollah; less than helpful in Iraq, shipping weapons to the country for attacks on Sunni and coalition forces; and has belligerent regional ambitions.
Second, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the country continues to produce highly-enriched uranium, which can be weaponized and made into a bomb. The NIE stated that there was indeed a covert nuclear weapons program, albeit suspended in 2003, a finding which sows doubt about Iranian claims of a peaceful program in and of itself. Moreover, Tehran hid its nuclear program for over 20 years; is known to have received information from AQ Khan, the Pakistani who ran a black market nuclear bazaar; and is not fully cooperating with the UN and IAEA—just ask Mohammed El-Bareidi.
The IAEA chief a few months back gave Iran the benefit of the doubt and the chance to come clean about its troubled past, but was somewhat rebuked. His recent report, while not entirely damning, notes, Iran’s “cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,” and “since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing.”
No sideswipe at the intelligence community whatsoever, but intelligence is inherently flawed—and in this case, perhaps even more so. Primarily because the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, it lacks intelligence resources in Tehran. Iran is also thought to be mindful of the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq, where Israeli planes took out Saddam's nascent nuclear plant, so it disperses and hides its nuclear facilities underground, making them almost impervious to inspection and military strikes. Hence, the NIE's conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt.
In fact, the NIE could even have a negative net effect. It has been seized upon by the Iranians for a media tool. They can now play the victims of baseless Western accusations and hostility. Firebrand Iranian president Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "This is a declaration of victory for the Iranian nation against the world powers over the nuclear issue…a final shot to those who, in the past several years, spread a sense of threat and concern in the world through lies of nuclear weapons.”
Also, the intelligence disclosure will likely disrupt the relative international unity at the UNSC, which recently saw China and Russia, previously dragging their feet, come on board for new sanctions. Do not be surprised when Putin references the NIE for his reluctance to agree to more sanctions.
So where does that leave us? Well, Iran continues to produce highly enriched uranium and has not come clean about its nuclear past and future ambitions. The problem has not gone away.
Iran has the distinct advantage of being able, through Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty, to legally wield a civilian uranium enrichment process on its soil. There is the rub. Any solution will thus have to involve talking Tehran out of doing something perfectly legal, in order to prevent it from using that as a front for a covert, illegal weapons program. And to do so the U.S. must offer a package of carrots and sticks.
As has been the case for years, a grand bargain is needed, one which addresses Iranian energy and security. While one of the biggest energy producing nations, Tehran still complains of the need to diversify its energy through a nuclear program. Iran also has legitimate security concerns: the U.S. maintains a military presence on its borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is almost fully surrounded by ideologically hostile Sunni-Arab states; add Israel to the mix and one could say the neighborhood is quite dangerous.
An energy solution would allow for a limited uranium enrichment facility in Iran—a nationalist prerequisite—or enriching it somewhere else, Russia perhaps, as has been proposed, and sending it back to Tehran. A regional security conference or regime, which would regularly bring these neighbors together to discuss differences and security conditions, could be a good start. But at the end of the day, the U.S. must engage Iran and put everything on the table: economic incentives, possibility of renewed diplomatic relations, security guarantees, and more.
In return, Iran must give up its expansive uranium enrichment program, disclose any and all information on its past and present nuclear undertakings, and scale back its links with Hizbollah and Shia militias in Iraq. To be sure, this is a daunting task. But if the U.S. directly intervened and put forward a grand bargain and Iran balked, the U.S. would no longer be subject to criticism for its lack of engagement and carrots, and Iran would truly be isolated. It is indeed worth a try.
For all Bush’s sabre-rattling, Washington is in no mood for another occupation—especially of a country with roughly three times the landmass and the population of Iraq, not to mention a more fervent nationalist streak. Yet neither is it content with the possibility of a nuclear Iran.
As such, all must be done to strike an accord. The NIE does hold out chances for success, given the mullah’s supposed positive response to Western pressure, but does not fully change or alleviate the situation. This good news only turns to great when the problem is close to being resolved.
The good news traveled fast—well, unless you are Mike Huckabee. Less than twenty-four hours after the NIE became available, politicians and analysts alike were jumping for joy. Senator Hillary Clinton declared: “I'm relieved that the intelligence community has reached this conclusion.”
But other Democrats were tougher in their tone, utilizing the information to make the case that the Bush Administration was overestimating the threat from Iran to further its case for regime change. Clinton’s fellow Democratic presidential contender John Edwards noted, in reference to the administration, “It's absolutely clear and eerily similar to what we saw with Iraq, where they were headed." "The last seven years in the Mideast by this administration have been the lost seven years when you see on every front a reversal,” said Rahm Emanuel, Chairman of the House Democratic Caucus.
