With last week’s agreement in Brussels on a “reform treaty” for the European Union, much of the rancorous debate on the moribund constitution and its slimmed down successor is now over.
The new treaty features: a new 2 ½-year term EU president; a high representative for foreign affairs, equipped with a diplomatic service; and a new voting system, in which measures pass with the support of 55% of member states and 65% of the overall EU population.
Although the acrimonious negotiations reached a fever pitch, a deal was salvaged. German Chancellor Angela Merkel—who has built up a reputation as a master deal-maker for her efforts at EU conferences and at the recent G8 Summit—once again was adept in bringing the feuding sides together to form a consensual compromise.
The skeptical Poles were appeased by delaying the full inception of the new voting system, which greatly dilutes their influence, until 2017. British interests were also protected, as Blair obtained opt-outs from criminal justice integration and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.
For many, the agreement evoked sighs of relief. The EU could now put a halt to its introspection and get to work on the great issues of the day: climate change, terrorism, etc. And with updated institutions and a somewhat united front, the EU is now better able to flex its muscles on the world stage.
For others, however, the treaty represents yet another attempt by the European elite to further enhance its power by going over the heads of the citizenry. After the EU constitution was dismissed by the French and Dutch referendums in 2005, the document was repackaged and will be ratified in national parliaments rather than put to the people in referendums—except for perhaps in Ireland, one of the most pro-EU countries on the continent. This is further proof, in the minds of these critics, of the existence of a “democratic deficit” in the EU.
The democratic deficit is many things for many people. But a common thread in its line of linking is this: the EU is far removed from the people and extracts national sovereignty from member states without popular consent. And ratifying the new treaty—very similar to the constitution denied by the people only two years ago—through national parliaments rather than referendum, does indeed sound very undemocratic.
Yet the European project has always been an elite-driven process. What is new is the allegation of democratic deficiency. What gives? The most likely answer is that the European people were quite willing to surrender power to Brussels and open up national markets as long as their governments maintained large welfare states to protect them.
Now that growth rates across the continent are rather stagnant and the welfare states are at full capacity, the citizenry fears the perception of giving elites in Brussels further power to liberalize and put their jobs at risk. The “permissive consensus” for EU integration, once exhibited by the European populace, is largely over.
At the same time, it is partially the fault of national leaders for this rise in Euro-skepticism. By railing against the shadowy bureaucracy in Brussels, a quite attractive scapegoat, European leaders can shield themselves from blame. This has become a steady practice for national leaders, and has led in many instances to increased nationalism and Euro-skepticism.
Blaming Brussels also often infers a greater level of power onto the EU than it possesses. As a result, people come to expect too much from the EU, and are thus disappointed, as the EU is not a welfare state: it cannot tax and spend. Brussels does not exert much control over “hot-button” issues such as: pensions, education, and defense.
Dictating what constitutes “jam”—the EU indeed caused some consternation after it ruled that marmalade can only be composed of citrus fruits, preserves made of other “soft” fruits must be considered and labeled jam—and how big lawnmowers’ engines can be, does not elicit support or sympathy for one’s cause. To be fair, the EU does indeed do a lot more. Yet these mundane tasks do not inspire or garner popularity.
The EU is confusing to those who study it, so the common man on the street in Lisbon, if he or she even cares, must be bewildered by Brussels. A recent FT/Harris poll indicates that of those surveyed in the United Kingdom, over half had not heard of the EU Constitution or had just heard the name.[1] Yet despite their overwhelming ambivalence, roughly 70% of the Brits in the same poll stated their desire for a popular referendum on the new treaty.
Therein lies the paradox of the EU: many Europeans are either confused about the EU’s actions or do not care, but at the same time, are now against further EU integration. Manifested in the Dutch and French voters’ rejection of the constitutional treaty, this popular feeling of confusion and fear of EU integration is dangerous for the future of Europe. Globalization, added by Europeanization, has unleashed greater economic competition along with an erosion of national identity. And when combined with economic decline, the people, when asked, have unleashed their anger on the EU.
Many of the negative votes cast in France and the Netherlands, undoubtedly were attempts at discrediting the unpopular national governments at the time. But the rise in Euro-skepticism and ambivalence is largely a result of the combination of many factors: namely, the aforementioned end of the permissive consensus hastened by the decline of economic growth and the welfare state; the failure of national leaders to present the benefits of EU membership to the citizenry and their constant insults aimed at Brussels; and the “delivery deficit” of the EU—its incapacity to exert influence on many of the issues that matter to the European populace.
The EU is also at fault for its own unpopularity, through its structure and complexity: it is led by an unelected bureaucracy, the European Commission, which delivers numerous amounts of red tape, annexes and protocols that unnecessarily add to popular confusion.
However, it is difficult to see how else a regulatory body can be run, and aside from cutting red-tape—Jose Barrosso, the current EU Commission President, has promised to do the latter—the responsibility for helping to refurbish the image of the EU lies with national leaders, as ultimately, the member states control Brussels. Although a tough task, national leaders must cease unfair accusations of the EU, help steer the body toward solutions on central issues of the day, and better explain the advantages of EU membership.
Although as undemocratic as it may seem, the best way forward for Europe is the rapid ratification of the new treaty, so it can move on. New initiatives of importance to the citizenry, such as the recent EU agreement on climate change, need to be hashed out multilaterally in Brussels. And the new treaty helps the EU to do so, free from having to worry about constitutions and institutional reforms. As Philip Stephens has noted, “Anything is better than an argument about voting weights.”[2]
[1] Parker, George. “EU citizens want referendum on treaty.” The Financial Times. June 17, 2007.
[2] Stephens, Philip. “The debate about Europe is haunted by shared delusions.” The Financial Times. June 22, 2007.
Thursday, June 28, 2007
Wednesday, June 20, 2007
Blair's Past Sullies His Future
British Prime Minister Tony Blair is set to deliver his final swansong on the international stage at this week’s European Union Summit, before he hands over the keys to 10 Downing Street to the eager Gordon Brown. Although Mr. Blair has yet to leave office, the potential job offers have been pouring in. Most recently, he has been linked to the posts of future EU President and Middle-East envoy for President Bush and the International Quartet.
Whether out of advance nostalgia for Blair’s time in office, sympathy for the waning politician, or out of the genuine belief that he deserves the positions and would serve them well, these offers are troublesome. The (almost) former prime minister, although very well-qualified, is not the right person for either job—thanks in large part to the Iraq war.
Newly-elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy, prior to this week’s crucial EU Summit, reportedly shopped Tony Blair around Europe as a possible candidate for the presidency. The title of EU President, which perhaps will not come into existence—Blair will actually have a say this week in Brussels on whether the post is created and included in a successor treaty to the debunked constitution—in theory, would be an excellent fit for the globetrotting and charismatic statesman.
His efforts—although maybe not enough for Bono and Geldof—in increasing aid to Africa and intervening in the war-torn Balkans have won him plaudits from humanitarians across the world. And his articulacy usually leaves audiences impressed. Who better to symbolically represent the European Union internationally and help set the agenda for the bloc?
