After the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, the United States was left alone at the top. Uni-polarity and American hegemony became popular phrases among foreign policy thinkers, stirring up comparisons—often ludicrous—between the U.S. and former dominant powers such as Rome and Napoleon’s France.
In this new international context, containment strategies became meaningless—there was no one to contain. Policymakers focused instead on what to do with all this power. Should Washington, as neo-conservative pundit Charles Krauthammer has suggested, utilize this “unipolar moment” to reshape the world in accordance to its values and desires, or follow a more realist dictum, staying out of entangling interventions to preserve hegemony for as long as it can?
Now, the heady days are gone. With a falling dollar, quagmire in Iraq, and constant and increasing international resentment to American power, other, less positive questions are being asked. Is U.S. hegemony coming to an end? How much longer will the U.S. continue to lead the world?
One country inevitably frames this debate: China. A rising China—growing economically at roughly ten percent a year and spending a large percentage of that revenue on revamping its military—frustrates American efforts in Darfur and Iran, to name a few.
More worrying, conventional international relations theory warns that the likelihood of conflict between great powers is heightened at the time of a declining hegemon and the ascendance of a worthy competitor. Washington’s stated goal, outlined in the 2002 NSS, is to prevent the emergence of a competitor—in other words, China. Accordingly, a sense of an inevitability of conflict thus looms, as the U.S. loses prestige and China picks up the slack. The die may be cast and Taiwan may be the trigger.
To be sure, there is a risk of a clash, but it is far from unavoidable. It is in neither country’s interests to fight a world—probably nuclear—war. Doomsday talk is all well and good, but it is unlikely that war will ensue between the powers for a plethora of reasons, economic interdependence being one, hence the statements coming from both governments on the need for strategic partnership and dialogue.
Washington is and will continue to be the leading power. Moreover, Beijing’s upsurge is littered with uncertainties. High economic growth rates are rarely continuous and the communist party’s grip on political power may be challenged by an ever-expanding middle class, threatening stability and the economy.
Be that as it may, China will be a force to be reckoned with, whether as a hegemon or rival superpower. As a result, U.S. policymakers must think about an international system dominated, or at least led, by China. What would such a world look like?
Unlike the U.S. and other past superpowers, China believes above all in sovereignty in foreign policy. One’s domestic problems are just that, domestic, and should be dealt with by one’s own government. This has much to do with China’s own human rights abuses and lack of democratic transparency, which constantly evoke Western criticism.
This non-interventionist zeal is currently playing itself out in Africa, which could serve as a microcosm of a Sino-dominated world. Beijing’s thirst for energy supplies brings it to Sudan and other parts of the continent and results in high levels of aid, investment, and trade, roughly $6 billion in FDI from 2000 to 2006 and over $1 billion in development assistance from 2004 to 2005—enough to inspire Bono to write a ballad.
Yet, Chinese efforts in Africa maintain one primary difference between those of the West. Beijing’s assistance comes with no political strings attached. World Bank and IMF support is usually contingent on political and economic reforms: take it or leave it. But China is filling the gap, becoming a preferable alternative for many regional leaders. Indeed, conditional free loans and aid seem to make the corrupt governments of Mugabe and others happy, while infuriating Western aid officers.
Perhaps the role of hegemon would change this stance, making China a more responsible broker. Perhaps not. The U.S. and EU both tacitly support dictators and those harboring precious energy commodities, Saudi Arabia comes to mind, but not to the extent of China.
This divergence frustrates relations between Beijing and the West, as seen in their impasse on how to proceed in regards to genocide in Darfur and the Iranian nuclear program. The European Union prides itself on pooling national sovereignty and resources and Washington is known for intercession, making the transatlantic alliance unlikely to collaborate with Beijing on many issues.
The U.S. would be left to counterbalance a dominant China by backing regional and fellow democratic powers such as India and Japan—the nuclear deal with the former is one such example of this strategy.
Western liberal interventionism, for all its faults, maintains a decent record: notably in the Balkans. An international system, dominated by China and its hands-off approach—as shown in its current dealings in Africa—would likely allow fraudulent tyrannies to feel at ease, perpetuating international insecurity and injustice. Those yearning for America’s fall from grace should be careful what they wish for.
