Nationalist Economics

Conventional wisdom dictates that nationalism and separatism are characterized by close-knit bonds formed from an intense allegiance to a common history, lineage, land, and language. This is largely correct, especially in regards to more primitive nationalist movements in lesser developed countries.

Yet in more prosperous and federal—where much power is devolved from the central government to regional entities—countries, financial concerns often reign supreme. Self interested economics—anxiety over sharing wealth with less affluent regions within the country—must be added to the dynamic, as witnessed by recent nationalist unrest.

Belgium, famous for its waffles and chocolate, but also for its communitarian and federalist structures, is falling victim to this phenomenon. Its reputation for diversity and collegiality may be on the wane, as the multi-ethnic state is danger of disintegration.

The small country hosts the most supranational entity in the world, the European Union, along with a diverse domestic population: split between the French-speaking Walloons in the south and the Dutch-speaking Flems in the north, with some German-speakers on the side.

Indeed, linguistic cleavages have threatened the unity of the country since its creation in 1830 by King Leopold. The capital, Brussels, is caught in the middle—the site of a verbal war, with each side seeking to impose its linguistic dominance. This an exaggeration perhaps, but gaining validity with time.

Currently exacerbating things is the lack of a standing government, despite over one hundred days passing since the election. An effort to carve together a center-right coalition is hamstrung by—surprise, surprise—bickering between Flemish and Walloon officials.

Fears of the state’s collapse were fanned last year when the television station RTBF—a cruel joke indeed—reported that Flanders had declared independence. Also, one Flemish journalist put Belgium for sale on Ebay.

With no federal government, Flemish separatists may see this as the perfect time to break away. Remi Vermeiren, a Flemish nationalist, declared, "For a while, 'separatist' was a dirty word. Now there are almost daily discussions about it.” Walloons seem scared to death of this possibility, with one regional newspaper noting, “The Walloons are like a wife who's scared that her husband may leave her.”

It was not always this way. Wallonia was a region of immense industrial economic power, with profitable mining and steel sectors. Nationalism followed. Flanders was an economic laggard. But recently, the roles have reversed.

Having achieved high levels of economic growth—clearly delineating itself from Wallonia—largely on the back of a burgeoning services sector, Flanders is reluctant to share the wealth. Subsidies to its poorer regional neighbor suck the state coffers dry, leaving many Flemish citizens feeling bitter.

This is certainly what Vermeiren was trying to convey with the statement: “We are an expensive, inefficient country.” Unsurprisingly, Flemish nationalists want to retain their economic windfalls, while Walloons wish to retain the allocation of funds.

This is not how a successful federal state is governed. Unity in diversity is largely dependent on economic solidarity. Unfortunately in a federal state, despite what Gordon Gekko might say, greed does not work. Reallocating funds from richer to poorer regions helps develop the entire country’s economy, which in the long run is good for the more affluent areas.

The modern European Union is based on this premise. EU Structural and Regional Funds is a financial program, which injects capital from rich member states into lesser developed, usually new, members. Spain joined in 1986, with a relatively dismal economy. Regional funds turned the country’s economic fortunes around to the point that now Spain is a net contributor to the EU budget.

Ironically, Spain is also a country embroiled in separatist, economic conflict. Regional variety, even more so than Belgium, is rampant in Spain, which is made up of 17 semi-autonomous regions. Also home to the two of the most enduring and well known nationalist movements, in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the country is no stranger to separatist unease.

The Catalan and Basque regions are two of the most affluent areas in Spain. To be sure, there is much more than economics at play in these movements, but in today’s federal system, finance again plays a primary role. In this vein, Catalonia recently obtained an agreement with the central government in which it controls over 50% of its tax receipts.

Needier regions such as Andalusia have complained that this jeopardizes national economic cohesion, as the area, much like Wallonia, receives benefits from wealthier regions. The center-right Popular Party responded to the new Catalan statute by warning of “the Balkanization of Spain.”

Neither Spain nor Belgium is in imminent danger of dissolution. But a common thread running through the separatist threats is economic nationalism. If Scots truly thought they could hold their own economically—and there are many who already do—without the help of London and the rest of Great Britain, the nationalist movement would gain even greater support and British unity would likely be in danger.

Prosperity empowers an already divergent people who wish to garner greater control of their economic destiny—much to the dismay of other provinces—adding a financial layer to nationalist separatism. Economic nationalism may be the wave of the future in a globalized world.

