After weeks of speculation, the Turkish government has finally ordered military strikes on the Kurdish region of Northern Iraq in an effort to stamp out PKK (Kurdistan Worker’s Party), a separatist terrorist group. Although a ground incursion has yet to be deployed, air strikes may be a precursor to a full-scale invasion. And this is exactly what PKK wants.
Turkey has long struggled to assimilate the roughly 15 million Kurds living in its territory. The PKK, forming in the 1970s, seeks to create an independent Kurdish state and has used terrorist means to achieve its goal. Waging a guerilla war in the 1980s, PKK’s conflict with Turkey has claimed over 37,000 lives.
In recent years, the situation has settled down a bit. PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 and urged the movement to conduct a peaceful struggle, and the group announced a ceasefire last September. Kurds participate in the political process, taking up seats in the Turkish parliament.
Now, there is a threat of all out war, which would open another front in Iraq and likely destabilize the only relatively peaceful area in the country. The U.S., along with the Iraqi central government, has pleaded with Turkey to refrain from military actions in Iraq.
But after succumbing to numerous guerilla attacks—a recent PKK cross-border assault left 12 Turkish soldiers dead—Ankara is fed up. Military actions have ensued. The Turkish military announced yesterday that 30 Kurdish rebels were killed near the Iraq border.
Why would PKK so willingly antagonize Turkey and its vastly powerful military? PKK knew it was on thin ice and Ankara was poised for an invasion to wipe them out, so why did they commit another atrocity, killing 12 Turks? They must have known air strikes and a ground assault were to follow.
PKK knew exactly what it was doing. It wants to lull Turkey into a military conflict in Northern Iraq. With concrete results from its assimilatory program, the Turkish government has helped placate the fiery Kurdish minority, and PKK fears its separatist goals are slipping away. To reinvigorate the pan-Kurdish separatist movement it seeks to extract Turkish revenge.
This is a common terrorist tactic, regularly employed by the Basque separatist group ETA, known as the spiral of action-repression-action. When fearing marginalization, terrorist groups carry out attacks on enemy government forces to inhibit a repressive response, which will rally nationalists and provide legitimacy for more terrorist attacks, producing a cycle of violence.
PKK is using this method because it wants the wrath of Turkey to rally its Kurdish brothers in Iraq. It seems this strategy may work. Upon hearing the Turkish threat of military force, Kurdish regional president, Massoud Barzani, declared: “We are fully prepared to defend our democratic experience and the dignity of our people and the sanctity of our homeland.” This must have been music to PKK’s ears.
Aside from playing into PKK's hands, Turkey also has military limits to its objectives. An invasion would not only stir up Kurdish nationalist sentiment and likely become a PKK recruiting tool, but strategically and militarily it might not do much good.
PKK, in similar fashion to Al-Qaeda in Tora Bora, hides in treacherous mountain terrain in Northern Iraq, maintaining an underground cave system seemingly impervious to air strikes and capture. Annihilating the terrorist group via a ground campaign is a strategy strewn with pitfalls.
So what is to be done? Politically, PKK’s antics have put both Turkey and the Kurdish regional government in a bind. Ankara cannot appear weak to its domestic audience and neither can the Kurds in Iraq. Washington is also in a crunch: it must convince Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to show restraint, knowing full well that it would react similarly to attacks on its forces.
To avoid all the problems associated with a Turkish invasion, Iraqi and American officials must provide Ankara with military and intelligence assistance and conduct missions to rid the area of PKK rebels. To be sure, U.S. troops are under enough duress in the country without taking on another enemy. Yet small-scale missions, or air strikes and intelligence gathering would be tremendously helpful in alleviating the situation. All sides must do everything possible to disrupt PKK’s destructive plan.
Friday, October 26, 2007
Friday, October 19, 2007
Russia and China: The New Axis of Evil?
When President Bush coined the infamous term “Axis of Evil” in his 2003 State of the Union address to describe the non-existent coalition of Iran, North Korea and Iraq, these three states assumingly represented the biggest threat to American interests. Yet they had little contact or mutual interests—Iraq and Iran actually went to war with each other from 1980-1988—which is why pundits are still trying to grasp what the president exactly meant by the phrase.
If evil is equated with the ability and motivation to block American efforts around the world, then one might come to the conclusion that Russia and China, not the three above, now constitute the Axis of Evil. Indeed, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, they can frustrate most U.S. interventions with one word: veto.