Not so fast. Blair’s potential candidacy most likely would not even get off the ground. As former leader of Britain, one of the most powerful and Euro-skeptic countries in the EU, which has yet to join the euro and is constantly seen as nationalist and opposed to further EU integration, Blair has many strikes against him in Brussels.
Although one of the most committed Europeans to ever grace Downing Street, Blair would not measure up to the true Euro-federalist. His neo-liberal economic views, out of touch with many socialists and protectors of the welfare-state across the continent, would also be a sticking point—although similar economic beliefs did not ruin former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Barrosso’s chances of becoming EU Commission President. Also, Gordon Brown would probably not enjoy being in his predecessor’s shadow again, even if it was only in Brussels.
The biggest hurdle to Blair’s EU presidential candidacy, however, has to stem from his primary role in the invasion of Iraq. An issue that still riles up many Europeans, from Madrid to Stockholm, the war is extremely unpopular, haunting Blair’s legacy. Unsurprisingly, a recent Harris poll notes that 75% of Europeans do not think that Tony Blair would make a good full-time EU president.[1]
Intense division among European Union members in 2002 and 2003, wrought by Iraq, could flare up again if Blair was put forward as a presidential nominee—not the result proponents of creating the post would have desired, as the EU President is supposed to represent a united Europe.
A Sarkozy aide recently defended his boss’ support for Blair's candidacy by declaring, “We want a president who is credible.”[2] Unfortunately, the ineptitude and chaos surrounding the Iraq war has, in the eyes of many Europeans, largely drained that quality from Mr. Blair.
The same, for the most part, goes for Blair’s other proposed future employment, that of Bush’s or the International Quartet's—the four-party mediator of the Middle-East Peace Process, made up of the EU, UN, US, and Russia—envoy for the Middle-East. Iraq-invoked sentiment spoils the good intentions of the job offer.
Although the former prime minister has experience with many of the Middle-East’s leaders, his perceived pro-Israel leanings and principal role in the invasion of Iraq would not play well in the region. His angry critics in the Middle-East would not want to listen to Blair’s thoughts on their problems, especially if he speaks for Bush. As Brookings analyst Shibley Telhami points out, "Blair is the third most disliked person in the Middle East after the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister." Blair’s efforts as envoy, thus, would likely be ineffective and counterproductive.
Many Britons and others around the globe, unfairly in my opinion, already perceive the prime minister as “Bush’s poodle”. If Blair became Bush’s personal errand boy for the very region in which he and the American president are believed to have helped destabilize, the negative caricature would be fully realized.
To be sure, it is regrettable that Tony Blair’s otherwise solid and admirable reputation, earned from spending a remarkable ten years in office, has been soiled by an ill-advised war. His avid Atlanticism and liberal interventionism shone on the world stage, and gained him many friends across the globe, especially in Washington.
More importantly, Blair’s political impact within the U.K. and across Europe, as a result of his decision to shift the Labour Party to the center and advocate the “third way” between state-led socialism and Lazes Faire free-market economics, has been tremendous. Mr. Blair has helped reconstruct the British and European political landscape.
The British and European Left will likely never be the same. As Philip Stephens points out, “Mr Blair’s central political insight was to separate the enduring ‘ends’ of a left-of-centre government - a fairer society with a wider spread of opportunity – from his party’s century-long addiction to the socialist ‘means’ of an ever more mighty state. What works pragmatism elbowed aside outdated ideology.”[3] And for many like-minded politicians in Europe, including those in the French Socialist Party and their counterparts in Spain, the lessons from “Blairism” have at least nudged them to modernize and move to the middle.
Britain’s Conservative Party also took the hint—after being drubbed by Blair’s New Labour in the past three elections—moderating its image as the party of tax cuts and the reduction of public services, and shifting to the center so as to recapture the support of “Middle England”. As Stephens notes, referring to the departing prime minister, “The better gauge of his political legacy comes from David Cameron’s Conservatives.”
However, these achievements are tarnished by Iraq. Like it or not, the prime minister will be judged on the war, an issue which evokes widespread anger and poisons his otherwise lofty status and sound ideas. And for that reason, Blair’s future does not look bright.
[1] Parker, George. “EU Citizens Want Referendum on Treaty.” The Financial Times. June 18, 2007.
[2] Blitz, James, and others. “Sarkozy Touts Blair for First EU President.” The Financial Times. June 16/17, 2007.
[3] Stephens, Philip. “Blair’s Remarkable Record.” The Financial Times. May 10, 2007.
Whether out of advance nostalgia for Blair’s time in office, sympathy for the waning politician, or out of the genuine belief that he deserves the positions and would serve them well, these offers are troublesome. The (almost) former prime minister, although very well-qualified, is not the right person for either job—thanks in large part to the Iraq war.
Newly-elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy, prior to this week’s crucial EU Summit, reportedly shopped Tony Blair around Europe as a possible candidate for the presidency. The title of EU President, which perhaps will not come into existence—Blair will actually have a say this week in Brussels on whether the post is created and included in a successor treaty to the debunked constitution—in theory, would be an excellent fit for the globetrotting and charismatic statesman.
His efforts—although maybe not enough for Bono and Geldof—in increasing aid to Africa and intervening in the war-torn Balkans have won him plaudits from humanitarians across the world. And his articulacy usually leaves audiences impressed. Who better to symbolically represent the European Union internationally and help set the agenda for the bloc?
Not so fast. Blair’s potential candidacy most likely would not even get off the ground. As former leader of Britain, one of the most powerful and Euro-skeptic countries in the EU, which has yet to join the euro and is constantly seen as nationalist and opposed to further EU integration, Blair has many strikes against him in Brussels.
Although one of the most committed Europeans to ever grace Downing Street, Blair would not measure up to the true Euro-federalist. His neo-liberal economic views, out of touch with many socialists and protectors of the welfare-state across the continent, would also be a sticking point—although similar economic beliefs did not ruin former Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Barrosso’s chances of becoming EU Commission President. Also, Gordon Brown would probably not enjoy being in his predecessor’s shadow again, even if it was only in Brussels.
The biggest hurdle to Blair’s EU presidential candidacy, however, has to stem from his primary role in the invasion of Iraq. An issue that still riles up many Europeans, from Madrid to Stockholm, the war is extremely unpopular, haunting Blair’s legacy. Unsurprisingly, a recent Harris poll notes that 75% of Europeans do not think that Tony Blair would make a good full-time EU president.[1]
Intense division among European Union members in 2002 and 2003, wrought by Iraq, could flare up again if Blair was put forward as a presidential nominee—not the result proponents of creating the post would have desired, as the EU President is supposed to represent a united Europe.
A Sarkozy aide recently defended his boss’ support for Blair's candidacy by declaring, “We want a president who is credible.”[2] Unfortunately, the ineptitude and chaos surrounding the Iraq war has, in the eyes of many Europeans, largely drained that quality from Mr. Blair.
