Turkey’s incumbent Justice and Development party, AKP, predictably won this past weekend’s election—by a landslide. In general, ruling parties usually fail to win a larger percentage of the vote the next time around. But AKP was predicted by almost all political analysts to do so, and they did. Why?
In part, their competition is lacking. The center-left CHP party, which is closely aligned to the military elite, ran on a platform of secularism—and not much else. With a growing economy—averaging 7 ½ annual growth rates the past five years—and a country full of Muslims, CHP was no match for the moderately Islamist and pro-market AKP.
Secularism is indeed an essential aspect of the Turkish republic, and has been since its founding in 1923 out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire by Kemal Attaturk. Mr. Attaturk engrained on the nation not only an affinity for its founder, but also a tradition of separation of church and state, an ideal closely protected by a nationalist military. To that end, there have been four military-led coups since 1960.
Yet it was these age-old Turkish institutions, secularism and the military, which triggered the recent lop-sided elections. In what came to be known as the “cyber-coup”, the military in April published an online protest of the nomination of the former Islamist firebrand and current foreign minister, Abdullah Gul, for the traditionally secular post of president of the republic. AKP responded by calling for elections. And in a tragic twist of fate, the fiercely secular military further enhanced the standing of the Turkish Islamists.
Turkey has long been lauded as a model for Muslim countries, secular and pro-Western. Does the election change this analysis? With a large Muslim population, leaning toward Islam is a vote winner, and AKP has captured this sentiment. But secularism is not going anywhere, providing a check to what is seen by critics as the creeping Islamization of society.
Aside from secularism, Turkey is also a bright-spot in the region because of the moderation of its Islamist movement. Islam will wield at least a marginal role in Middle-East politics, as it does now in Turkey, and in this vein, AKP should be seen in the region as an Islamist movement worth emulating.
Turkey’s political evolution, and perhaps eventually that of the region, is “one that is embedded in cultural conservatism and in search of an appropriate synthesis between Islam, capitalism and secular, liberal democracy.”[1] AKP’s platform provides the right mix of these positions, hence its success.
Another of AKP’s attractive qualities is its more pro-European stance. This stands in direct contrast to its CHP rivals’ nationalist ambivalence to EU accession. Thus, despite the numerous obstacles inside and outside of Turkey to EU membership, the election also bodes well for its prospects.
What the West should be concerned about, however, is that Turkish public opinion towards the US and the West is at a low point. But AKP is not the primary reason for the plunge, Iraq is.
Turkish politicians warned of the dangers of invading Iraq. Their warnings that the Kurdish minority in Turkey would be emboldened by the formation of an autonomous Kurdish state in northern Iraq went unheeded and came to fruition. Kurdish terrorists are now accused of using Iraq as a staging point for operations in Turkey, leading to the buildup of Turkish forces on the border, poised for an incursion.
The military unsurprisingly favors crossing the border, much to the dismay of US officials. AKP in the run-up to the election was perhaps forced to posture in support of the measure, but the end of the electoral process should help cool things down.
Military elites, in a sense, lost the election without fielding a candidate. Their objection to Abdullah Gul’s nomination provoked the election, and the results were a negative referendum on the prominent role of the military in Turkish politics.
This phenomenon is encouraging for both Turkish democracy and EU accession. It would be difficult to find a modern country in which the military wields as much power as it does in Turkey. For elected officials to be in constant fear of a military-led coup is not helpful for the democratic process.
Moreover, the military’s political interventions frighten those in Brussels who favor Turkish accession, and provides ammunition to those against the endeavor. The election weakens the military's grip on power and shows political maturity, which should help Ankara's cause in Brussels.
While many claim the election results are a blow to secularism in Turkey, which may be the case on a very small scale, they are a positive signal for Turkey’s future. Democracy and the economy were electoral winners. Political and economic stability now reigns in Turkey—at least for the time being.
Polarization between the secularists and Islamists, however, could spark conflict. The military will be even more on guard against Islam’s role in the political realm, and could provoke a conflict with the Kurds in northern Iraq to reassert itself. But taken as a whole, AKP’s landslide victory is good news for Turkey and the West, and will hopefully lead to Turkey fulfilling its potential, not just geographically, as a bridge from the West to the Middle-East.
[1] Ozel, Soli. “Turkey’s Quest to Modernize Remains on Track.” The Financial Times. July 26, 2007.