And they are. Be it the genocide in Darfur, independence for Kosovo, or the nuclear ambitions of Iran, Russian and or Chinese intransigence denies the West the ability to effectively deal with these situations. The threat of a veto in the UNSC blocks any hope of a united international front. Seen through this light, Russia and China could be on roughly the same level as the original axis.
To hear the 2008 Republican presidential hopefuls on the campaign trail, it seems they agree. Mitt Romney recently deemed the United Nations an “extraordinary failure,” and proposed a democratic alternative. “We should develop some of our own—if you will—forums and alliances or groups that have the ability to actually watch out for the world and do what’s right,” declared the former Massachusetts governor.
John McCain has also floated a similar proposal. In the new issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, he suggests, “We should go further by linking democratic nations in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies,” which “could act when the UN fails.”
Last but not least, national opinion poll leader Rudy Giuliani has followed suit, albeit more subtly. Stating in his recent contribution to Foreign Affairs, “The UN has proved irrelevant to the resolution of almost every major dispute of the last 50 years,” he concludes, “We must be prepared to look to other tools.”
To be sure, UN-bashing is a common practice among GOP circles. The U.S. bypassed the UNSC by invading Iraq, but never before have mainstream, powerful Republicans unanimously recommended going outside the UNSC framework to create a permanent “Coalition of the Willing.” Their point that Russia and China continually hamper American and Western initiatives is well taken. But is a League of Democracies or Coalition of the Free really necessary or practical?
At first glance, the idea seems worthy of consideration. Why not sidestep Russian and Chinese obstruction and garner more legitimacy for Washington’s endeavors by creating a new forum?
First, whether other democratic allies in Europe and elsewhere would go along with this enterprise is dubious. Officials in Brussels still extol the multilateralism of the UN.
Second, what would stop Russia, China, perhaps along with other U.S.-labeled international pariahs such as Venezuela and Cuba, from doing the same and creating an anti-American organization? The world would be further divided, not only ideologically, but now institutionally, between the West and its adversaries. This may be an exaggeration, but the threat of this coming to fruition renders the idea counterproductive.
Finally, there is already such a forum of U.S.-led democracies—it is called NATO. This alliance has expanded to Central and Eastern Europe and fields troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan, among other global hotspots. If Romney and his counterparts really wish to seek other international outlets apart from the UN, then expand NATO. Such a scheme was recently put forward by former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and included adding non-European liberal democracies such as Israel, Australia, and Japan to the membership directory.
Do Russia and China truly constitute an Axis of Evil? Of course not, they are neither evil nor an axis. They be autocratic, but do not—as far as we know—sponsor terrorism or subscribe to an expansive, totalitarian ideology.
Mutual interests may include thumbing their noses at Washington every once and a while, and pursuing pet projects at the expense of the U.S. in the UNSC—China’s thirst for Sudanese energy supplies prevents its backing of intervention in Darfur, while Russia opposes the U.S. and EU by supporting its fellow Slavs in Serbia in their quest to retain Kosovo—yet there is no long-term allegiance between the two.
Realist power politics largely lies behind the Eurasian neighbors’ belligerence towards the West. Preventing the superpower from getting its way, while at the same time increasing one’s power and prestige, is the name of the game. The two are playing it well, to the detriment of Washington and many of its foreign policy goals.
What is the solution? Aznar’s NATO expansion proposal should be analyzed. The Cold War is over, and the conventional military threat to Europe, the Kremlin’s inflammatory rhetoric notwithstanding, affords NATO the opportunity to enlarge beyond its original transatlantic script. Unfortunately, the obstructionist threat from Russia and China is real and here to stay. Branding it an Axis of Evil, however, is misleading. How about Axis of Exasperation?
If evil is equated with the ability and motivation to block American efforts around the world, then one might come to the conclusion that Russia and China, not the three above, now constitute the Axis of Evil. Indeed, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, they can frustrate most U.S. interventions with one word: veto.
And they are. Be it the genocide in Darfur, independence for Kosovo, or the nuclear ambitions of Iran, Russian and or Chinese intransigence denies the West the ability to effectively deal with these situations. The threat of a veto in the UNSC blocks any hope of a united international front. Seen through this light, Russia and China could be on roughly the same level as the original axis.
To hear the 2008 Republican presidential hopefuls on the campaign trail, it seems they agree. Mitt Romney recently deemed the United Nations an “extraordinary failure,” and proposed a democratic alternative. “We should develop some of our own—if you will—forums and alliances or groups that have the ability to actually watch out for the world and do what’s right,” declared the former Massachusetts governor.