The same, for the most part, goes for Blair’s other proposed future employment, that of Bush’s or the International Quartet's—the four-party mediator of the Middle-East Peace Process, made up of the EU, UN, US, and Russia—envoy for the Middle-East. Iraq-invoked sentiment spoils the good intentions of the job offer.
Although the former prime minister has experience with many of the Middle-East’s leaders, his perceived pro-Israel leanings and principal role in the invasion of Iraq would not play well in the region. His angry critics in the Middle-East would not want to listen to Blair’s thoughts on their problems, especially if he speaks for Bush. As Brookings analyst Shibley Telhami points out, "Blair is the third most disliked person in the Middle East after the US President and the Israeli Prime Minister." Blair’s efforts as envoy, thus, would likely be ineffective and counterproductive.
Many Britons and others around the globe, unfairly in my opinion, already perceive the prime minister as “Bush’s poodle”. If Blair became Bush’s personal errand boy for the very region in which he and the American president are believed to have helped destabilize, the negative caricature would be fully realized.
To be sure, it is regrettable that Tony Blair’s otherwise solid and admirable reputation, earned from spending a remarkable ten years in office, has been soiled by an ill-advised war. His avid Atlanticism and liberal interventionism shone on the world stage, and gained him many friends across the globe, especially in Washington.
More importantly, Blair’s political impact within the U.K. and across Europe, as a result of his decision to shift the Labour Party to the center and advocate the “third way” between state-led socialism and Lazes Faire free-market economics, has been tremendous. Mr. Blair has helped reconstruct the British and European political landscape.
The British and European Left will likely never be the same. As Philip Stephens points out, “Mr Blair’s central political insight was to separate the enduring ‘ends’ of a left-of-centre government - a fairer society with a wider spread of opportunity – from his party’s century-long addiction to the socialist ‘means’ of an ever more mighty state. What works pragmatism elbowed aside outdated ideology.”[3] And for many like-minded politicians in Europe, including those in the French Socialist Party and their counterparts in Spain, the lessons from “Blairism” have at least nudged them to modernize and move to the middle.
Britain’s Conservative Party also took the hint—after being drubbed by Blair’s New Labour in the past three elections—moderating its image as the party of tax cuts and the reduction of public services, and shifting to the center so as to recapture the support of “Middle England”. As Stephens notes, referring to the departing prime minister, “The better gauge of his political legacy comes from David Cameron’s Conservatives.”
However, these achievements are tarnished by Iraq. Like it or not, the prime minister will be judged on the war, an issue which evokes widespread anger and poisons his otherwise lofty status and sound ideas. And for that reason, Blair’s future does not look bright.
[1] Parker, George. “EU Citizens Want Referendum on Treaty.” The Financial Times. June 18, 2007.
[2] Blitz, James, and others. “Sarkozy Touts Blair for First EU President.” The Financial Times. June 16/17, 2007.
[3] Stephens, Philip. “Blair’s Remarkable Record.” The Financial Times. May 10, 2007.
Wednesday, June 13, 2007
Allow Islamists the Chance to Gain Power in the Middle-East? Perhaps.
This week’s Egyptian elections to parliament’s upper chamber witnessed typical electoral intimidation by government security forces, killing one and sparking violent clashes across the country.
President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party once again made sure its candidates won contested seats, even though the government has already done its best to marginalize the main opposition, which in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood, by outlawing the group and forcing its members to run as independents.
Yet these efforts were apparently not enough, and many government-sponsored polling stations refused to allow Muslim Brotherhood supporters to vote even as fifteen year olds—eighteen is the official voting age—reportedly bragged about casting votes for the NDP.
While the Bush Administration has publicly backed a democratic reform agenda in the Middle-East, pledging to “end tyranny in our world”, it has largely turned a blind eye to pro-democracy advocates in Egypt and still supports Mubarak via a massive aid program—over one billion dollars a year—as Egypt is second only to Israel in the amount of annual aid it receives from Washington.
Although this is nothing new, the circumstances in Egypt do raise the question: given the popular support the US loses in the region as a consequence of its sponsorship of Arab dictators, is it worth it to support authoritarian leaders and refuse Islamic parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood access to the reins of power?
Many observers would undoubtedly say yes. As the world's most recognizable endorser of democracy, backing authoritarian leaders certainly does not enhance American credentials, but the alternative is much worse. Another Islamic, anti-American regime usurping power in the Middle-East and possibly providing a safe haven for fundamentalist terrorists is a nightmare. Indeed, a popular criticism against democracy promotion in the region is the possibility that parties like Hamas or Hizbollah could win elections and turn the region even more unsympathetic to American interests.
However, it is unlikely that if the Egyptians and other subjugated peoples in the region, such as those in Jordan or Tunisia, were free to vote in fair elections, the result would be the election of fundamentalist terror-sponsors. The Muslim Brotherhood parties across the region are, at the end of the day, rather moderate. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence years ago and says that it although it does favor Islamic law; it will abide by the democratic process.
Instead of resulting in the spread of radical fundamentalism, the democratic process would most likely decrease the popular support for these groups and moderate their views. The popularity of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood largely stems from their myth of being the only opposition to an oppressive government and the true protectors of the Arab street.
This perception is then given teeth by the charitable actions of many of these groups, handing out assistance to the poor and subsequently winning their backing. It is unsurprising that these parties are popular. Given their charity and incredible organizational ability; they are the only credible alternative to the harsh autocratic regimes in the region.
Furthermore, the myth is perpetuated by the fact that they have never had the opportunity to govern. It is easy for the opposition in politics to gain popularity by railing against the existing government—especially in a dictatorship when criticism is almost always warranted—because it does not have to make difficult decisions and be accountable to the public, traits which are associated with being in power democratically. Since they have never had the chance to rule, they have never been tested.
Allowing the Muslim Brotherhood and similar parties the chance to govern would likely shatter these positive perceptions. Governing means displeasing some people and engendering unpopularity, and forces political groups to prove their worth through results rather than perceptions. And after experiencing first-hand that Sharia law, if implemented, is not its savior, the populace will ideally vote out these parties and in doing so force them to moderate and improve their platforms if they wish to regain power—that is usually what democracy does.
This is not a neo-conservative manifesto, nor does it predict a rosy picture for democracy in the region. Promoting democracy should be an overall goal for the United States, but not through force, and not if it is sure to cause harm to long-term interests. Even if free and fair elections were held across the region—in and of itself, extremely difficult to bring about—victorious Islamic parties could then refuse to adhere to democratic ideals and impose their own form of dictatorship through Islamic law, á lá Iran.
But keeping Islamic parties out of the political process increases their support and adds to their mystique, and can also lead them to adopt extremist tactics—terrorism. To be sure, democracy is not going to happen overnight, yet engaging with moderate Islamic parties such as the Brotherhood and pressuring autocratic regimes to open up the political process to them in the mean-time should be a component of US policy in the region.