Friday, July 27, 2007
Thursday, July 19, 2007
The Kremlin's Childish Desires
A state, in many ways, is like a child. It must be watched over, cared for, and protected. The most striking infantile trait of the state, however, is its desire to be heard. On the world stage, states often wield attention deficit disorders. Its feelings are hurt if its opinion is not taken into account, and it will often, in turn, seek to reproach this insult.
Many of the actions of Vladimir Putin’s Russia should be seen through this lens. After a brief period of relative insignificance, the Kremlin wants to project its opinion and throw its weight around internationally, and the West is becoming frustrated over this fact.
The most recent spat between the Kremlin and the West is over the fallout from the poisoning of former KGB officer and recent Putin-critic Alexander Litvinenko. Litvinenko died last November in London, due to exposure to the radioactive agent polonium 210. His demise sparked accusations of a Kremlin-led conspiracy after the Russian dissident exclaimed on his deathbed that Putin was responsible for his murder—an accusation Moscow has adamantly denied. Russia then refused to extradite Andrei Lugovoi to the UK to be tried for the killing of Litvinenko.
This week, Gordon Brown confronted the Kremlin’s lack of cooperation by expelling four Russian diplomats. Putin responded in kind today, sending four British diplomats back to the UK. And thus, a tit-for-tat diplomatic struggle is under way.
Putin has made the case that extradition is both unconstitutional and unnecessary. Regarding the former, he is right, the Russian constitution forbids the extradition of nationals to be tried abroad. It is also unnecessary, according to the Kremlin, because Lugovoi will be investigated in Russia.
Moreover, the UK is hosting many officials wanted by Moscow, notably Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch accused by the Kremlin of seeking to foment a violent overthrow of the Putin government, and Chechen leader Ahmed Zakayev. London has refused over twenty Russian extradition applications for these suspects and others.
Brown’s rebuttal is that Putin’s government has conveniently failed to get to the bottom of several assassinations of Kremlin foes, including the savage murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and thus cannot be trusted to bring Litvinenko’s killers to justice. The new prime minister must have also felt compelled to react strongly as a result of his brief tenure at 10 Downing. Showing weakness to Russia in his first international row would set a bad precedent and would also likely be frowned upon by his domestic audience.
Whatever one might say about Vladimir Putin, he certainly keeps Russia in the news. This is exactly what he wants, and this affair is no exception. The Russia of the mid-1990s, a weakened state reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union, no longer exists. Putin has seen to that.
Russia was largely ignored during that turbulent time. But they were heady days for the West, it had "won" the Cold War and NATO and the EU expanded their respective spheres of influence right up to the doorstep of Russia. An introspective and fragile Kremlin could do nothing about it. With the windfalls of high energy prices filling state coffers and fuelling high levels of economic growth within the country, however, Moscow is determined to reassert itself.
Witness the Kremlin’s heavy-handed use of energy supplies in Ukraine and other former Soviet states and insistence that its reservations be considered regarding a range of issues: the invasion of Iraq, the Middle-East Peace Process, Iran’s nuclear program, and the independence of Kosovo. Putin also wishes to reverse the decisions of the past, renegotiating energy deals and international agreements from the 1990s, which “were not, in the Kremlin’s eyes, bargains between equals, but rather exploitation of Russian weakness.”[1]
The Kremlin is even sponsoring the indoctrination of young people with this feeling of being short-changed internationally. Nashi, meaning “our own”, is a pro-Putin youth group, which violentally demonstrated in front of the Estonian embassy after the former Soviet country moved a Soviet WWII memorial. Many of its members are currently in summer camps, learning the ropes and seeking to gain entry into cushy state jobs by vowing allegiance to Putin and the Kremlin.
An ardent nationalism, along with the aforementioned feeling of international self-entitlement, seems to be a common thread running through the thinking of these young people. Yulia Kuliyeva, a Nashi ideologue, declares: “We are defending our sovereignty not from somebody else, but for ourselves, so that people can listen to us, so that we can speak and our opinion will be taken into account.”[2] Again, bitterness abound for the unstable 1990s and a childish desire to be recognized across the globe.
To be sure, Russia is a force on the world stage and seeks to be heard. The 1990s was a blip on the radar screen. Putin is tapping into popular nationalism and reclaiming world power status. Western officials need to gauge Moscow’s opinion on many issues, as it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a participant in the important international issues listed above.