John McCain has also floated a similar proposal. In the new issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, he suggests, “We should go further by linking democratic nations in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies,” which “could act when the UN fails.”
Last but not least, national opinion poll leader Rudy Giuliani has followed suit, albeit more subtly. Stating in his recent contribution to Foreign Affairs, “The UN has proved irrelevant to the resolution of almost every major dispute of the last 50 years,” he concludes, “We must be prepared to look to other tools.”
To be sure, UN-bashing is a common practice among GOP circles. The U.S. bypassed the UNSC by invading Iraq, but never before have mainstream, powerful Republicans unanimously recommended going outside the UNSC framework to create a permanent “Coalition of the Willing.” Their point that Russia and China continually hamper American and Western initiatives is well taken. But is a League of Democracies or Coalition of the Free really necessary or practical?
At first glance, the idea seems worthy of consideration. Why not sidestep Russian and Chinese obstruction and garner more legitimacy for Washington’s endeavors by creating a new forum?
First, whether other democratic allies in Europe and elsewhere would go along with this enterprise is dubious. Officials in Brussels still extol the multilateralism of the UN.
Second, what would stop Russia, China, perhaps along with other U.S.-labeled international pariahs such as Venezuela and Cuba, from doing the same and creating an anti-American organization? The world would be further divided, not only ideologically, but now institutionally, between the West and its adversaries. This may be an exaggeration, but the threat of this coming to fruition renders the idea counterproductive.
Finally, there is already such a forum of U.S.-led democracies—it is called NATO. This alliance has expanded to Central and Eastern Europe and fields troops in Kosovo and Afghanistan, among other global hotspots. If Romney and his counterparts really wish to seek other international outlets apart from the UN, then expand NATO. Such a scheme was recently put forward by former Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar, and included adding non-European liberal democracies such as Israel, Australia, and Japan to the membership directory.
Do Russia and China truly constitute an Axis of Evil? Of course not, they are neither evil nor an axis. They be autocratic, but do not—as far as we know—sponsor terrorism or subscribe to an expansive, totalitarian ideology.
Mutual interests may include thumbing their noses at Washington every once and a while, and pursuing pet projects at the expense of the U.S. in the UNSC—China’s thirst for Sudanese energy supplies prevents its backing of intervention in Darfur, while Russia opposes the U.S. and EU by supporting its fellow Slavs in Serbia in their quest to retain Kosovo—yet there is no long-term allegiance between the two.
Realist power politics largely lies behind the Eurasian neighbors’ belligerence towards the West. Preventing the superpower from getting its way, while at the same time increasing one’s power and prestige, is the name of the game. The two are playing it well, to the detriment of Washington and many of its foreign policy goals.
What is the solution? Aznar’s NATO expansion proposal should be analyzed. The Cold War is over, and the conventional military threat to Europe, the Kremlin’s inflammatory rhetoric notwithstanding, affords NATO the opportunity to enlarge beyond its original transatlantic script. Unfortunately, the obstructionist threat from Russia and China is real and here to stay. Branding it an Axis of Evil, however, is misleading. How about Axis of Exasperation?
Friday, October 12, 2007
U.S.-Turkish Relations Take A Hit
As a secular Muslim country, staunch NATO member, and regional power in the strategically important Middle-East, Turkey is a tremendous asset to U.S. foreign policy. But now the alliance, tried and tested throughout the Cold War, is showing signs of strain.There are two primary causes: the Kurds in Northern Iraq and the Armenian genocide.
In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Turkish Parliament narrowly defeated—by one vote—a measure allowing U.S.-led coalition forces to invade Iraq via Turkey. Government officials clearly had the Kurdistan question on their minds during the vote. They feared that overthrowing Saddam Hussein could open Pandora’s box and confer upon the Kurds—a nation without a state—semi-autonomy in Northern Iraq, which would confound Turkey’s own Kurdish problem.
For years, rebels in southeastern Turkey, under the banner of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party), have conducted bloody terrorist attacks in the country in the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan.
Now, with a relatively sovereign Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, PKK members, Ankara claims, are using the area as a safe-haven and base for cross-border attacks in Turkey. Thirty Turks have died in such attacks over the past two weeks, according to the government. Nationalists in the Turkish military have long called for an incursion into Iraq to stamp out PKK. Washington has so far been able to convince Prime Minister Erdogan to refrain from doing so. However, his patience is wearing thin.