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Sunday, November 18, 2007
The Other State of Emergency
Amidst the chaos in Pakistan, where martial law is reigning indefinitely, another state of emergency was declared—this time in Georgia. In similar fashion to Pervez Musharraf, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili cracked down on protesters, blacked out independent media, and criticized the opposition.
Unlike in Pakistan, the state of emergency has now ended. But the damage has been done, and the Rose Revolution, which brought democracy to Georgia and vaulted Mr. Saakashvili to power through an electoral landslide, is perhaps starting to wilt.
Martial law was designed to squash unfriendly protests, which have been rampant in Tbilisi and are said by Saakashvili to be sponsored by the Kremlin. However, claims of links between the opposition and Moscow are dubious. Levan Gachechiladze, recently chosen to face Saakashvili in upcoming elections, has denied subservience to Russia, stating that he largely backs the Georgian president’s pro-West policies.
Instead, domestic uprisings arose from Saakashvili’s failure to spread windfalls from high-level economic growth, topping ten percent annually, to the rural poor—agriculture provides for almost half of the population—and slashing of state-owned industry, which led many to the unemployment line.
Be that as it may, while not as potentially dangerous as Pakistan—the country is devoid of an Islamic terrorist or nuclear threat—Georgia’s authoritarian backsliding is damaging to the West.
President Bush’s conspicuous silence on the issue, no pun intended, speaks to the fact that Georgia’s former illustrious status among the neoconservative ranks is fading. Indeed, the reputation of Saakasvili, Bush’s golden boy, took a hit.
Unfortunately, Georgia’s current strife is a negative trend seen throughout the region. This was not always the case; things were looking up in the neighborhood. Democracy activists had a good run in 2004—at least in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Ten former communist countries joined the European Union, and popular uprisings, known by their respective colors—Rose in Georgia’s case, Orange for Ukraine—resulted in the democratic election of pro-Western leaders in former Soviet republics.
But thereafter, things turned sour. Ukraine has been embroiled with corruption and paralyzing infighting between the pro-Russian Regions Party, led by Victor Yankukovych, and President Yuschenko’s western-leaning Orange Coalition, which has since split into rival factions. And now with Georgia showing signs of implosion, the revolutionary spirits in the region have all but subsided. This is not to mention the repeated sparks flying between the newly independent Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—and a resurgent Russia.
To be sure, Georgia is a strategic country, serving as a microcosm of the wider region’s troubles: torn between Moscow and the West, home to separatist movements, and politically unstable. Tit for tat expulsions of diplomats, trade embargos, and downright espionage, have been commonplace between the Eurasian neighbors. A quasi-Cold War—meaning in this case an ideological conflict between those in Moscow’s orbit and others seeking Euro-Atlantic integration—largely confined to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, is underway.
Tblisi, Moscow, and Washington have all contributed to the acrimony. Saakashvili’s constant paranoia-induced conspiracy theories, along with detention of Russian military personnel, have infuriated the Kremlin. For its part, Russia’s support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially given its own separatist problems in Chechnya, smacks of hypocritical opportunism, as does its refusal to allow precious Georgian exports, such as wine, access to its market.
The U.S. has also been insincere in its push for democracy in the country, overlooking some of the Georgian’s president’s misgivings. And as Dmitri Simes points out: “Blind support for Saakashvili contributes to a sense in Moscow that the United States is pursuing policies aimed at undermining what remains of Russia’s drastically reduced regional influence.”
All sides could help alleviate the situation by reversing these mistaken policies. Saakashvili should turn more focus inward, gearing the economy towards wider prosperity and eschewing the opportunity to blame Moscow for all the country’s ills. Putin needs to recognize that territorial integrity is a priority for Georgia, just as it is for Russia, and halt the political usage of trade sanctions.
The U.S. should protect Georgia, as it is a true democracy in a region surrounded by autocrats, the state of emergency notwithstanding, against Russian belligerence. At the same time, if Washington truly cares about democracy in the region, it should criticize its erosion in Moscow and Tbilisi alike—Bush’s muted response to the state of emergency engenders allegations of double-talk.