The status quo is certainly unstable, and the region is a powder keg. There is indeed some truth to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s oft-repeated statement that “For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle East. And ultimately, we got neither.” Supporting unpopular authoritarian leaders creates animosity towards the United States, which fully shows itself after the autocratic regime is deposed, and can have disastrous results. However, military intervention has not done the trick either.
Regionally, we have seen what can happen when the US seeks to impose democracy at the barrel of a gun—Iraq. And we have also seen what can happen when the US unconditionally backs an authoritarian leader who is then overthrown—the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Thus, even with its potential flaws, allowing moderate Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood a shot at the democratic process could turn out to be the least bad option.
President Hosni Mubarak’s National Democratic Party once again made sure its candidates won contested seats, even though the government has already done its best to marginalize the main opposition, which in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood, by outlawing the group and forcing its members to run as independents.
Yet these efforts were apparently not enough, and many government-sponsored polling stations refused to allow Muslim Brotherhood supporters to vote even as fifteen year olds—eighteen is the official voting age—reportedly bragged about casting votes for the NDP.
While the Bush Administration has publicly backed a democratic reform agenda in the Middle-East, pledging to “end tyranny in our world”, it has largely turned a blind eye to pro-democracy advocates in Egypt and still supports Mubarak via a massive aid program—over one billion dollars a year—as Egypt is second only to Israel in the amount of annual aid it receives from Washington.
Although this is nothing new, the circumstances in Egypt do raise the question: given the popular support the US loses in the region as a consequence of its sponsorship of Arab dictators, is it worth it to support authoritarian leaders and refuse Islamic parties such as the Muslim Brotherhood access to the reins of power?
Many observers would undoubtedly say yes. As the world's most recognizable endorser of democracy, backing authoritarian leaders certainly does not enhance American credentials, but the alternative is much worse. Another Islamic, anti-American regime usurping power in the Middle-East and possibly providing a safe haven for fundamentalist terrorists is a nightmare. Indeed, a popular criticism against democracy promotion in the region is the possibility that parties like Hamas or Hizbollah could win elections and turn the region even more unsympathetic to American interests.
However, it is unlikely that if the Egyptians and other subjugated peoples in the region, such as those in Jordan or Tunisia, were free to vote in fair elections, the result would be the election of fundamentalist terror-sponsors. The Muslim Brotherhood parties across the region are, at the end of the day, rather moderate. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood renounced violence years ago and says that it although it does favor Islamic law; it will abide by the democratic process.
Instead of resulting in the spread of radical fundamentalism, the democratic process would most likely decrease the popular support for these groups and moderate their views. The popularity of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood largely stems from their myth of being the only opposition to an oppressive government and the true protectors of the Arab street.
This perception is then given teeth by the charitable actions of many of these groups, handing out assistance to the poor and subsequently winning their backing. It is unsurprising that these parties are popular. Given their charity and incredible organizational ability; they are the only credible alternative to the harsh autocratic regimes in the region.
Furthermore, the myth is perpetuated by the fact that they have never had the opportunity to govern. It is easy for the opposition in politics to gain popularity by railing against the existing government—especially in a dictatorship when criticism is almost always warranted—because it does not have to make difficult decisions and be accountable to the public, traits which are associated with being in power democratically. Since they have never had the chance to rule, they have never been tested.
Allowing the Muslim Brotherhood and similar parties the chance to govern would likely shatter these positive perceptions. Governing means displeasing some people and engendering unpopularity, and forces political groups to prove their worth through results rather than perceptions. And after experiencing first-hand that Sharia law, if implemented, is not its savior, the populace will ideally vote out these parties and in doing so force them to moderate and improve their platforms if they wish to regain power—that is usually what democracy does.
This is not a neo-conservative manifesto, nor does it predict a rosy picture for democracy in the region. Promoting democracy should be an overall goal for the United States, but not through force, and not if it is sure to cause harm to long-term interests. Even if free and fair elections were held across the region—in and of itself, extremely difficult to bring about—victorious Islamic parties could then refuse to adhere to democratic ideals and impose their own form of dictatorship through Islamic law, á lá Iran.
But keeping Islamic parties out of the political process increases their support and adds to their mystique, and can also lead them to adopt extremist tactics—terrorism. To be sure, democracy is not going to happen overnight, yet engaging with moderate Islamic parties such as the Brotherhood and pressuring autocratic regimes to open up the political process to them in the mean-time should be a component of US policy in the region.
The status quo is certainly unstable, and the region is a powder keg. There is indeed some truth to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s oft-repeated statement that “For 60 years, we often thought that we could achieve stability without liberty in the Middle East. And ultimately, we got neither.” Supporting unpopular authoritarian leaders creates animosity towards the United States, which fully shows itself after the autocratic regime is deposed, and can have disastrous results. However, military intervention has not done the trick either.
Regionally, we have seen what can happen when the US seeks to impose democracy at the barrel of a gun—Iraq. And we have also seen what can happen when the US unconditionally backs an authoritarian leader who is then overthrown—the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran. Thus, even with its potential flaws, allowing moderate Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood a shot at the democratic process could turn out to be the least bad option.
Friday, June 8, 2007
Missile Defense Update: "Putin's Mysterious Proposal"
(This is a brief update to the article: "Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?")
With Russian President Vladimir Putin, one never knows what to expect—hence the reason for this update. The most recent posting, titled “Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?”, discussed the ever-increasing acrimony between Russia and the West, specifically regarding the debate over missile defense.
In the run-up to this week’s G8 Summit, Putin and Bush seemed to have dug in their heels, rearing for a fight over the controversial missile defense shield. Bush appeared dead-set on deploying the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic while Putin said he would respond in kind by pulling out of related treaties and targeting nuclear weapons at Eastern Europe.
But then Putin, to the astonishment of Washington and others, came out with a proposal to base the radar system for the missile defense shield in neighboring Azerbaijan. This would diminish Russia’s security concerns and as a result, Moscow would no longer need to point nuclear weapons at its western neighbors—ending the war of words between the two sides.
The US had previously attempted to enlist the cooperation of Russia on this project, but to no avail. Putin’s offer, thus, surprised the Bush Administration. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated shortly after hearing of the Russian proposal, “It is a bold proposal. We have to have our experts look at it.”
At first glance, the deal is the best of both worlds: it protects all of Europe from Iranian missiles and does not antagonize Moscow. Yet it is a less than advantageous alternative for Washington. For one, placing the radar system in Azerbaijan increases the distance between the radar and the missile defense interceptors in Poland, thereby weakening its efficiency. An additional geographical problem is that the radar would be too close to Iran, from which the shield would be likely intercepting missiles. And politically, basing an essential part of the system in Azerbaijan, a dictatorial and former Soviet state, is certainly less attractive than doing so in the more pro-American and democratic Czech Republic.