Which brings us to the second point of contention—Armenian genocide. When the Ottoman Empire fell in the beginning of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Armenians, at least, died in what is now Turkey. Turks and Armenians are at historical loggerheads over the cause of death.
The former assert that the dead succumbed to circumstances surrounding the war—such as famine—while the latter allege that they were victims of genocide at the hands of Turkey’s early founders. Stubborn nationalists in Ankara refuse to concede any wrongdoing on the part of their forefathers, let alone deem it genocide. And Armenians will call it nothing else.
In this strange historical fight, Armenians have attempted to enlist the help of foreign governments. They are aided in this struggle by a strong lobby. A cabal of ex-pat Armenians, wealthy, organized and obsessed by this single issue, has assisted in persuading the governments of various countries to do their bidding. France, in similar legislation to that regarding the holocaust, even went so far as to proclaim Armenian genocidal-denial a crime.
Washington followed suit this week. The U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, despite the opposition of the Bush Administration, just passed legislation labeling the Armenian casualties, roughly from 1915 to 1917, as genocide. Ankara, unsurprisingly, did not take this very well, temporarily withdrawing its ambassador from Washington.
Turkish officials now appear to be linking the two issues. Aside from recalling its U.S. envoy, Ankara has also followed up the congressional legislation with calls for a ground raid into Northern Iraq, as the Turkish Parliament prepares to vote on a resolution granting authority to the prime minister to use military force in Iraq.
Suat Kiniklioglu, MP from Prime Minister Erdogan’s AKP Party, recently declared: “The prime minister feels that our policy of restraint (on the PKK) has to end.” He also warned, after the vote in Washington: “When we look back in 20 years we might see this as a milestone in the way Turkey and the U.S. have drifted apart.”
All three parties involved have contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. Armenians, with all due respect, should try to move on. Going on a crusade against Turkey, and campaigning for foreign governments to legislate on their behalf, for tragic circumstances occurring almost a century ago, is unproductive.
For Ankara, it would help alleviate concerns if it were to give up some of its stubborn resistance and concede that some Turks—before Turkey was created in 1923—contributed to the slaughter of Armenians. Also, Turkey should not connect the U.S. resolution with the more serious and volatile Kurdish problem.
Washington, to be sure, needs to try to halt PKK operations in Northern Iraq, and solicit the help of the Kurdish Regional Government in this effort. The fervently secular—or Kemalist, in reference to Kemal Ataturk, the country’s founder—Turkish military, fresh off an electoral loss to the mildly Islamist AKP, appears itching for a confrontation with the Kurds.
U.S.-Turkish relations, usually quote strong, lie in the balance. Given the advantages of having a largely secular, democratic, Muslim country—which could be a model for the region—on Washington’s side, the choice should be simple.
With all the troubles in the region, opening up a Kurdish-Turkish front in Northern Iraq would be hazardous, to say the least. Hence, patching up the alliance and preventing a war in Northern Iraq, rather than making it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide, should be an immediate priority.
In the run-up to the Iraq War, the Turkish Parliament narrowly defeated—by one vote—a measure allowing U.S.-led coalition forces to invade Iraq via Turkey. Government officials clearly had the Kurdistan question on their minds during the vote. They feared that overthrowing Saddam Hussein could open Pandora’s box and confer upon the Kurds—a nation without a state—semi-autonomy in Northern Iraq, which would confound Turkey’s own Kurdish problem.
For years, rebels in southeastern Turkey, under the banner of the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party), have conducted bloody terrorist attacks in the country in the hope of creating an independent Kurdistan.
Now, with a relatively sovereign Kurdish region in Northern Iraq, PKK members, Ankara claims, are using the area as a safe-haven and base for cross-border attacks in Turkey. Thirty Turks have died in such attacks over the past two weeks, according to the government. Nationalists in the Turkish military have long called for an incursion into Iraq to stamp out PKK. Washington has so far been able to convince Prime Minister Erdogan to refrain from doing so. However, his patience is wearing thin.
Which brings us to the second point of contention—Armenian genocide. When the Ottoman Empire fell in the beginning of the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of Armenians, at least, died in what is now Turkey. Turks and Armenians are at historical loggerheads over the cause of death.
The former assert that the dead succumbed to circumstances surrounding the war—such as famine—while the latter allege that they were victims of genocide at the hands of Turkey’s early founders. Stubborn nationalists in Ankara refuse to concede any wrongdoing on the part of their forefathers, let alone deem it genocide. And Armenians will call it nothing else.