However, the Kremlin’s booming economy and energy reserves do not give it the right to do whatever it wants internationally. This requires a strong and clear Western response when Russia oversteps its boundaries. Putin needs to know that if he acts like a child, he will be treated like one.
[1] Stephens, Philip. “With Due Respect to Mr Putin.” The Financial Times. July 17, 2007.
[2] Buckley, Neil. “New Cadre Raises Campfire Song to Russia and Putin.” The Financial Times. July 19, 2007.
Many of the actions of Vladimir Putin’s Russia should be seen through this lens. After a brief period of relative insignificance, the Kremlin wants to project its opinion and throw its weight around internationally, and the West is becoming frustrated over this fact.
The most recent spat between the Kremlin and the West is over the fallout from the poisoning of former KGB officer and recent Putin-critic Alexander Litvinenko. Litvinenko died last November in London, due to exposure to the radioactive agent polonium 210. His demise sparked accusations of a Kremlin-led conspiracy after the Russian dissident exclaimed on his deathbed that Putin was responsible for his murder—an accusation Moscow has adamantly denied. Russia then refused to extradite Andrei Lugovoi to the UK to be tried for the killing of Litvinenko.
This week, Gordon Brown confronted the Kremlin’s lack of cooperation by expelling four Russian diplomats. Putin responded in kind today, sending four British diplomats back to the UK. And thus, a tit-for-tat diplomatic struggle is under way.
Putin has made the case that extradition is both unconstitutional and unnecessary. Regarding the former, he is right, the Russian constitution forbids the extradition of nationals to be tried abroad. It is also unnecessary, according to the Kremlin, because Lugovoi will be investigated in Russia.
Moreover, the UK is hosting many officials wanted by Moscow, notably Boris Berezovsky, a Russian oligarch accused by the Kremlin of seeking to foment a violent overthrow of the Putin government, and Chechen leader Ahmed Zakayev. London has refused over twenty Russian extradition applications for these suspects and others.
Brown’s rebuttal is that Putin’s government has conveniently failed to get to the bottom of several assassinations of Kremlin foes, including the savage murder of journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and thus cannot be trusted to bring Litvinenko’s killers to justice. The new prime minister must have also felt compelled to react strongly as a result of his brief tenure at 10 Downing. Showing weakness to Russia in his first international row would set a bad precedent and would also likely be frowned upon by his domestic audience.
Whatever one might say about Vladimir Putin, he certainly keeps Russia in the news. This is exactly what he wants, and this affair is no exception. The Russia of the mid-1990s, a weakened state reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union, no longer exists. Putin has seen to that.
Russia was largely ignored during that turbulent time. But they were heady days for the West, it had "won" the Cold War and NATO and the EU expanded their respective spheres of influence right up to the doorstep of Russia. An introspective and fragile Kremlin could do nothing about it. With the windfalls of high energy prices filling state coffers and fuelling high levels of economic growth within the country, however, Moscow is determined to reassert itself.
Witness the Kremlin’s heavy-handed use of energy supplies in Ukraine and other former Soviet states and insistence that its reservations be considered regarding a range of issues: the invasion of Iraq, the Middle-East Peace Process, Iran’s nuclear program, and the independence of Kosovo. Putin also wishes to reverse the decisions of the past, renegotiating energy deals and international agreements from the 1990s, which “were not, in the Kremlin’s eyes, bargains between equals, but rather exploitation of Russian weakness.”[1]
The Kremlin is even sponsoring the indoctrination of young people with this feeling of being short-changed internationally. Nashi, meaning “our own”, is a pro-Putin youth group, which violentally demonstrated in front of the Estonian embassy after the former Soviet country moved a Soviet WWII memorial. Many of its members are currently in summer camps, learning the ropes and seeking to gain entry into cushy state jobs by vowing allegiance to Putin and the Kremlin.
An ardent nationalism, along with the aforementioned feeling of international self-entitlement, seems to be a common thread running through the thinking of these young people. Yulia Kuliyeva, a Nashi ideologue, declares: “We are defending our sovereignty not from somebody else, but for ourselves, so that people can listen to us, so that we can speak and our opinion will be taken into account.”[2] Again, bitterness abound for the unstable 1990s and a childish desire to be recognized across the globe.