The Denouement of De Gaulle's Influence

Charles De Gaulle, former French President and architect of the fifth republic, once said: “France cannot be France without greatness.” Self proclaimed Gaullist and current French premier, Nicolas Sarkozy, campaigned on a similar pledge to make France great, and in doing so, project more power to the world. But the two differ on the means to this end.

For De Gaulle, greatness was best achieved in frequent opposition to the United States. The general likely drew this lesson from the 1956 Suez Crisis, in which the U.S. intervened—after not being consulted—to stop the French, British, and Israeli-led effort to regain control of the canal from Egyptian nationalist president Nasser.

After this rebuff, France and Great Britain were in similar, dire straits: their colonial possessions were disappearing and the United States was emerging as the great power, willing and able to frustrate their imperial endeavors.

Great Britain, henceforth, decided to cling to Washington in order to preserve some of its declining prestige—and the “special relationship” was born. Another viable strategy was to go against the new superpower and seek independence from her, which is the route De Gaulle ended up taking.

France would build up Europe, and a powerful Europe would stand up to the United States and maintain French greatness in the world, a concept which led former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan to later remark about De Gaulle: "He talks of Europe and means France." As British historian Timothy Garton Ash observes, "France's rank was to be secured through the institutions of Europe, with French political leadership supported by Germany's economic weight."

It was largely through this framework that France withdrew from the NATO integrated military command in 1966 and forced the mutual security organization to move its headquarters from Paris to Brussels; twice denied Great Britain’s application to the European Community in the 1960s, claiming its membership would be like an American “Trojan horse” in the organization; and commenced a rapprochement with Western Germany in the form of the 1963 Elysee Treaty. De Gaulle also flirted with the Soviets, visiting Moscow in 1966.

This is to not to say that De Gaulle openly opposed U.S. foreign policy in all its forms and backed the Soviet Union in the battles of the Cold War. Instead, he actively pursued selective antagonism, attempting to force Washington to take into account French interests.

Sarkozy’s predecessor, Jacques Chirac, carried the Gaullist banner in his calls for a “multilateral world” and resistance to the U.S. invasion of Iraq—again, not like Hugo Chavez, but nowhere near as friendly to American policy as Tony Blair. A French-led European counterweight was Chirac’s—and De Gaulle’s—ultimate goal.

But this did not happen. Europe has long been divided between Atlanticists who wish to align with Washington on most issues and those who seek to increase European capabilities to balance American power. To be sure, this wedge is not clear-cut, it is not anti-Americans versus Washington lap-dogs—there are different shades.

Nonetheless, there is a rift. The run-up to the Iraq War—with Great Britain, Spain, and Italy, along with many Eastern European countries backing Washington, and France, Germany and others opposing the invasion—highlighted the disunity. But Iraq also showed how fragile these allegiances are, varying from administration to administration.

The European balance of power—not in the conventional sense—of Atlanticists and Gaullists is constantly changing. Spain and Italy are now run by center-left governments who oppose the war and after gaining office quickly withdrew their country’s troops, deployed by former sympathetic conservative leaders, from Iraq. Meanwhile, Germany and France, the main antagonists before the war, are now run by Atlanticists Angela Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy.

One might expect Sarkozy, leader of the Gaullist UMP party to continue De Gaulle and Chirac’s strategy. But this largely has not been the case. Symbolically, he passed over southern France and Europe to vacation in New Hampshire in August. And on the economic side, the new French president is an open admirer of the U.S. and its entrepreneurial spirit and favors American-style reforms of the French labor market.

Sarkozy’s foreign policy, however, is the primary departure from Gaullist ideology. In fact, the French general is likely rolling in his grave after Sarkozy’s recent statements. Opening up old wounds, Sarkozy stated that France should perform a “full role” in NATO, which could lead to the reinstatement of France in the integrated military structure and the reversal of De Gaulle’s 1966 decision.

Moreover, French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner frightened many Europeans by alluding to the possibility of military conflict with Iran over its nuclear program, stating: "We have to prepare for the worst, and the worst is war.” He has since moved away from these remarks a bit, but there is a marked change of policy towards Iran.

Kouchner’s declaration has been backed up by threats of more sanctions—outside of the UN Security Council if necessary—if Iran does not comply; similar to Bush’s stance. Washington is no doubt delighted by this somewhat volte-face in French foreign policy, but Gaullists like Chirac are probably not.

Does this truly constitute a repudiation of Gaullist foreign policy? Perhaps not. For all his musings on NATO and Iran, Sarkozy is still an economic nationalist in favor of protection of state-led industry, much like De Gaulle. The French President’s attempts to guard against globalization and build up French and European champions fit the bill. In this sense, American and French interests do not coincide.