Given its flaws, outlined above, Washington is likely to take issue with the proposal. Yet Washington must seem flexible and willing to listen to the alternative—especially given its reputation for stubborn unilateralism and the primacy of this issue. At the end of the day, however, Bush will likely refuse the Kremlin’s overture. As the Moscow-based defense analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, points out, “The Pentagon won’t want this at all.”
What, then, is Putin’s rationale for putting forward this new plan? Indeed, this may seem to be a breakthrough compromise brokered by Putin, but it is most likely another ploy by the crafty president. The Kremlin sees yet another opportunity to paint the Bush Administration as unilateralist and insensitive to others’ security concerns.
In making an offer Bush has to refuse, Putin will be seen as the more compromising and cool-headed of the two leaders, offering a reasonable alternative that the imperialist Americans characteristically dismiss. Russia will appear to be less belligerent, enlisting—in theory—more international support, and engendering more legitimacy for its objections to the deployment of the system in Europe, which will in turn further divide Europeans on the issue.
This could turn out to be yet another victory for the Kremlin’s divide and conquer strategy, which has shown itself largely via the use of energy supplies. While Putin is quite unpredictable in general, the West should be catching on to his shrewd, deceptive ways.
With Russian President Vladimir Putin, one never knows what to expect—hence the reason for this update. The most recent posting, titled “Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?”, discussed the ever-increasing acrimony between Russia and the West, specifically regarding the debate over missile defense.
In the run-up to this week’s G8 Summit, Putin and Bush seemed to have dug in their heels, rearing for a fight over the controversial missile defense shield. Bush appeared dead-set on deploying the shield in Poland and the Czech Republic while Putin said he would respond in kind by pulling out of related treaties and targeting nuclear weapons at Eastern Europe.
But then Putin, to the astonishment of Washington and others, came out with a proposal to base the radar system for the missile defense shield in neighboring Azerbaijan. This would diminish Russia’s security concerns and as a result, Moscow would no longer need to point nuclear weapons at its western neighbors—ending the war of words between the two sides.
The US had previously attempted to enlist the cooperation of Russia on this project, but to no avail. Putin’s offer, thus, surprised the Bush Administration. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley stated shortly after hearing of the Russian proposal, “It is a bold proposal. We have to have our experts look at it.”
At first glance, the deal is the best of both worlds: it protects all of Europe from Iranian missiles and does not antagonize Moscow. Yet it is a less than advantageous alternative for Washington. For one, placing the radar system in Azerbaijan increases the distance between the radar and the missile defense interceptors in Poland, thereby weakening its efficiency. An additional geographical problem is that the radar would be too close to Iran, from which the shield would be likely intercepting missiles. And politically, basing an essential part of the system in Azerbaijan, a dictatorial and former Soviet state, is certainly less attractive than doing so in the more pro-American and democratic Czech Republic.
Given its flaws, outlined above, Washington is likely to take issue with the proposal. Yet Washington must seem flexible and willing to listen to the alternative—especially given its reputation for stubborn unilateralism and the primacy of this issue. At the end of the day, however, Bush will likely refuse the Kremlin’s overture. As the Moscow-based defense analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, points out, “The Pentagon won’t want this at all.”
What, then, is Putin’s rationale for putting forward this new plan? Indeed, this may seem to be a breakthrough compromise brokered by Putin, but it is most likely another ploy by the crafty president. The Kremlin sees yet another opportunity to paint the Bush Administration as unilateralist and insensitive to others’ security concerns.
In making an offer Bush has to refuse, Putin will be seen as the more compromising and cool-headed of the two leaders, offering a reasonable alternative that the imperialist Americans characteristically dismiss. Russia will appear to be less belligerent, enlisting—in theory—more international support, and engendering more legitimacy for its objections to the deployment of the system in Europe, which will in turn further divide Europeans on the issue.
This could turn out to be yet another victory for the Kremlin’s divide and conquer strategy, which has shown itself largely via the use of energy supplies. While Putin is quite unpredictable in general, the West should be catching on to his shrewd, deceptive ways.
Wednesday, June 6, 2007
Special G8 Double Feature -- Missile Defense: The Beginning of a New Cold War?
(This weekly HACL includes two articles regarding issues discussed at this week's G8 summit)
With all the tension surrounding the upcoming G-8 Summit, namely environmental differences between the U.S. and the other participants, one can rest easy knowing that at least Russia is not again hosting the conference. The summit in St. Petersburg last year, where Russian President Vladimir hypocritically placed energy security as the main issue on the agenda after withholding gas supplies to his neighbors, was entertaining, but disastrous. And with Putin recently clamping down on pro-democracy protesters, being linked to the fatal poisoning of dissidents, and handpicking his potential successor, he would be hard pressed to find the time to host the international gala anyway.
Putin’s authoritarian streak and heavy-handed foreign policy, especially regarding Russia’s “near abroad” neighbors, has put him frequently at odds with the U.S. and much of Europe. The result has been a tit-for-tat shouting match between the two former Cold War adversaries on issues ranging from Iran to missile defense, with Russia attempting to divide Europe to further its aims—giving some pundits cause to warn of a new Cold War looming.
Russia’s concerns were laid out in a policy speech by Putin earlier this year at a security conference in Munich—attended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates—where he roasted U.S. foreign policy and denounced unilateral intervention. Putin declared: “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law…One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way,” and went on to beg the questions: “Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?” Apparently not Mr. Putin. Moscow has consistently wielded different sets of opinion than its western friends over a number of issues, such as the invasion of Iraq, Kosovo, how to deal with a nuclear Iran, and arms control, to name a few.
Of course, the U.S. and Europe are not at all pleased with Putin’s behavior either. Interference in the internal affairs of others, or “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions,” the Russian president warned in Munich, “have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”
Yet Putin has not heeded his own advice: intervening on the side of Victor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and later unilaterally shutting off energy supplies to the country, and deporting Georgians from Russia and placing a quasi-embargo on its tiny neighbor’s goods after Tbilisi arrested a few alleged Russian spies. Unilateralism has been met with more unilateralism. Indeed, Putin’s response to U.S. unilateralism is like confronting a friend’s alcoholism by becoming an alcoholic.
More specifically, the most contentious, and potentially the most dangerous, issue as of late has been Washington’s decision to place missile interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic as part of a missile defense shield. It is aimed at Iran, not Russia, as Bush administration officials contend. But Putin, predictably, is not convinced—at least not publicly. The Russian president has noted, “The U.S. said that this system is deployed to defend the threat from Iran, but the scope of Iran's missile could not reach Europe.” True, as far as we know, but this shield is for the future, planning for the worst should the Iranian nuclear talks go awry.
While the shield would be deployed near Russian borders, it is clearly a defensive weapon. Roughly ten missile defense interceptors and a radar system should not worry the Kremlin. Even if it was a defensive posture against Russia, nuclear warheads from Moscow—numbering in the thousands—could easily bypass the missile shield and obliterate European and American cities.