To be sure, Russia is a force on the world stage and seeks to be heard. The 1990s was a blip on the radar screen. Putin is tapping into popular nationalism and reclaiming world power status. Western officials need to gauge Moscow’s opinion on many issues, as it is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and a participant in the important international issues listed above.
However, the Kremlin’s booming economy and energy reserves do not give it the right to do whatever it wants internationally. This requires a strong and clear Western response when Russia oversteps its boundaries. Putin needs to know that if he acts like a child, he will be treated like one.
[1] Stephens, Philip. “With Due Respect to Mr Putin.” The Financial Times. July 17, 2007.
[2] Buckley, Neil. “New Cadre Raises Campfire Song to Russia and Putin.” The Financial Times. July 19, 2007.
Thursday, July 12, 2007
Sarkozy’s Budgetary Battle is Europe’s Too
French President Nicolas Sarkozy continues to shatter the European status-quo. Some of his endeavors have earned him many admirers, others not so much. His first EU summit was largely perceived as a triumph. Gallantly campaigning for a slimmed down version of the EU constitutional treaty, whose outline was agreed upon a few weeks ago in Brussels, the new French president was instrumental in leading Europe out of its constitutional malaise.
At that same EU summit, he also ruffled some feathers, especially those of economic liberals. Indeed, the Frenchman showed his Gaullist streak—obtaining the deletion of the words “undistorted competition” from the new treaty, which he defended by skeptically asking: “What has competition done for Europe?”
France has long been known for its protectionism, or “economic patriotism” as former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin put it. While Sarkozy promised a “rupture” from these dismal economic policies of the past, regarding industrial policy and trade, it has largely been business as usual.
This has understandably disappointed many European free marketeers who firmly believed that the election of the neoliberal Sarkozy would veer France and Europe toward less protectionism and more economic growth. Unsurprisingly, Sarkozy’s economic patriotism has put him at odds with more economically liberal states such as Britain, whose new Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling characterized recent French actions as protectionist, declaring: “There is no other name for it.”
Britain is not the main antagonist in the most recent foray, as this time the showdown is over monetary policy. Sarkozy is taking on many members of the Eurozone, the group of thirteen European states who wield the euro as their currency, specifically directing much of his ire at the group’s Stability and Growth Pact.
The pact seeks to enforce fiscal discipline by dictating that each Eurozone member-state must keep its respective annual budget deficit under 3% of GDP. It has not fared so well. France and Germany, among others, have breached the pact in the past. This lack of compliance led Eurozone ministers this April to attempt to salvage the fiscal spirit of the pact, boldly agreeing to balance their budgets by 2010.
Mr. Sarkozy has taken issue with the timing of the commitment, arguing that his economic strategy, which he touted during the recent electoral campaign, takes precedence. Although Sarkozy was the candidate of the incumbent party of Chirac, he represented that change by outlining a daring economic scheme hinging on tax cuts and greater worker productivity. Yet these economic policies do not coincide with the eurozone's dictate of balancing the budget by 2010.
Granting big tax-cuts means an increase in the budget deficit in the short-term. In the long-term, according to Sarkozy, the deficit will give way to greater revenues for the state, resulting from higher levels of economic growth. Budgetary inflation in the short-term, full state coffers in the long-term. This is risky strategy, which does not adhere to eurozone standards. Hence the reason for the French president’s appearance in this week’s meeting of Eurozone finance ministers.
In an unprecedented move for a European leader, Sarkozy showed up in Brussels on Monday to explain his economic tactics to a largely skeptical group of European finance ministers. The French president expressed his desire to infringe upon April’s promise, asking for, or perhaps demanding, more time to balance the budget. And as expected, Sarkozy was not given a warm reception. An unnamed diplomat noted that the meeting was “pretty heated.” Why were many of the participants apparently so unwilling to grant Paris a little flexibility?
Well, other than the blatant violation of a pledge, it is the fear that Sarkozy’s move will set a dangerous precedent. If France gets more time to tinker with its budget, then why not Portugal or Italy? More specifically, the Germans are also against Sarkozy’s calls for more political guidance of the European Central Bank and demands for the bank to expand its focus from curbing inflation to fostering jobs and growth. Berlin is adamant about low inflation and ECB independence, putting France and Germany at loggerheads.