In this strange historical fight, Armenians have attempted to enlist the help of foreign governments. They are aided in this struggle by a strong lobby. A cabal of ex-pat Armenians, wealthy, organized and obsessed by this single issue, has assisted in persuading the governments of various countries to do their bidding. France, in similar legislation to that regarding the holocaust, even went so far as to proclaim Armenian genocidal-denial a crime.
Washington followed suit this week. The U.S. House of Representatives' Foreign Affairs Committee, despite the opposition of the Bush Administration, just passed legislation labeling the Armenian casualties, roughly from 1915 to 1917, as genocide. Ankara, unsurprisingly, did not take this very well, temporarily withdrawing its ambassador from Washington.
Turkish officials now appear to be linking the two issues. Aside from recalling its U.S. envoy, Ankara has also followed up the congressional legislation with calls for a ground raid into Northern Iraq, as the Turkish Parliament prepares to vote on a resolution granting authority to the prime minister to use military force in Iraq.
Suat Kiniklioglu, MP from Prime Minister Erdogan’s AKP Party, recently declared: “The prime minister feels that our policy of restraint (on the PKK) has to end.” He also warned, after the vote in Washington: “When we look back in 20 years we might see this as a milestone in the way Turkey and the U.S. have drifted apart.”
All three parties involved have contributed to this unfortunate state of affairs. Armenians, with all due respect, should try to move on. Going on a crusade against Turkey, and campaigning for foreign governments to legislate on their behalf, for tragic circumstances occurring almost a century ago, is unproductive.
For Ankara, it would help alleviate concerns if it were to give up some of its stubborn resistance and concede that some Turks—before Turkey was created in 1923—contributed to the slaughter of Armenians. Also, Turkey should not connect the U.S. resolution with the more serious and volatile Kurdish problem.
Washington, to be sure, needs to try to halt PKK operations in Northern Iraq, and solicit the help of the Kurdish Regional Government in this effort. The fervently secular—or Kemalist, in reference to Kemal Ataturk, the country’s founder—Turkish military, fresh off an electoral loss to the mildly Islamist AKP, appears itching for a confrontation with the Kurds.
U.S.-Turkish relations, usually quote strong, lie in the balance. Given the advantages of having a largely secular, democratic, Muslim country—which could be a model for the region—on Washington’s side, the choice should be simple.
With all the troubles in the region, opening up a Kurdish-Turkish front in Northern Iraq would be hazardous, to say the least. Hence, patching up the alliance and preventing a war in Northern Iraq, rather than making it illegal to deny the Armenian genocide, should be an immediate priority.
Friday, October 5, 2007
Prime Minister Putin?
Well, it seems as if Russian President Vladimir Putin is finally off the job market. His recent decision to lead the United Russia Party in upcoming elections likely means that after leaving the Kremlin in 2008 he will take up the post of prime minister. Rumors about his future employment have swirled since he mischievously announced that he would not alter the constitution to serve a third term as president but would still somehow wield power in the future.
The president, by refusing to tinker with the constitution, wants to deflect potential Western criticism, which would liken him to other leaders who have bent the electoral rules to stay in power—i.e. Hugo Chavez. But because of the constitutional promise, conventional wisdom was that Putin would take a lower level position and wait for 2012 to re-take the Kremlin.
Indeed, the Russian Premier has been linked to numerous positions, including the following: CEO of Gazprom, the state-owned energy giant; National Security Advisor; President, amending the constitution and staying on for another term; and some that have yet to be created.
The mystery surrounding Putin’s successor is thrown another twist. Many analysts foresaw Putin naming a prime minister shortly before the election, who would then become president in 2008—a similar route that Putin took to the Kremlin in 1999. The Russian President, however, turned the race upside down when he named unheralded Victor Zubkov, a former Soviet State Farm Director and Putin crony from his days in St. Petersburg, as prime minister a few weeks ago.
Something was up. Yet no one could tell for sure. Now, perhaps we know. Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively, were long considered the frontrunners. These men seem the most likeable. Yet neither is able to become president without the endorsement of Putin, whose ratings are in the 70s. Their potential popularity may turn out to be their downfall, as Putin does not want a rival in the Kremlin.
Instead, he wants a loyalist. Zubkov must now be considered the favorite for the presidency, and will play a primary role in Putin's grand scheme. With the appointment of this relatively unknown, weak bureaucrat, Putin seeks to install a caretaker president who will not pose a threat and gladly relinquish the Kremlin keys to him in 2012.