The stakes are high, and the region is dangerously polarized. Whether the downward slope is inverted is up to the players involved. And while much of the world’s gaze is now largely transfixed on the Middle-East and specifically on Pakistan, policymakers need to pay attention to the other region’s state of emergency.
Unlike in Pakistan, the state of emergency has now ended. But the damage has been done, and the Rose Revolution, which brought democracy to Georgia and vaulted Mr. Saakashvili to power through an electoral landslide, is perhaps starting to wilt.
Martial law was designed to squash unfriendly protests, which have been rampant in Tbilisi and are said by Saakashvili to be sponsored by the Kremlin. However, claims of links between the opposition and Moscow are dubious. Levan Gachechiladze, recently chosen to face Saakashvili in upcoming elections, has denied subservience to Russia, stating that he largely backs the Georgian president’s pro-West policies.
Instead, domestic uprisings arose from Saakashvili’s failure to spread windfalls from high-level economic growth, topping ten percent annually, to the rural poor—agriculture provides for almost half of the population—and slashing of state-owned industry, which led many to the unemployment line.
Be that as it may, while not as potentially dangerous as Pakistan—the country is devoid of an Islamic terrorist or nuclear threat—Georgia’s authoritarian backsliding is damaging to the West.
President Bush’s conspicuous silence on the issue, no pun intended, speaks to the fact that Georgia’s former illustrious status among the neoconservative ranks is fading. Indeed, the reputation of Saakasvili, Bush’s golden boy, took a hit.
Unfortunately, Georgia’s current strife is a negative trend seen throughout the region. This was not always the case; things were looking up in the neighborhood. Democracy activists had a good run in 2004—at least in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Ten former communist countries joined the European Union, and popular uprisings, known by their respective colors—Rose in Georgia’s case, Orange for Ukraine—resulted in the democratic election of pro-Western leaders in former Soviet republics.
But thereafter, things turned sour. Ukraine has been embroiled with corruption and paralyzing infighting between the pro-Russian Regions Party, led by Victor Yankukovych, and President Yuschenko’s western-leaning Orange Coalition, which has since split into rival factions. And now with Georgia showing signs of implosion, the revolutionary spirits in the region have all but subsided. This is not to mention the repeated sparks flying between the newly independent Baltic states—Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania—and a resurgent Russia.
To be sure, Georgia is a strategic country, serving as a microcosm of the wider region’s troubles: torn between Moscow and the West, home to separatist movements, and politically unstable. Tit for tat expulsions of diplomats, trade embargos, and downright espionage, have been commonplace between the Eurasian neighbors. A quasi-Cold War—meaning in this case an ideological conflict between those in Moscow’s orbit and others seeking Euro-Atlantic integration—largely confined to Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union, is underway.
Tblisi, Moscow, and Washington have all contributed to the acrimony. Saakashvili’s constant paranoia-induced conspiracy theories, along with detention of Russian military personnel, have infuriated the Kremlin. For its part, Russia’s support for the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, especially given its own separatist problems in Chechnya, smacks of hypocritical opportunism, as does its refusal to allow precious Georgian exports, such as wine, access to its market.
The U.S. has also been insincere in its push for democracy in the country, overlooking some of the Georgian’s president’s misgivings. And as Dmitri Simes points out: “Blind support for Saakashvili contributes to a sense in Moscow that the United States is pursuing policies aimed at undermining what remains of Russia’s drastically reduced regional influence.”
All sides could help alleviate the situation by reversing these mistaken policies. Saakashvili should turn more focus inward, gearing the economy towards wider prosperity and eschewing the opportunity to blame Moscow for all the country’s ills. Putin needs to recognize that territorial integrity is a priority for Georgia, just as it is for Russia, and halt the political usage of trade sanctions.
The U.S. should protect Georgia, as it is a true democracy in a region surrounded by autocrats, the state of emergency notwithstanding, against Russian belligerence. At the same time, if Washington truly cares about democracy in the region, it should criticize its erosion in Moscow and Tbilisi alike—Bush’s muted response to the state of emergency engenders allegations of double-talk.