While breaking April’s promise undoubtedly puts forth a negative image of France and could lead to more calls for flexibility from other member-states, the precedent has already been set. The Stability and Growth Pact has been constantly disobeyed since its inception in 1997: what is left to salvage? The fiscal straight-jacket of the eurozone takes away economic sovereignty from European governments. Public spending cannot be utilized by the state to help speed economic recovery in the midst of hard times. The pact is not realistic, which is why it is frequently abused.
To be sure, a degree of economic and fiscal collaboration is necessary for monetary union. But just as important, if not more so, for the future of the eurozone is economic growth and productivity for one of its biggest economies. Granting a little flexibility would not be the end of the world. It could produce positive economic gains for the rest of the continent. Sarkozy can technically pursue any fiscal strategy he desires this year, as the French budget is within eurozone bounds. However, Sarkozy is right to warn his colleagues of his plans, which run the risk of reneging on the budget declaration.
Europe has recently experienced indications of an economic recovery. Growth has increased on average, and Germany continues to be the world’s biggest exporter. Yet the EU needs an economically vibrant France to further raise levels of prosperity. If Sarkozy’s tax stimulus package and subsequent breach of eurozone rules can turn France into a leading engine of economic growth, then he should be given the opportunity to do so.
Often what is good for France is good for Europe, as former French President Charles De Gaulle frequently stated. Despite Sarkozy's protectionist grandstanding, which is partially employed to keep the majority of the French onboard for his painful economic reforms, his struggle for economic growth is also Europe’s. He needs to be free to wage that struggle.
At that same EU summit, he also ruffled some feathers, especially those of economic liberals. Indeed, the Frenchman showed his Gaullist streak—obtaining the deletion of the words “undistorted competition” from the new treaty, which he defended by skeptically asking: “What has competition done for Europe?”
France has long been known for its protectionism, or “economic patriotism” as former Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin put it. While Sarkozy promised a “rupture” from these dismal economic policies of the past, regarding industrial policy and trade, it has largely been business as usual.
This has understandably disappointed many European free marketeers who firmly believed that the election of the neoliberal Sarkozy would veer France and Europe toward less protectionism and more economic growth. Unsurprisingly, Sarkozy’s economic patriotism has put him at odds with more economically liberal states such as Britain, whose new Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling characterized recent French actions as protectionist, declaring: “There is no other name for it.”
Britain is not the main antagonist in the most recent foray, as this time the showdown is over monetary policy. Sarkozy is taking on many members of the Eurozone, the group of thirteen European states who wield the euro as their currency, specifically directing much of his ire at the group’s Stability and Growth Pact.
The pact seeks to enforce fiscal discipline by dictating that each Eurozone member-state must keep its respective annual budget deficit under 3% of GDP. It has not fared so well. France and Germany, among others, have breached the pact in the past. This lack of compliance led Eurozone ministers this April to attempt to salvage the fiscal spirit of the pact, boldly agreeing to balance their budgets by 2010.
Mr. Sarkozy has taken issue with the timing of the commitment, arguing that his economic strategy, which he touted during the recent electoral campaign, takes precedence. Although Sarkozy was the candidate of the incumbent party of Chirac, he represented that change by outlining a daring economic scheme hinging on tax cuts and greater worker productivity. Yet these economic policies do not coincide with the eurozone's dictate of balancing the budget by 2010.
Granting big tax-cuts means an increase in the budget deficit in the short-term. In the long-term, according to Sarkozy, the deficit will give way to greater revenues for the state, resulting from higher levels of economic growth. Budgetary inflation in the short-term, full state coffers in the long-term. This is risky strategy, which does not adhere to eurozone standards. Hence the reason for the French president’s appearance in this week’s meeting of Eurozone finance ministers.
In an unprecedented move for a European leader, Sarkozy showed up in Brussels on Monday to explain his economic tactics to a largely skeptical group of European finance ministers. The French president expressed his desire to infringe upon April’s promise, asking for, or perhaps demanding, more time to balance the budget. And as expected, Sarkozy was not given a warm reception. An unnamed diplomat noted that the meeting was “pretty heated.” Why were many of the participants apparently so unwilling to grant Paris a little flexibility?
Well, other than the blatant violation of a pledge, it is the fear that Sarkozy’s move will set a dangerous precedent. If France gets more time to tinker with its budget, then why not Portugal or Italy? More specifically, the Germans are also against Sarkozy’s calls for more political guidance of the European Central Bank and demands for the bank to expand its focus from curbing inflation to fostering jobs and growth. Berlin is adamant about low inflation and ECB independence, putting France and Germany at loggerheads.