Furthermore, as Stephen Rademaker points out, if the U.S. truly wished to defend against Russia, it would not deploy the system in Europe. The former State Department official observes, “If Russia really is worried about the effect on its 2200-warhead strategic nuclear force of 10 additional interceptors, then it ought to applaud the decision to install them in Europe rather than Alaska, where most US interceptors are… Alaska is downrange from Russian ICBM bases, so interceptors launched from there would have better odds of shooting down incoming Russian warheads.”[1]
To be sure, the Kremlin should not have been expected to immediately warm to the idea of an American-led defense system mounting near its borders, but it is quite clear that the system is not meant to defend against a perceived Russian threat. Moreover, the Bush Administration has even asked the Russians to participate in the program. Missile Defense Agency head General Obering has stated, regarding the threat from ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), “If we were to combine with Russia to set up a common defense system to make these weapons basically unusable, that would be a perfect goal.”
Besides scathing rhetoric, the Kremlin’s response has been to threaten to pull out of Cold War-era arms treaties and aim weapons at Eastern Europe. Putin has warned that Russia maintains the right to withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, both initiatives sought to limit the Cold War military buildup in Europe.
The Kremlin has followed this up by declaring its intention to direct its military might at Eastern Europe. Putin gave notice that “if the American nuclear potential grows in European territory, we will have to have new targets in Europe.” Russia does have a right to reexamine the treaties above, as the Bush Administration did indeed pull out of the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia, which limited anti-ballistic missile defenses, in 2002. But Putin agreed to it, and again, it does not make much sense for Putin to rail against American unilateralism and then act unilaterally.
Putin’s threats were then matched by action. Last week, Russia test-fired new missiles, which the Kremlin said were a necessary reaction to the missile defense shield. Putin’s defense was, “It wasn't us who initiated a new round of arms race.” But in seeking to demonstrate its invulnerability to the missile defense shield, Russia has only strengthened the U.S. argument that the shield is not aimed at Moscow. Russian Defense Minister and potential Putin successor, Sergei Ivanov, cautioned, “A more efficient sword can be found for every shield.” Precisely. Bush Administration spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said the same thing in so many words, “Russia's strong missile capabilities are no match for our European missile defense plans and will not upset the strategic balance in the region.”
Where is Europe in all of this? As has been the norm, much of Europe is divided over missile defense. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has advised the U.S. to better inform Russia and NATO on the details of the shield and her foreign minister Kurt Beck has warned of a new arms race in Europe, while the Czechs and Poles seem more than willing to host the system.
This division between much of Eastern and Western Europe underlines the EU’s troubled relationship with Russia. Germany and France, among others in Western Europe, have been known to favor a less confrontational approach to Moscow than their Eastern European neighbors, whose current antagonism toward Russia is only natural given the Soviet Union’s former occupation and oppression of Eastern Europe during the Cold War.
Poland has refused to allow for a new EU-Russia partnership agreement until Moscow ends its unnecessary embargo on Polish meats. Meanwhile, Estonia’s decision to remove a Soviet WWII monument from its current site sparked widespread condemnation from the Kremlin. The EU has only tepidly supported its eastern members in their current plights with Russia. Regarding the Estonian dispute, Jonathan Eyal observed, “At every stage, the Union has given the indication that it is prepared to compromise over the interests of its new members in order to maintain good links with Moscow.”[2]
Putin relishes European division, and frequently has sought to bring it about—largely through energy supplies. And as Philip Stephens argues, “In missile defense, he sees another opportunity to create division.”[3] A weak, divided Europe allows the Kremlin to regain old clout and wrest more influence over its former Soviet possessions and Eastern European satellites.
While much easier said than done, especially when discussing 25 different states, the EU needs to unify and create a more common approach to Russia—chiefly regarding energy policy, Kosovo, and the U.S. missile defense shield. Brussels should stand up for its member states when they are unjustly affronted by the Kremlin, but at the same time, the newly-acceded Eastern European members should not let a cruel history justify unwarranted provocation of Moscow.
On the other side of the pond, the U.S. needs to take into account Russia’s security imperatives, but should not cower to Putin’s harsh rhetoric. Bush famously stated after his first face to face with the Russian president that he looked at Putin and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” Well, it is doubtful that Bush would be happy if he took another look.
However, Bush needs the Kremlin’s help on a wide range of issues, namely nuclear talks with Iran and non-proliferation of their respective nuclear weapon arsenals. The recent tit-for-tat escalation between Washington and Moscow, largely over missile defense, is counterproductive and each side is not likely to stand down, making their upcoming meeting at the G8 quite tense. But the two sides’ differences are nowhere near Cold-War levels, and there is no realistic threat of nuclear annihilation. Hence, while certainly not a new Cold War; unfortunately, relations between Russia and the West are getting frostier by the minute.
[1] Rademaker, Stephen. “America and Russia need a wider deal on missiles.” The Financial Times. May 24, 2007.
[2] Eyal, Jonathan. “European appeasement will worsen Russian aggression.” The Financial Times. May 18, 2007.
[3] Stephens, Philip. “The Putin Strategy is to divide Europe over missile defense.” The Financial Times. April 13, 2007.
With all the tension surrounding the upcoming G-8 Summit, namely environmental differences between the U.S. and the other participants, one can rest easy knowing that at least Russia is not again hosting the conference. The summit in St. Petersburg last year, where Russian President Vladimir hypocritically placed energy security as the main issue on the agenda after withholding gas supplies to his neighbors, was entertaining, but disastrous. And with Putin recently clamping down on pro-democracy protesters, being linked to the fatal poisoning of dissidents, and handpicking his potential successor, he would be hard pressed to find the time to host the international gala anyway.
Putin’s authoritarian streak and heavy-handed foreign policy, especially regarding Russia’s “near abroad” neighbors, has put him frequently at odds with the U.S. and much of Europe. The result has been a tit-for-tat shouting match between the two former Cold War adversaries on issues ranging from Iran to missile defense, with Russia attempting to divide Europe to further its aims—giving some pundits cause to warn of a new Cold War looming.
Russia’s concerns were laid out in a policy speech by Putin earlier this year at a security conference in Munich—attended by U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates—where he roasted U.S. foreign policy and denounced unilateral intervention. Putin declared: “We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law…One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way,” and went on to beg the questions: “Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?” Apparently not Mr. Putin. Moscow has consistently wielded different sets of opinion than its western friends over a number of issues, such as the invasion of Iraq, Kosovo, how to deal with a nuclear Iran, and arms control, to name a few.
Of course, the U.S. and Europe are not at all pleased with Putin’s behavior either. Interference in the internal affairs of others, or “unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions,” the Russian president warned in Munich, “have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centers of tension.”
Yet Putin has not heeded his own advice: intervening on the side of Victor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and later unilaterally shutting off energy supplies to the country, and deporting Georgians from Russia and placing a quasi-embargo on its tiny neighbor’s goods after Tbilisi arrested a few alleged Russian spies. Unilateralism has been met with more unilateralism. Indeed, Putin’s response to U.S. unilateralism is like confronting a friend’s alcoholism by becoming an alcoholic.