Not so fast. While certainly a welcome development, the NIE does not close the case on Iran and its nuclear program—not even close. While certainly understandable, the Democrats should wait before using the findings for political vindication, just as the Republicans should not act as if the news is insignificant.
Indeed, the NIE does not alter many of the troubling circumstances surrounding Iran. First, Iran is still a sponsor or terrorism, funding and supporting Hizbollah; less than helpful in Iraq, shipping weapons to the country for attacks on Sunni and coalition forces; and has belligerent regional ambitions.
Second, regarding Iran’s nuclear program, the country continues to produce highly-enriched uranium, which can be weaponized and made into a bomb. The NIE stated that there was indeed a covert nuclear weapons program, albeit suspended in 2003, a finding which sows doubt about Iranian claims of a peaceful program in and of itself. Moreover, Tehran hid its nuclear program for over 20 years; is known to have received information from AQ Khan, the Pakistani who ran a black market nuclear bazaar; and is not fully cooperating with the UN and IAEA—just ask Mohammed El-Bareidi.
The IAEA chief a few months back gave Iran the benefit of the doubt and the chance to come clean about its troubled past, but was somewhat rebuked. His recent report, while not entirely damning, notes, Iran’s “cooperation has been reactive rather than proactive,” and “since early 2006, the Agency has not received the type of information that Iran had previously been providing, pursuant to the Additional Protocol and as a transparency measure. As a result, the agency's knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing.”
No sideswipe at the intelligence community whatsoever, but intelligence is inherently flawed—and in this case, perhaps even more so. Primarily because the U.S. does not maintain diplomatic relations with Iran, it lacks intelligence resources in Tehran. Iran is also thought to be mindful of the 1981 Osirak attack in Iraq, where Israeli planes took out Saddam's nascent nuclear plant, so it disperses and hides its nuclear facilities underground, making them almost impervious to inspection and military strikes. Hence, the NIE's conclusions should be taken with a grain of salt.
In fact, the NIE could even have a negative net effect. It has been seized upon by the Iranians for a media tool. They can now play the victims of baseless Western accusations and hostility. Firebrand Iranian president Ahmadinejad proclaimed, "This is a declaration of victory for the Iranian nation against the world powers over the nuclear issue…a final shot to those who, in the past several years, spread a sense of threat and concern in the world through lies of nuclear weapons.”
Also, the intelligence disclosure will likely disrupt the relative international unity at the UNSC, which recently saw China and Russia, previously dragging their feet, come on board for new sanctions. Do not be surprised when Putin references the NIE for his reluctance to agree to more sanctions.
So where does that leave us? Well, Iran continues to produce highly enriched uranium and has not come clean about its nuclear past and future ambitions. The problem has not gone away.
Iran has the distinct advantage of being able, through Article 4 of the Non Proliferation Treaty, to legally wield a civilian uranium enrichment process on its soil. There is the rub. Any solution will thus have to involve talking Tehran out of doing something perfectly legal, in order to prevent it from using that as a front for a covert, illegal weapons program. And to do so the U.S. must offer a package of carrots and sticks.
As has been the case for years, a grand bargain is needed, one which addresses Iranian energy and security. While one of the biggest energy producing nations, Tehran still complains of the need to diversify its energy through a nuclear program. Iran also has legitimate security concerns: the U.S. maintains a military presence on its borders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and it is almost fully surrounded by ideologically hostile Sunni-Arab states; add Israel to the mix and one could say the neighborhood is quite dangerous.
An energy solution would allow for a limited uranium enrichment facility in Iran—a nationalist prerequisite—or enriching it somewhere else, Russia perhaps, as has been proposed, and sending it back to Tehran. A regional security conference or regime, which would regularly bring these neighbors together to discuss differences and security conditions, could be a good start. But at the end of the day, the U.S. must engage Iran and put everything on the table: economic incentives, possibility of renewed diplomatic relations, security guarantees, and more.
In return, Iran must give up its expansive uranium enrichment program, disclose any and all information on its past and present nuclear undertakings, and scale back its links with Hizbollah and Shia militias in Iraq. To be sure, this is a daunting task. But if the U.S. directly intervened and put forward a grand bargain and Iran balked, the U.S. would no longer be subject to criticism for its lack of engagement and carrots, and Iran would truly be isolated. It is indeed worth a try.
For all Bush’s sabre-rattling, Washington is in no mood for another occupation—especially of a country with roughly three times the landmass and the population of Iraq, not to mention a more fervent nationalist streak. Yet neither is it content with the possibility of a nuclear Iran.
As such, all must be done to strike an accord. The NIE does hold out chances for success, given the mullah’s supposed positive response to Western pressure, but does not fully change or alleviate the situation. This good news only turns to great when the problem is close to being resolved.
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