While breaking April’s promise undoubtedly puts forth a negative image of France and could lead to more calls for flexibility from other member-states, the precedent has already been set. The Stability and Growth Pact has been constantly disobeyed since its inception in 1997: what is left to salvage? The fiscal straight-jacket of the eurozone takes away economic sovereignty from European governments. Public spending cannot be utilized by the state to help speed economic recovery in the midst of hard times. The pact is not realistic, which is why it is frequently abused.
To be sure, a degree of economic and fiscal collaboration is necessary for monetary union. But just as important, if not more so, for the future of the eurozone is economic growth and productivity for one of its biggest economies. Granting a little flexibility would not be the end of the world. It could produce positive economic gains for the rest of the continent. Sarkozy can technically pursue any fiscal strategy he desires this year, as the French budget is within eurozone bounds. However, Sarkozy is right to warn his colleagues of his plans, which run the risk of reneging on the budget declaration.
Europe has recently experienced indications of an economic recovery. Growth has increased on average, and Germany continues to be the world’s biggest exporter. Yet the EU needs an economically vibrant France to further raise levels of prosperity. If Sarkozy’s tax stimulus package and subsequent breach of eurozone rules can turn France into a leading engine of economic growth, then he should be given the opportunity to do so.
Often what is good for France is good for Europe, as former French President Charles De Gaulle frequently stated. Despite Sarkozy's protectionist grandstanding, which is partially employed to keep the majority of the French onboard for his painful economic reforms, his struggle for economic growth is also Europe’s. He needs to be free to wage that struggle.
Tuesday, July 3, 2007
Terrorism: En Español
This past weekend’s terrorist attacks in the U.K., perpetrated in London and Glasgow, dominated the headlines. Saturday's bomb threat conducted by ETA, the Basque militant group which has terrorized Spain for over forty years, at the Ibiza airport, as a result, was secondary news. It was just another day for Spaniards living under the wrath of ETA, underlining both the steady reality and political impact of terrorism in Spain.
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which roughly translates to Basque Homeland and Liberty, emerged from a Basque youth group in the late 1950s, and carried out its first violent operation in 1961 by attempting to derail a train full of pro-Franco Civil War veterans. It has been traumatizing Spain in its quest for an independent Basque state ever since, claiming over 800 victims.
Many tactics have been employed by Madrid over the years in an effort to eradicate the group and lessen its popularity. Francisco Franco, the dictator who ruled the country from 1939 until his death in 1975, chose the iron fist, making illegal any manifestation of “Basqueness”: language, symbols, festivals, etc. This subjugation of Basque rights undoubtedly had a hand in the birth of ETA.
After the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the Basques were granted a high degree of sovereignty in the form of the Basque Statute of Autonomy. Yet shortly thereafter, ETA’s body count increased dramatically.
This led the Felipe Gonzalez’s socialist government in the 1980s to engage in what was known as the “dirty war”. Under its auspices, the government sponsored death squads to stamp out ETA, an effort which not only resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians, but also fuelled a new generation of Basques to hate Madrid and militarize. Ceasefires have since been negotiated and broken. In the end, neither devolution nor repression has successfully led to the end of ETA, leaving the Spanish authorities clutching for options.
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the current Spanish Prime Minister, drew the ire of many, especially on the right, when he began a direct dialogue with ETA. Negotiations then resulted in the terrorist group’s announcement of a “permanent ceasefire” in the spring of 2005. Yet hopes of a lasting peace were dashed last December when ETA bombed the Barajas airport in Madrid, killing two Ecuadorians. And now the ceasefire has been completely nullified by the Basque militants, hence the recent attack in Ibiza.
Thanks to ETA, Spaniards have had to learn to live with terrorism—as harsh as that may sound. Spain is unique in this regard. It is indeed one of the few countries home to an Association of Victims of Terrorism (ATV) group, which wields political clout in regards to government policy on ETA. Add to the mix the recent threat from militant Islam—embodied in the devastating attacks of March 11, 2004—and Spain is ensconced with terrorism.
The 2004 election results, which catapulted the likely runner-up Zapatero to the Moncloa Palace, literally were a byproduct of terrorism. Terrorist attacks by Islamic militants three days prior and the PP-led government’s inept insistence on linking ETA to the bombings despite evidence to the contrary led Spaniards to punish the Popular Party at the ballot box.