More specifically, the most contentious, and potentially the most dangerous, issue as of late has been Washington’s decision to place missile interceptors in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic as part of a missile defense shield. It is aimed at Iran, not Russia, as Bush administration officials contend. But Putin, predictably, is not convinced—at least not publicly. The Russian president has noted, “The U.S. said that this system is deployed to defend the threat from Iran, but the scope of Iran's missile could not reach Europe.” True, as far as we know, but this shield is for the future, planning for the worst should the Iranian nuclear talks go awry.
While the shield would be deployed near Russian borders, it is clearly a defensive weapon. Roughly ten missile defense interceptors and a radar system should not worry the Kremlin. Even if it was a defensive posture against Russia, nuclear warheads from Moscow—numbering in the thousands—could easily bypass the missile shield and obliterate European and American cities.
Furthermore, as Stephen Rademaker points out, if the U.S. truly wished to defend against Russia, it would not deploy the system in Europe. The former State Department official observes, “If Russia really is worried about the effect on its 2200-warhead strategic nuclear force of 10 additional interceptors, then it ought to applaud the decision to install them in Europe rather than Alaska, where most US interceptors are… Alaska is downrange from Russian ICBM bases, so interceptors launched from there would have better odds of shooting down incoming Russian warheads.”[1]
To be sure, the Kremlin should not have been expected to immediately warm to the idea of an American-led defense system mounting near its borders, but it is quite clear that the system is not meant to defend against a perceived Russian threat. Moreover, the Bush Administration has even asked the Russians to participate in the program. Missile Defense Agency head General Obering has stated, regarding the threat from ICBMs (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles), “If we were to combine with Russia to set up a common defense system to make these weapons basically unusable, that would be a perfect goal.”
Besides scathing rhetoric, the Kremlin’s response has been to threaten to pull out of Cold War-era arms treaties and aim weapons at Eastern Europe. Putin has warned that Russia maintains the right to withdrawal from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, both initiatives sought to limit the Cold War military buildup in Europe.
The Kremlin has followed this up by declaring its intention to direct its military might at Eastern Europe. Putin gave notice that “if the American nuclear potential grows in European territory, we will have to have new targets in Europe.” Russia does have a right to reexamine the treaties above, as the Bush Administration did indeed pull out of the 1972 ABM Treaty with Russia, which limited anti-ballistic missile defenses, in 2002. But Putin agreed to it, and again, it does not make much sense for Putin to rail against American unilateralism and then act unilaterally.
Putin’s threats were then matched by action. Last week, Russia test-fired new missiles, which the Kremlin said were a necessary reaction to the missile defense shield. Putin’s defense was, “It wasn't us who initiated a new round of arms race.” But in seeking to demonstrate its invulnerability to the missile defense shield, Russia has only strengthened the U.S. argument that the shield is not aimed at Moscow. Russian Defense Minister and potential Putin successor, Sergei Ivanov, cautioned, “A more efficient sword can be found for every shield.” Precisely. Bush Administration spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said the same thing in so many words, “Russia's strong missile capabilities are no match for our European missile defense plans and will not upset the strategic balance in the region.”
Where is Europe in all of this? As has been the norm, much of Europe is divided over missile defense. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has advised the U.S. to better inform Russia and NATO on the details of the shield and her foreign minister Kurt Beck has warned of a new arms race in Europe, while the Czechs and Poles seem more than willing to host the system.
This division between much of Eastern and Western Europe underlines the EU’s troubled relationship with Russia. Germany and France, among others in Western Europe, have been known to favor a less confrontational approach to Moscow than their Eastern European neighbors, whose current antagonism toward Russia is only natural given the Soviet Union’s former occupation and oppression of Eastern Europe during the Cold War.
Poland has refused to allow for a new EU-Russia partnership agreement until Moscow ends its unnecessary embargo on Polish meats. Meanwhile, Estonia’s decision to remove a Soviet WWII monument from its current site sparked widespread condemnation from the Kremlin. The EU has only tepidly supported its eastern members in their current plights with Russia. Regarding the Estonian dispute, Jonathan Eyal observed, “At every stage, the Union has given the indication that it is prepared to compromise over the interests of its new members in order to maintain good links with Moscow.”[2]
Putin relishes European division, and frequently has sought to bring it about—largely through energy supplies. And as Philip Stephens argues, “In missile defense, he sees another opportunity to create division.”[3] A weak, divided Europe allows the Kremlin to regain old clout and wrest more influence over its former Soviet possessions and Eastern European satellites.
While much easier said than done, especially when discussing 25 different states, the EU needs to unify and create a more common approach to Russia—chiefly regarding energy policy, Kosovo, and the U.S. missile defense shield. Brussels should stand up for its member states when they are unjustly affronted by the Kremlin, but at the same time, the newly-acceded Eastern European members should not let a cruel history justify unwarranted provocation of Moscow.
On the other side of the pond, the U.S. needs to take into account Russia’s security imperatives, but should not cower to Putin’s harsh rhetoric. Bush famously stated after his first face to face with the Russian president that he looked at Putin and “was able to get a sense of his soul.” Well, it is doubtful that Bush would be happy if he took another look.
However, Bush needs the Kremlin’s help on a wide range of issues, namely nuclear talks with Iran and non-proliferation of their respective nuclear weapon arsenals. The recent tit-for-tat escalation between Washington and Moscow, largely over missile defense, is counterproductive and each side is not likely to stand down, making their upcoming meeting at the G8 quite tense. But the two sides’ differences are nowhere near Cold-War levels, and there is no realistic threat of nuclear annihilation. Hence, while certainly not a new Cold War; unfortunately, relations between Russia and the West are getting frostier by the minute.
[1] Rademaker, Stephen. “America and Russia need a wider deal on missiles.” The Financial Times. May 24, 2007.
[2] Eyal, Jonathan. “European appeasement will worsen Russian aggression.” The Financial Times. May 18, 2007.
[3] Stephens, Philip. “The Putin Strategy is to divide Europe over missile defense.” The Financial Times. April 13, 2007.
Special G8 Double Feature -- The United States Climate Question and the G8 Summit by Richard Meyer
After years of obstinately dragging its feet on climate change, the Bush administration last week has finally won a little praise.
President Bush gave a speech outlining his diplomatic positions prior to this week's G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. In it he acknowledged global warming as an issue he takes "seriously," proposing that the top 15 worldwide carbon polluters discuss possible technology sharing and energy efficiency solutions to help reduce greenhouse gases.
This is an undoubtedly marked policy change from an Administration that has been labeled "denialist" and "anti-science." The President’s language indicates a new willingness to internationally engage the formation of climate solutions, potentially laying the groundwork for negotiations with developing countries like India and China, whom the administration claims must be included in any international regulatory regime if the United States is to participate.
On the surface, this proposal is a welcome shift for those who would like to see real, substantive climate mitigation. Unfortunately, the environmental credibility of this administration has worn thin, and this pronouncement is most likely a tactical maneuver calculated to continue the Administration's political adherence to a business-as-usual approach to climate change (see: do nothing for as long as possible).