The stakes are high, and the region is dangerously polarized. Whether the downward slope is inverted is up to the players involved. And while much of the world’s gaze is now largely transfixed on the Middle-East and specifically on Pakistan, policymakers need to pay attention to the other region’s state of emergency.
Thursday, November 8, 2007
The Good News Coming Out of Pakistan
Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf put the nail in his own coffin. By declaring a state of emergency, which includes cutting off private media outlets and detaining opposition figures, he has heightened public hatred toward his regime and put Pakistan on the brink of chaos.
Western officials have publicly condemned the move—U.S. Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice pleaded with Musharraf not to go through with it—but privately worry about what would follow in the wake of his demise.
Indeed, stability is paramount in a country home to a mixture of dangerous elements: terrorism, the constant threat of military strife with its Indian neighbor, the presence of Osama Bin Laden, nuclear weapons, and now a weak and unpopular military dictatorship.
With disastrous conditions like this, it is hard to see the silver lining in Pakistan. But there is reason for hope amidst the debris. What has accompanied Musharraf’s distress is the dramatic rise of civil society in the country—enough to make Robert Putnam blush—a precursor for homegrown democracy.
The concept of civil society largely owes itself to the aforementioned political scientist Robert Putnam—famous in the U.S. for his groundbreaking work, “Bowling Alone”, in which he stated that the decline of civic associations in the U.S.—organizations outside of the government, symbolized in this case by bowling leagues—has led to political apathy and democratic deficiency.
He is the godfather of social capital and civil society. And according to Putnam, people who belong to civic associations, whether sports clubs or bird-watching groups, develop trust, participation, and bonds between peers, making them better democrats.
His study of democracy in Italy, “Making Democracy Work”, found that the civic community, whose citizens are “helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance,” was more entrenched in the north of Italy. This is why the region was more democratic and less corrupt than its less civic neighbors in the south. In short, his conclusion was “the more civic a region, the more effective its government.”
What does this have to do with Pakistan? As the Musharraf debacle has illustrated, backing a military dictator is a hazardous enterprise, while Iraq has shown that overthrowing autocrats by force and implanting democracy is also a troublesome tactic. If a third option, indigenous democracy, is the right course of action, the creation of a vibrant civil society maybe the means to bring it about.
There are signs that Pakistan may be ripe for civil society-backed democracy. The current crisis can largely be traced to the removal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary this March, reportedly on trumped up corruption charges—Musharraf’s seemingly favorite strategy of silencing dissent—but likely because of his independent inquiry into the illegal detention of Pakistanis. Packs lined the streets, mainly comprised of lawyers in business suits, in perpetual protest until Chaudhary was reinstated—to much fanfare—and granted rock star status.
These suits could represent the future of Pakistan. With a burgeoning middle-class—spurred by capitalism—and publicly active lawyers bringing about political reform, the country may be another testing ground for Putnam’s theory.
And who are the ones being detained by Musharraf through this state of emergency? Lawyers and opposition politicians are the main targets—despite the general’s statements on tackling extremism—of the martial law declaration. "Those he has arrested are progressive, secular-minded people while the terrorists are offered negotiations and ceasefires,” rightly declared Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist.
However, do a group of lawyers, upset by the president’s stranglehold on the judiciary, really constitute a reformist civil society and the hope for democracy in Pakistan? By definition, groups organizing outside of the scope of government can be deemed a part of civil society. Fighting for civil rights, moreover, logically makes them civil activists.
Civil society stamped and approved or not, these lawyers cannot bring about change by themselves. Democracy hinges on more civil groups joining the fight, and perhaps on Western pressure, among many other things. And even with the inception of democracy, Pakistan will still be one of the most dangerous countries on the planet. There will still be a large terrorist presence—indoctrinated by the country’s numerous madrassahs—and a powerful military and intelligence apparatus, linked to the Taliban and other Islamic extremists, and topped off by a nuclear weapon arsenal.