Given the age-old threat from ETA and the recent targeting of Spain by Islamic militants, it is safe to say that Spanish politics is dominated by terrorism. Similar to the current political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere, in Spain a potential terrorist attack results in a drop in the approval rating of the standing government.
But this was not always the case. For the most part, Madrid’s ETA strategy was agreed upon on a bi-partisan basis between the center-right Popular Party and the center-left Socialists, a strategy recently approved in writing via the 2000 Anti-Terrorism Pact.
However, intense political polarization has been the norm in Spain, particularly after the March 11th attacks, poisoning consensual relations between the two sides. Moreover, since Zapatero went against the advice of PP in negotiating with ETA—and attempted to garner the glory and title of the leader who provided an end to the most persistent problem in Spain—he staked his government’s reputation on the successful outcome of the negotiations.
When they went afoul and ETA perpetrated the attack on Barajas Airport, his popularity consequently took a major hit. Meanwhile, PP leader Mariano Rajoy’s previous accusations of naiveté on the part of the Socialist administration for talking to terrorists were given more credence, producing a poll bounce for the opposition conservatives.
Zapatero has since railed against ETA’s breaking of the ceasefire and called off negotiations, and even reached out to Rajoy in an attempt to renew the bi-partisan anti-terrorism strategy. But the PP leader’s hard-line approach on ETA is a vote-winner.
And he recognizes that reuniting his party with the Socialists largely prevents him from continuing to score political points by denouncing Zapatero’s stance on the Basque group. As such, Rajoy has stipulated stringent conditions for his support, complicating the fence-mending negotiations with Zapatero.
Because of its tumultuous past and current experience with ETA, Spain is better prepared to handle the Islamic terrorist threat, which will take good intelligence and ruthless enforcement of the law. And regarding ETA, its popularity and therefore also its finances and manpower, are greatly diminished as a result of its indiscriminate death toll and effective Spanish policing.
As in the case of US relations (or lack thereof) with Iran, negotiations with ETA are needed. Talking, in and of itself, does not reward bad behavior, and it is doubtful that ETA will unilaterally dismantle without dialogue and incentives—the carrot must go along with the stick. Furthermore, in contrast to Al Qaida and its more independent conspirators, ETA’s goals are known: an independent and united Basque state.
This makes it easier for negotiations—Madrid knows what it wants—and tougher as well, as the group appears dead-set on a dream that Spain will not fully grant. Yet given its relative weakness, ETA may opt for something less than its stated goal, perhaps a power-sharing agreement a la the peace agreement in Northern Ireland. But it takes consultation to hammer these things out. Hence, in essence Zapatero was not wrong in reaching out to ETA.
But the manner in which he did it, secretively offering almost unconditional talks with the terrorist group while keeping PP out of the discussion, was naïve and counterproductive. For his part, Rajoy has not helped the situation by making Zapatero and Spain’s loss his political gain. But unfortunately that is politics. Nonetheless, only by banding together in a bi-partisan approach, offering talks with incentives and disincentives, will ETA be closer to its demise. And the Spanish people, after years of trauma, will be grateful.
ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which roughly translates to Basque Homeland and Liberty, emerged from a Basque youth group in the late 1950s, and carried out its first violent operation in 1961 by attempting to derail a train full of pro-Franco Civil War veterans. It has been traumatizing Spain in its quest for an independent Basque state ever since, claiming over 800 victims.
Many tactics have been employed by Madrid over the years in an effort to eradicate the group and lessen its popularity. Francisco Franco, the dictator who ruled the country from 1939 until his death in 1975, chose the iron fist, making illegal any manifestation of “Basqueness”: language, symbols, festivals, etc. This subjugation of Basque rights undoubtedly had a hand in the birth of ETA.
After the transition to democracy in the late 1970s, the Basques were granted a high degree of sovereignty in the form of the Basque Statute of Autonomy. Yet shortly thereafter, ETA’s body count increased dramatically.
This led the Felipe Gonzalez’s socialist government in the 1980s to engage in what was known as the “dirty war”. Under its auspices, the government sponsored death squads to stamp out ETA, an effort which not only resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians, but also fuelled a new generation of Basques to hate Madrid and militarize. Ceasefires have since been negotiated and broken. In the end, neither devolution nor repression has successfully led to the end of ETA, leaving the Spanish authorities clutching for options.
Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the current Spanish Prime Minister, drew the ire of many, especially on the right, when he began a direct dialogue with ETA. Negotiations then resulted in the terrorist group’s announcement of a “permanent ceasefire” in the spring of 2005. Yet hopes of a lasting peace were dashed last December when ETA bombed the Barajas airport in Madrid, killing two Ecuadorians. And now the ceasefire has been completely nullified by the Basque militants, hence the recent attack in Ibiza.
Thanks to ETA, Spaniards have had to learn to live with terrorism—as harsh as that may sound. Spain is unique in this regard. It is indeed one of the few countries home to an Association of Victims of Terrorism (ATV) group, which wields political clout in regards to government policy on ETA. Add to the mix the recent threat from militant Islam—embodied in the devastating attacks of March 11, 2004—and Spain is ensconced with terrorism.
The 2004 election results, which catapulted the likely runner-up Zapatero to the Moncloa Palace, literally were a byproduct of terrorism. Terrorist attacks by Islamic militants three days prior and the PP-led government’s inept insistence on linking ETA to the bombings despite evidence to the contrary led Spaniards to punish the Popular Party at the ballot box.
Given the age-old threat from ETA and the recent targeting of Spain by Islamic militants, it is safe to say that Spanish politics is dominated by terrorism. Similar to the current political realities in the U.S. and elsewhere, in Spain a potential terrorist attack results in a drop in the approval rating of the standing government.
But this was not always the case. For the most part, Madrid’s ETA strategy was agreed upon on a bi-partisan basis between the center-right Popular Party and the center-left Socialists, a strategy recently approved in writing via the 2000 Anti-Terrorism Pact.
However, intense political polarization has been the norm in Spain, particularly after the March 11th attacks, poisoning consensual relations between the two sides. Moreover, since Zapatero went against the advice of PP in negotiating with ETA—and attempted to garner the glory and title of the leader who provided an end to the most persistent problem in Spain—he staked his government’s reputation on the successful outcome of the negotiations.
When they went afoul and ETA perpetrated the attack on Barajas Airport, his popularity consequently took a major hit. Meanwhile, PP leader Mariano Rajoy’s previous accusations of naiveté on the part of the Socialist administration for talking to terrorists were given more credence, producing a poll bounce for the opposition conservatives.
Zapatero has since railed against ETA’s breaking of the ceasefire and called off negotiations, and even reached out to Rajoy in an attempt to renew the bi-partisan anti-terrorism strategy. But the PP leader’s hard-line approach on ETA is a vote-winner.
And he recognizes that reuniting his party with the Socialists largely prevents him from continuing to score political points by denouncing Zapatero’s stance on the Basque group. As such, Rajoy has stipulated stringent conditions for his support, complicating the fence-mending negotiations with Zapatero.
Because of its tumultuous past and current experience with ETA, Spain is better prepared to handle the Islamic terrorist threat, which will take good intelligence and ruthless enforcement of the law. And regarding ETA, its popularity and therefore also its finances and manpower, are greatly diminished as a result of its indiscriminate death toll and effective Spanish policing.
As in the case of US relations (or lack thereof) with Iran, negotiations with ETA are needed. Talking, in and of itself, does not reward bad behavior, and it is doubtful that ETA will unilaterally dismantle without dialogue and incentives—the carrot must go along with the stick. Furthermore, in contrast to Al Qaida and its more independent conspirators, ETA’s goals are known: an independent and united Basque state.
This makes it easier for negotiations—Madrid knows what it wants—and tougher as well, as the group appears dead-set on a dream that Spain will not fully grant. Yet given its relative weakness, ETA may opt for something less than its stated goal, perhaps a power-sharing agreement a la the peace agreement in Northern Ireland. But it takes consultation to hammer these things out. Hence, in essence Zapatero was not wrong in reaching out to ETA.
But the manner in which he did it, secretively offering almost unconditional talks with the terrorist group while keeping PP out of the discussion, was naïve and counterproductive. For his part, Rajoy has not helped the situation by making Zapatero and Spain’s loss his political gain. But unfortunately that is politics. Nonetheless, only by banding together in a bi-partisan approach, offering talks with incentives and disincentives, will ETA be closer to its demise. And the Spanish people, after years of trauma, will be grateful.
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