Yet, to be sure, no French president has ever appeared so friendly to U.S. foreign policy. Aligning with Washington on a tougher stance vis-à-vis Iran and possibly bringing France back to the forefront of the transatlantic security alliance, NATO, is a clear deviation from De Gaulle and is undoubtedly welcomed by Washington.

Whether the French people will continue to go along with these and other controversial Sarkozy initiatives—his approval rating is roughly in the 60s—remains to be seen. But De Gaulle’s stranglehold on French foreign policy, certainly under Sarkozy, is nearing its end, or to be fitting, its denouement.

Passport Politics

Rarely do travel restrictions enter the discourse of strategic foreign policy-makers. It is doubtful that Henry Kissinger spent much time on the subject. Grander and more long-term issues such as the balance of power get more air-time and attention. It is up to consular officials in the State Department to handle the mundane, everyday issues of U.S. foreign Policy: issuing passports and granting visas.

However, as with so many other issues: it is the little things that count. Denying access to wanting visitors can poison relations with other countries. American officials seem to recognize this, hence the many exchange programs initiated over the years. Without such programs, it is easy for foreign populaces to simply agree with the stereotypes of Americans: fat, arrogant, loud, and uncultured.

It is rare that foreigners who actually make the trek to the United States continue to believe these things. And upon returning to their home countries, they relay their adventures and perceptions of America—hopefully positive—to fellow nationals, likely spreading a more constructive view of the United States. In the grand scheme of things, this can help foster better international relations and more support for U.S. foreign policy.

Seen in this light, the travel restrictions imposed on many Eastern Europeans are tragic. Poland is one such country excluded from the Visa Waiver Program, which allows visitors to enter the United States for ninety days without a visa. As a result, travel and commerce between the two countries suffers. This may seem inconsequential to U.S. officials, but it is at the top of the list of priorities for many Poles, and is beginning to damage what would be an otherwise close relationship.

The alliance between the two is quite strong. Poland sent a large contingency to Iraq and plans to host a U.S.-sponsored missile-defense shield. As is the case with many of its neighbors, the country still harbors much goodwill towards the United States for its support and calls for freedom during the Cold War. Warsaw, given its troubled history, is paranoid and sees Washington as the most likely guarantor of protection from an increasingly resurgent and interventionist Russia.

Unsurprisingly, Polish popular sentiment is largely pro-American—especially when compared to its Western European counterparts. New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman declares: “I found the cure to anti-Americanism: Come to Poland.” Michael Mandelbaum, U.S. Foreign Policy expert from Johns Hopkins, adds: “Poland is the most pro-American country in the world — including the United States.”

But things are changing—for the worse. The 2007 edition of Transatlantic Trends, the influential survey conducted by the German Marshall Fund, bears this out. In 2002, 64% of Poles found strong U.S. world leadership to be desirable. Now, only 40% share that sentiment. Similarly, generic approval rating for the U.S. declined from 65% in 2002 to 57% in 2007.

Many factors are at play here, which could explain the waning pro-American sentiment: adverse effects from the Iraq War and the onset of European Union membership, to name a few. But to be sure, the visa restrictions are playing a primary role in the rise in Polish anti-Americanism. In a recent PBS documentary entitled, “The Anti-Americans: A Hate/Love Relationship”, one Pole pointed out that while blatantly anti-American Frenchman can travel to the U.S. without problems, Poles cannot.

Whenever border issues are brought up, national security concerns surface. Granting asylum to criminals or foreigners bent on doing the country harm obviously should not be U.S. policy. But in this case, these fears are unlikely to be realized. These are Poles, not Syrians: what is the problem?

There are inherent problems—Poland is not devoid of shady characters who wish to travel to the U.S. and there are floods of Islamic, potentially fundamentalist, immigrants residing in Europe—so there should be regulations. But the Visa Waiver Program needs to be updated immediately. Benefits of the program should be bestowed upon countries, like Poland, whose citizens pose little or no security risks and whose governments are friendly to the United States.

A little bit goes a long way. Clearing up these visa difficulties would closely align Poland with the United States for the foreseeable future; giving Polish leaders the political support and leverage to collaborate with the U.S. on future projects such as the missile defense shield. Passport politics is not likely to be taught in intro to international relations courses. But visas, however unexciting, should be part of the U.S. foreign policy arsenal.