Putnam’s assertions are flawed but valid. Perhaps they will be tested in Pakistan. Be that is it may, rising public activism, embodied by the protesting groups of lawyers, while not sufficient, is necessary for democratic pluralism. There may be positive effects of the state of emergency after-all.
Western officials have publicly condemned the move—U.S. Secretary of State Condolleeza Rice pleaded with Musharraf not to go through with it—but privately worry about what would follow in the wake of his demise.
Indeed, stability is paramount in a country home to a mixture of dangerous elements: terrorism, the constant threat of military strife with its Indian neighbor, the presence of Osama Bin Laden, nuclear weapons, and now a weak and unpopular military dictatorship.
With disastrous conditions like this, it is hard to see the silver lining in Pakistan. But there is reason for hope amidst the debris. What has accompanied Musharraf’s distress is the dramatic rise of civil society in the country—enough to make Robert Putnam blush—a precursor for homegrown democracy.
The concept of civil society largely owes itself to the aforementioned political scientist Robert Putnam—famous in the U.S. for his groundbreaking work, “Bowling Alone”, in which he stated that the decline of civic associations in the U.S.—organizations outside of the government, symbolized in this case by bowling leagues—has led to political apathy and democratic deficiency.
He is the godfather of social capital and civil society. And according to Putnam, people who belong to civic associations, whether sports clubs or bird-watching groups, develop trust, participation, and bonds between peers, making them better democrats.
His study of democracy in Italy, “Making Democracy Work”, found that the civic community, whose citizens are “helpful, respectful, and trustful toward one another, even when they differ on matters of substance,” was more entrenched in the north of Italy. This is why the region was more democratic and less corrupt than its less civic neighbors in the south. In short, his conclusion was “the more civic a region, the more effective its government.”
What does this have to do with Pakistan? As the Musharraf debacle has illustrated, backing a military dictator is a hazardous enterprise, while Iraq has shown that overthrowing autocrats by force and implanting democracy is also a troublesome tactic. If a third option, indigenous democracy, is the right course of action, the creation of a vibrant civil society maybe the means to bring it about.
There are signs that Pakistan may be ripe for civil society-backed democracy. The current crisis can largely be traced to the removal of Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary this March, reportedly on trumped up corruption charges—Musharraf’s seemingly favorite strategy of silencing dissent—but likely because of his independent inquiry into the illegal detention of Pakistanis. Packs lined the streets, mainly comprised of lawyers in business suits, in perpetual protest until Chaudhary was reinstated—to much fanfare—and granted rock star status.
These suits could represent the future of Pakistan. With a burgeoning middle-class—spurred by capitalism—and publicly active lawyers bringing about political reform, the country may be another testing ground for Putnam’s theory.
And who are the ones being detained by Musharraf through this state of emergency? Lawyers and opposition politicians are the main targets—despite the general’s statements on tackling extremism—of the martial law declaration. "Those he has arrested are progressive, secular-minded people while the terrorists are offered negotiations and ceasefires,” rightly declared Asma Jahangir, a Pakistani lawyer and human rights activist.
However, do a group of lawyers, upset by the president’s stranglehold on the judiciary, really constitute a reformist civil society and the hope for democracy in Pakistan? By definition, groups organizing outside of the scope of government can be deemed a part of civil society. Fighting for civil rights, moreover, logically makes them civil activists.
Civil society stamped and approved or not, these lawyers cannot bring about change by themselves. Democracy hinges on more civil groups joining the fight, and perhaps on Western pressure, among many other things. And even with the inception of democracy, Pakistan will still be one of the most dangerous countries on the planet. There will still be a large terrorist presence—indoctrinated by the country’s numerous madrassahs—and a powerful military and intelligence apparatus, linked to the Taliban and other Islamic extremists, and topped off by a nuclear weapon arsenal.
Putnam’s assertions are flawed but valid. Perhaps they will be tested in Pakistan. Be that is it may, rising public activism, embodied by the protesting groups of lawyers, while not sufficient, is necessary for democratic pluralism. There may be positive effects of the state of emergency after-all.
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