The week before Bush’s change-of-heart speech, two events occurred that supports the notion that the Bush team may not be as willing to take on the climate issue as they might indicate. The first was the issuing of an Executive Order instructing the Environmental Protection Agency to develop new rules to regulate and reduce greenhouse gases, with provisions included for information and resource sharing with other federal agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture and Energy. Absent from this Order was any language of mandatory caps on carbon dioxide emissions or timetables for results (see: no teeth). In essence, the order gives more time for federal agencies to study the problem, but no directives to actually solve it.
The second event was the outright rejection of the German-proposed global warming declaration for the G8 summit. Offered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a critical topic on this year's G8 agenda, her proposal set greenhouse gas reduction targets of 50% of 1990 levels by 2050, an ambitious post-Kyoto pledge. The Bush administration's diplomatic envoy rejected this language, holding firm to the position that mandatory caps on emissions are unacceptable, and instead offered their more preferable –yet considerably more difficult to enforce – solution of alternative energy technology sharing.
One might roll their eyes at the seeming predictability and repetitiousness of the Bush climate change position. Indeed, since Bush rejected the Kyoto protocol, the White House’s stubbornness to discuss realistic solutions to reduce greenhouse gases has been the modus operandi. This fact is not forgotten by Europe, specifically Chancellor Merkel and outgoing Prime Minister Tony Blair. They perceive President Bush’s policy side-step as a contrivance to subvert an already heavily negotiated and widely agreed upon G8 climate proposal.
The Merkel submitted and Blair supported proposal demarks a clear line in the sand that the Bush administration will not cross. The proposal, on top of establishing mandatory caps on emissions, would also pledge the formation of a global carbon market, a process that they have agreed the United Nations should lead. The United States has rejected these three initiatives. Bush’s own proposal, offered in his speech last week, is now perceived by the European G8 members as a maneuver to split the G8 and create enmity on the climate issue.
The consequences of the Bush strategy will play out this week in Germany. Two outcomes are likely. The first, which the Bush Administration is surely playing for, is a renewed enforcement of their climate position: specifically, that mandatory caps are economically incapacitating and that it is preferable to incentivize climate-fighting technological solutions through subsidies and reduced tariffs.
The second outcome, which Merkel and Blair fear, is a splitting of the G8 membership over the climate question. The consequence of this will probably parallel previous international agreements to climate change: Europe will extend the mandatory emissions caps past 2012, while the United States supports non-binding dateless agreement reducing carbon dioxide emissions. By splitting the G8, the Bush administration strengthens its policy and allows its go-it-alone approach to continue.
The climate question is one of many issues to be discussed during the G8 summit. Others include aid to Africa, and perhaps even Iranian sanctions – a key foreign policy objective the Bush administration cannot achieve unless it has the support of the other G8 members. While these diplomatic questions remain in separate discussion camps, it may behoove the United States to bridge some political gaps with the climate issue, realigning the United States with both political and scientific reality.
-Richard Meyer
President Bush gave a speech outlining his diplomatic positions prior to this week's G8 summit in Heiligendamm, Germany. In it he acknowledged global warming as an issue he takes "seriously," proposing that the top 15 worldwide carbon polluters discuss possible technology sharing and energy efficiency solutions to help reduce greenhouse gases.
This is an undoubtedly marked policy change from an Administration that has been labeled "denialist" and "anti-science." The President’s language indicates a new willingness to internationally engage the formation of climate solutions, potentially laying the groundwork for negotiations with developing countries like India and China, whom the administration claims must be included in any international regulatory regime if the United States is to participate.
On the surface, this proposal is a welcome shift for those who would like to see real, substantive climate mitigation. Unfortunately, the environmental credibility of this administration has worn thin, and this pronouncement is most likely a tactical maneuver calculated to continue the Administration's political adherence to a business-as-usual approach to climate change (see: do nothing for as long as possible).
The week before Bush’s change-of-heart speech, two events occurred that supports the notion that the Bush team may not be as willing to take on the climate issue as they might indicate. The first was the issuing of an Executive Order instructing the Environmental Protection Agency to develop new rules to regulate and reduce greenhouse gases, with provisions included for information and resource sharing with other federal agencies such as the Departments of Agriculture and Energy. Absent from this Order was any language of mandatory caps on carbon dioxide emissions or timetables for results (see: no teeth). In essence, the order gives more time for federal agencies to study the problem, but no directives to actually solve it.
The second event was the outright rejection of the German-proposed global warming declaration for the G8 summit. Offered by German Chancellor Angela Merkel as a critical topic on this year's G8 agenda, her proposal set greenhouse gas reduction targets of 50% of 1990 levels by 2050, an ambitious post-Kyoto pledge. The Bush administration's diplomatic envoy rejected this language, holding firm to the position that mandatory caps on emissions are unacceptable, and instead offered their more preferable –yet considerably more difficult to enforce – solution of alternative energy technology sharing.
One might roll their eyes at the seeming predictability and repetitiousness of the Bush climate change position. Indeed, since Bush rejected the Kyoto protocol, the White House’s stubbornness to discuss realistic solutions to reduce greenhouse gases has been the modus operandi. This fact is not forgotten by Europe, specifically Chancellor Merkel and outgoing Prime Minister Tony Blair. They perceive President Bush’s policy side-step as a contrivance to subvert an already heavily negotiated and widely agreed upon G8 climate proposal.
The Merkel submitted and Blair supported proposal demarks a clear line in the sand that the Bush administration will not cross. The proposal, on top of establishing mandatory caps on emissions, would also pledge the formation of a global carbon market, a process that they have agreed the United Nations should lead. The United States has rejected these three initiatives. Bush’s own proposal, offered in his speech last week, is now perceived by the European G8 members as a maneuver to split the G8 and create enmity on the climate issue.
The consequences of the Bush strategy will play out this week in Germany. Two outcomes are likely. The first, which the Bush Administration is surely playing for, is a renewed enforcement of their climate position: specifically, that mandatory caps are economically incapacitating and that it is preferable to incentivize climate-fighting technological solutions through subsidies and reduced tariffs.
The second outcome, which Merkel and Blair fear, is a splitting of the G8 membership over the climate question. The consequence of this will probably parallel previous international agreements to climate change: Europe will extend the mandatory emissions caps past 2012, while the United States supports non-binding dateless agreement reducing carbon dioxide emissions. By splitting the G8, the Bush administration strengthens its policy and allows its go-it-alone approach to continue.
The climate question is one of many issues to be discussed during the G8 summit. Others include aid to Africa, and perhaps even Iranian sanctions – a key foreign policy objective the Bush administration cannot achieve unless it has the support of the other G8 members. While these diplomatic questions remain in separate discussion camps, it may behoove the United States to bridge some political gaps with the climate issue, realigning the United States with both political and scientific reality.
-Richard Meyer
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