Rewarding North Korea Is Inevitable

After much wrangling, the $25 million in allegedly illicit funds were unfrozen and returned to North Korea a few months ago, allowing the nuclear disarmament process to continue.

This followed a landmark agreement in February in which leader Kim Jong Ill signed up to receive energy and aid in return for full dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program, sparking hopes, however faint, of perhaps the end of the crisis.

But, as seen in the fractious resolution of the money laundering ordeal, the devil is in the details. Officials on both sides must decide on the timing and reciprocity of the deal: when should North Korea shut down nuclear plants such as that in Yongbyon and when and how should they be rewarded for doing so?

As always, Kim wants to get a lot for a little, doing the bare minimum and demanding retribution. Predictably, he delayed the closure of the Yongbyon facility until he received the $25 million. Washington gave in to this demand, leading critics to cry appeasement.

Indeed, American hardliners such as former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton decried the February pact, alleging: “It is rewarding bad behavior.” He went on to declare: "It's a bad signal to North Korea and it's a bad signal to Iran. It will say to countries like Iran and other would-be proliferators, if you just have enough patience, if you just have enough persistence, you’ll wear the United States down."

Former State Department official, Stephen Rademaker, was also pessimistic about the deal, noting: “No matter what incremental progress is made in coming months, it would defy experience to believe that a permanent diplomatic resolution to the nuclear stand-off is at hand.”

To be sure, negotiations with North Korea over the years have not fared well: arrangements have been broken, each side accusing the other of not living up to their end of the bargain.

Although Pyongyang has recently acquired actual nuclear weapons and Washington has accused Kim of a secret uranium enrichment program, the issues are essentially the same: North Korea wants fuel, aid, and restoration of diplomatic ties with the U.S., while Washington desires full de-nuclearization in return.

The 1993 Agreed Framework was an incremental agreement based on these points. Construction on a peaceful, light-water nuclear reactor and fuel oil shipments to North Korea began, and Kim froze the nuclear program—temporarily.

Things came to a head in 2002, as Pyongyang blamed the U.S. for lack of progress on the agreement and kicked out IAEA inspectors. Kim subsequently pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 and sped up nuclear efforts. The Agreed Framework was in ashes.

The Bush Administration commenced six-party talks—involving the U.S., Russia, China, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea—to dissuade Kim’s regime from wielding nuclear weapons. Efforts were fruitless until September 2005, when an accord aimed at total disarmament was reached, followed by this February’s deal.

Although the road to Pyonyang has been wrought with pitfalls, does this mean, as critics of the recent pact seem to dictate, that the U.S. and others should stop trying? Refusing to negotiate with a cruel, dictatorial regime such as Kim’s may make officials in Washington feel better, but it does not keep nuclear weapons out of his hands. It may seem like succumbing to nuclear blackmail—in all reality, it is—but what is the alternative?

The fatal flaws of military-induced regime change do not need much reiteration. And isolating the regime and cutting off ties has not done the trick. The victims of this failed policy are, by and large, innocent North Korean citizens, who die of hunger while Kim eats steak and lobster in his palatial estates.

It is certainly not the duty of Washington and others to protect and feed the people of North Korea; it is Kim’s. But unfortunately the maltreatment of the populace has been an indirect consequence of this isolation strategy. South Korea and others constantly send food aid, but the more pragmatic and rational strategy would be to try to open up the North Korean economy so that citizens can feed themselves.

The political effects of economic and political engagement, contingent of course on reforms, would also be positive. Closing off the North Korean people to other cultures and news sources allows Kim to impose his views on the populace—without competition. With liberalization it would be more difficult for Kim to convince his people that a foreign adversary, such as the U.S., is the source of all their problems.

Change would be gradual. The economic and political structure would probably be similar to that of modern-day China: a relatively open, capitalist economy with strict political control—not the ideal situation, but certainly better for the North Korean people than present circumstances.

This clearly does not mean that Kim can ride rough-shod over the recent agreement and demand extraordinary concessions. But the sad truth is that, at some point, North Korea will need to be given carrots for disarmament; isolation has not and likely will not work. Washington cannot wish away this problem.

Libya in 2002 was rewarded with better relations for dismantling its program, which was much less advanced and dangerous. Pyongyang, and longer down the road, Tehran, will also have to be granted dispensation. Unfortunately, this is the nature of the beast.

Morality and idealism, especially in international relations, often must give way to pragmatism if problems are to be solved. It is inevitable that Kim and others will be paid off for giving up nuclear weapons. Regrettably, nuclear black-mail is here to stay.