In the meantime, Putin still needs to maintain his grip on power. The office of Prime Minister, as the current constitution dictates, is not much more than a figure head—the real influence lies in the Kremlin. As such, Putin will likely reform the constitution to grant more authority to the Prime Minister, and if the United Russia Party garners a 2/3 majority in the elections—as it might, given the president’s popularity—he will have the votes to do so.
This would produce another conundrum: what is Putin to do in 2012 when he resumes a presidency which has been weakened by his own reforms? It is unlikely that the constitution would be revised again. He might have to cross that bridge when he comes to it.
Here’s another possibility: Putin’s personality and popular approval is so overwhelming that he eschews institutional reform, and instead, simply pulls the reins of power from the prime minister’s office. Zubkov would not dare deny his ally. Backroom deals would be the norm: President Zubkov would merely read Prime Minister Putin’s marching orders.
On the other hand, Putin might not have the patience to wait until 2012. The constitution simply states that the limit is two consecutive terms. If his successor steps down shortly after gaining the presidency, Putin could technically reoccupy the Kremlin in accordance with the constitution.
As shown time and time again, the Russian premier is unpredictable. The ambiguity surrounding his future and that of his successor only serves to validate this point. Yet the likely scenario is Zubkov and Putin switching roles in 2008, resulting in another Putin presidency in 2012. What happens between 2008 and 2012 is up in the air. Yet, who will wield the true power in Russia for the foreseeable future is not.
The president, by refusing to tinker with the constitution, wants to deflect potential Western criticism, which would liken him to other leaders who have bent the electoral rules to stay in power—i.e. Hugo Chavez. But because of the constitutional promise, conventional wisdom was that Putin would take a lower level position and wait for 2012 to re-take the Kremlin.
Indeed, the Russian Premier has been linked to numerous positions, including the following: CEO of Gazprom, the state-owned energy giant; National Security Advisor; President, amending the constitution and staying on for another term; and some that have yet to be created.
The mystery surrounding Putin’s successor is thrown another twist. Many analysts foresaw Putin naming a prime minister shortly before the election, who would then become president in 2008—a similar route that Putin took to the Kremlin in 1999. The Russian President, however, turned the race upside down when he named unheralded Victor Zubkov, a former Soviet State Farm Director and Putin crony from his days in St. Petersburg, as prime minister a few weeks ago.
Something was up. Yet no one could tell for sure. Now, perhaps we know. Sergei Ivanov and Dmitry Medvedev, Defense Minister and Deputy Prime Minister respectively, were long considered the frontrunners. These men seem the most likeable. Yet neither is able to become president without the endorsement of Putin, whose ratings are in the 70s. Their potential popularity may turn out to be their downfall, as Putin does not want a rival in the Kremlin.
Instead, he wants a loyalist. Zubkov must now be considered the favorite for the presidency, and will play a primary role in Putin's grand scheme. With the appointment of this relatively unknown, weak bureaucrat, Putin seeks to install a caretaker president who will not pose a threat and gladly relinquish the Kremlin keys to him in 2012.
In the meantime, Putin still needs to maintain his grip on power. The office of Prime Minister, as the current constitution dictates, is not much more than a figure head—the real influence lies in the Kremlin. As such, Putin will likely reform the constitution to grant more authority to the Prime Minister, and if the United Russia Party garners a 2/3 majority in the elections—as it might, given the president’s popularity—he will have the votes to do so.
This would produce another conundrum: what is Putin to do in 2012 when he resumes a presidency which has been weakened by his own reforms? It is unlikely that the constitution would be revised again. He might have to cross that bridge when he comes to it.
Here’s another possibility: Putin’s personality and popular approval is so overwhelming that he eschews institutional reform, and instead, simply pulls the reins of power from the prime minister’s office. Zubkov would not dare deny his ally. Backroom deals would be the norm: President Zubkov would merely read Prime Minister Putin’s marching orders.
On the other hand, Putin might not have the patience to wait until 2012. The constitution simply states that the limit is two consecutive terms. If his successor steps down shortly after gaining the presidency, Putin could technically reoccupy the Kremlin in accordance with the constitution.
As shown time and time again, the Russian premier is unpredictable. The ambiguity surrounding his future and that of his successor only serves to validate this point. Yet the likely scenario is Zubkov and Putin switching roles in 2008, resulting in another Putin presidency in 2012. What happens between 2008 and 2012 is up in the air. Yet, who will wield the true power in Russia for the foreseeable future is not.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
